CHURCH HISTORY

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PARIS MASTERS OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES AND IDEAS OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM[1]

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To introduce the theme of this essay, there are few statements more fitting than the caustic judgment of Albertus Magnus on those whom he considered the enemies of freedom in his day.[2] Reproaching the petty obscurantism of the opponents of Aristotle's philosophy, he described these men, whose sole aim in reading books was to find something to condemn, as stagnant themselves in intellectual inertia, and seeking always to paralyze others into their own state. It was men like these, he said, who killed Socrates, and whose plots forced Aristotle to leave Athens with the words, "I shall not give the Athenians a second chance of sinning against philosophy." In the world of learning, according to Albertus, such bitter, bilious men are like the liver in the body; "they try to inject their own bitterness into everyone else, and to prevent others from pursuing truth in the sweetness of society."

As these remarks suggest, when medieval university masters felt impelled to justify their freedom in the face of attempts to impose restrictions on teaching and inquiry, they were not usually inspired to analyse the problem or to expound a theory. But if they did not produce the elaborate justifications of intellectual liberty which we owe to a Milton and a Mill, many of these teachers and scholars were, like Albertus Magnus, neither mute nor inglorious in their defense of the freedom they regarded as essential to the performance of their functions. For as the kind of freedom they actually enjoyed, which often exceeded their explicit claims, was to a large extent determined by the materials and methods of teaching, so their conceptions of freedom derive from their preoccupation with their functions as teachers. It is my purpose to examine here the more significant of these ideas, and especially those which are most relevant to the problems of dissent and conformity, as they were expressed by certain masters of arts and theology in the University of Paris in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Though this approach, confined as it is to a single university, offers a somewhat limited perspective on medieval conceptions of intellectual freedom, it should bring into sharp focus both their essential characteristics and the contexts in which they usually emerged. The University of Paris was pre-eminent during this period in those

disciplines—philosophy and theology—in which masters confronted the problems most directly, and were, therefore, most articulate in their efforts to resolve them. Their ideas of the nature and limits of freedom were shaped in an environment in which the corporate structure of the faculty provided an autonomous framework for the development of philosophy and theology as independent disciplines. Thus in the setting of the faculties of arts and theology, there gradually evolved divergent conceptions of truth and the freedom with which it should be pursued.

This divergence was sharpened by those conflicts—of corporate and ecclesiastical authorities, of ideas and intellectual movements—which were more pervasive than was sweetness in the society of masters. The Paris faculties of arts and theology were, in particular, the principal arenas of the great struggles in which the issues of freedom were acutely posed.[3] For if the challenge of Greek and Moslem philosophy and science aggravated, for individuals, the discordances between reason and faith, or between reason and authority, it also intensified the larger conflict between the philosophical spirit and the theological tradition which underlay the relations, and the internal development, of these two faculties. The faculty of theology was, moreover, a major battleground in the long and Protean struggle between the mendicant orders and the secular clergy, which became a focus for opposing conceptions of ecclesiastical government and for divergences on questions of doctrine and authority.[4] The periodic crises in these major conflicts were, in fact, almost always the occasions for those restrictive measures which often provoked the most explicit and revealing assertions of freedom.

It was in the greatest crisis in the history of the arts faculty, during the years from 1270 to 1277, that Siger of Brabant expressed most clearly the ideas of intellectual freedom which had been developing in this environment since the early thirteenth century.[5] From this time, it seems, there had been masters of arts who wanted to devote themselves to the study of philosophy in all its branches, and there had been theologians who opposed this enterprise, and on occasion with the hostility that reached its climax in the Paris condemnation of 1277.[6] Of this hostility, which cut short his teaching career, Siger himself was the most notable victim.[7]

Though the thought of this famous master, whose "eternal light" still shines in Dante's *Paradiso,* has been variously interpreted, it is commonly agreed that he was, as one of his students said, "the most distinguished teacher of philosophy" of his day.[8] In this role, and as the protagonist of philosophy in its struggle with the theologians, Siger not only proclaimed his discipline to be a completely autonomous sphere

of inquiry, but, more specifically, asserted the right of its teachers to discuss the doctrines of philosophy freely, without regard to their "truth" or "error." For, he declared, "though the opinions of Aristotle may be contrary to the truth, they should not be concealed by those who undertake to expound his works."[9]

These assertions were the logical outcome of that expansion of philosophical studies which had transformed a center of the liberal arts into the faculty of "rational, moral, and natural philosophy."[10] By Siger's time, the function of its masters was defined, not as the pursuit of truth, but as the exposition of those works of Aristotle which were now their official texts. To proceed philosophically, in their view, was to pursue the opinions of the philosophers, rather than the truth.[11] As teachers, they followed assiduously the rational methods and procedures elaborated by their predecessors.[12] Both lectures and disputations now centered on the discussion of questions or problems raised by their texts or detached from them. To the resolution of the conflicting arguments presented in these discussions were then applied all the resources of the art of logic which was regarded as the "path of reason," the "way to the principles of all methods."[13]

In their teaching these masters had developed not only a method, but a "manner of speaking," a precise and varied terminology for the presentation of arguments, doctrines and solutions, which enabled them to say almost anything disputatively, to discuss freely the most diverse opinions, even those which were contrary to faith.[14] When he was proceeding by the method of doubt or inquiry, or when he was simply presenting or "reciting" the arguments of his philosophical authorities, a master might venture any idea or opinion. Only when he "asserted" a conclusion or "determined" a question did he regard himself as committed to a particular solution. The use of "probable" argument, which had evolved from the procedures of dialectics, made it possible also to offer a theory or opinion as "probable," even when it could not be defended as true.[15]

The opportunities offered by these methods were most freely exploited by the considerable minority of masters led by Siger of Brabant, whose sole aim was to teach the philosophy of Aristotle independently of the concerns of theology and the interference of theologians.[16] Their spirit, doubtless stimulated by opposition, is evident in their confidence in reason and in their own capacities, in their glorification of philosophy, and in their disregard of theology and its traditional primacy.[17] Not only did their teaching arouse the alarm of their more conservative colleagues, who attempted in their statutes of 1272 to define the limits of philosophy and to impose restraints on freedom of discussion.[18] It also inflamed

the antagonism of the theologians, which was expressed first in Bishop Tempier's censure of 1270, and much more comprehensively seven years later, in his syllabus of 219 errors drawn largely from the works of masters of arts.[19] But still more seriously, the freedom with which these teachers explored the eternal and necessary universe of Aristotle, especially as it was interpreted by his Greek and Moslem commentators, could only sharpen its inescapable discordances with the created and contingent world that is harmonious with Christian faith. The masters who in their pursuit of the Philosopher's opinions advanced too far into his deterministic world thus confronted in their most acute forms the dilemmas of the Christian teacher of secular disciplines in this period.

In their efforts to resolve these dilemmas they did not resort to the doctrine of a "two-fold truth," as their adversaries and some modern scholars have charged.[20] Nor did they follow Averroes, in whose careful separation of three types of speculation—philosophical, theological, and that pertaining to popular religious faith—the primacy of philosophy was acknowledged.[21] Some Paris masters were apparently content to present the conclusions required by their philosophical arguments, and simply to declare that these were contrary to faith.[22] But others, including Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia, sought to separate the spheres of philosophy and faith by distinguishing between two spheres of inquiry, each with its proper methods—the natural order, which is the object of rational inquiry and the province of the philosopher, and a supernatural order of faith and revelation.[23]

In this they followed a tradition of long standing among Christian thinkers who wanted to devote themselves to the study of philosophy or "nature." At least as early as the twelfth century, Adelard of Bath and others had made this distinction, claiming that there need be no conflict between explanations in terms of "natural causes" and those in terms of Divine Providence.[24] Thirteenth century teachers of philosophy—not only the "radical Aristotelians," but the more moderate masters of arts, and theologians like Albertus Magnus—frequently pointed out that they were "not now discussing divine miracles, but the things of nature by natural explanation."[25] In making this disclaimer, they stressed the idea that these two languages have nothing in common, that a statement in one can be neither verified nor contradicted in the other.

But in their efforts to inhabit "divided and distinguished worlds," these masters faced another difficulty, for they explicitly acknowledged the primacy of faith, which they identified with truth.[26] Since, as Siger declared, the philosopher, however great he may be, can err, no one should deny catholic truth on account of any philosophical argument,

even though he does not know how to refute it.[27] Yet this, he said, does not seem fully satisfactory to the intellect; "if the knowledge of truth is the resolution of doubts, it does not appear that anyone can apprehend the truth and not know how to refute the arguments opposed to it."[28] Such statements as these reveal the heart of the dilemma experienced by Siger and others who, though evidently sincere in their desire to adhere to Christian faith, were obliged to solve their problems intellectually, by the exclusively rational methods of the master of arts.[29] If faith alone was equated with truth, how were the contradictions between revealed truths and philosophical propositions to be resolved, and how was philosophical inquiry to be defined and its independence and free pursuit justified? These questions were never satisfactorily answered by the masters of this period, and their failure underlines the limitations of their ideas of freedom, which were circumscribed quite as much by their conception of philosophy and its methods as by the compulsions of faith. Their difficulties illustrate clearly the deficiencies of Aristotelian natural philosophy, "a mélange of philosophical and positive knowledge," in which science is bound up with metaphysics.[30]

Though they defined the sphere of philosophy as the order of nature, the problems which dominated the teaching of these thirteenth century followers of the Philosopher were such metaphysical problems as the eternity of the world and the unicity of the intellective soul. And though they acknowledged that the degree of certitude which was to be achieved by dialectical methods was only "probable," the kind of certitude they were really seeking was ontological or metaphysical truth.[31] Dante's description of Siger "syllogizing the truths that brought him into hatred" is, from this point of view, most fitting, because it emphasizes the confidence of this master and his colleagues in logic as the way to truth, and suggests their confusion of dialectical and demonstrative proof.[32] Unlike some of their contemporaries at Oxford, they failed to recognize, or at least to use, the possibilities of empirical method and of "probable" or hypothetical inquiry which, more fully developed, might have released them from their difficulties.[33]

But if the "path of reason" had led these masters into a blind alley from which they could not escape as philosophers seeking truth, they could at least take the route to freedom offered by their aims and methods as teachers. Their assertions are thus, it seems, the earliest instances in the Western tradition in which the conception of freedom in teaching is explicitly founded, not on the idea of the pursuit of truth, but on the right of the teacher to discuss his materials regardless of their truth. This right was, in fact, commonly assumed by masters from the late thirteenth century onwards, for as one of them remarked,

> Although there may be some errors in philosophy, it is expedient that these errors should be taught and heard, not in order that men may believe them, but so that they may know how to oppose them according to the way of reason, by philosophical methods.[34]

Though thirteenth century masters of arts had not yet fully grasped the notion of philosophy as independent inquiry, their efforts had won the virtual autonomy of their discipline in relation to theology. Within the framework of this autonomy, their successors in the next century were to develop a clearer conception of philosophical inquiry and of their own functions and freedom, not merely as teachers of philosophy but as "philosophers" engaged in the search for truth. Stimulated by the diversity of interests, methods, and currents of thought which now characterized their environment, masters of arts in the fourteenth century carried much further earlier attempts to refine and explore the order of nature.[35] In this enterprise, they carved out for themselves a domain for which Ockham's claim would be made, that

> assertions especially concerning natural philosophy, which do not pertain to theology, should not be solemnly condemned or forbidden by anyone, since in such matters everyone should be free to say freely whatever he pleases.[36]

The achievement of freedom is perhaps best exemplified in the works of John Buridan, who taught in the arts faculty for at least thirty years, from 1328 to 1358, and was praised by his contemporaries as a "famous philosopher."[37]

In the teaching of this master are strikingly displayed all the tendencies of thought and methods of inquiry which were to contribute to the growing separation of science from metaphysics in this period, and eventually to make "the whole moving universe" rather than the texts of Aristotle the subject of natural philosophy.[38] Buridan's lectures show how freely the master of arts might now use these texts as a point of departure for independent inquiry founded on the investigation of specific problems regarding nature. What is particularly significant in the exploration of such problems by Buridan and many of his colleagues is the transformation of "probable" argument from a device of disputation into a mode of inquiry which permitted the use of hypotheses rather than principles as the bases of scientific explanation.[39]

Equally important was the increasing use of empirical methods in the testing, and sometimes in the construction, of these hypotheses. A variety of influences fostered the noteworthy empiricism of Buridan's approach to the problems of nature; for he was always happiest about the validity of his arguments when he could say, "I have tested it!"[40] Not only were the works and ideas of the Oxford followers of Robert Grosseteste now well known at Paris, but its masters had long

been exposed to the scientific studies of Albertus Magnus and his disciples.[41] Buridan himself relied heavily on the work of still another group, the Paris astronomers who supplied masters whose interests lay in physics and other branches of natural philosophy with both a model of empirical method and an arsenal of ammunition with which to attack the doctrine of Aristotle.[42]

Deficient as the use of hypothetical and empirical inquiry still was, it encouraged the development by these masters of a more pluralistic view of truth, and the freedom necessary for its pursuit. In their exploration of nature, Buridan and others were no longer looking for absolute metaphysical certainty, but for explanations of natural phenomena which were sufficient to "save the appearances."[43] Buridan's treatment of many problems reveals a clear grasp of the notion that "the verification of a particular theory did not exclude the possibility that there might be other theories which were true in the same sense."[44] His awareness of the complexities of the problem of certitude is further reflected in his statement that a blade of straw presented to the senses may give rise to a hundred theories or questions, on which the most learned doctors will have contrary opinions.[45] On each of these theories, one of the two opponents in any discussion, or perhaps both, will fall into error. Yet if one could not always satisfy himself with arguments or solutions, it was still necessary at least to consider and discuss the ideas of one's opponents, for such investigation might offer an opportunity of discovering truth.

Their concerns and methods thus tended to mitigate, for most masters of this period, the conflicts between philosophy and faith, and they were, besides, freed for the most part by the self-imposed limitations of their faculty from the necessity of taking account of theological or religious considerations.[46] But at least occasionally a master was confronted in his teaching with the requirements of faith or the restrictions which the theologians had attempted to impose, especially in the condemnation of 1277. Moderate by nature, Buridan seemed able, as did most of his contemporaries, to balance and accommodate the demands of faith and reason. For this master, the kind of conformity required by his environment appears to have been easy. As he remarked, no one should let himself be drawn from the common path by insoluble arguments in matters of faith and morals; for "he who believes that he knows everything, and will not yield in any of his opinions is a fool."[47] But in his attitude towards theology and theologians, Buridan commonly displayed the typical independence of the master of arts. When he was discussing questions which lay on the borderline between philosophy and theology, he was willing to express a certain deference for the opinions of the theologians, but he was al-

ways concerned to defend his own freedom of discussion and inquiry within the now greatly enlarged domain of nature.[48]

If the ideas of freedom expressed by masters of arts were shaped by the careful definition and intensive exploration of their philosophical province, the ideas of the theologians derive from the expansion of their discipline to encompass "all these things which pertain to the divine law and to that of nature."[49] For though its basic texts always remained the same—the Bible and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard—the study of theology was transformed as a result of its invasion by the problems and methods of philosophy. The extent of this transformation by the late thirteenth century is evident in the works of Godfrey of Fontaines, a distinguished master of his faculty from 1286 to 1300 and a spirited exponent of the freedom and authority of the theologian.[50] His ideas on these subjects are most fully stated in his quodlibets, the great magisterial disputations in which any subject might be discussed, from theological and philosophical problems and the issues of ecclesiastical and secular politics to the problems of social and economic life.[51] In these lively debates, the master was expected to declare his opinions freely, employing all the methods of teaching and inquiry which, from their center of developments in the faculty of arts, had now penetrated theology and other fields.

When theologians were called upon, as they often were in these disputations, to define theology and its relations with faith, they proclaimed their discipline a science and the highest science. Yet since it was subordinate to faith, many masters argued, with Godfrey of Fontaines, that as a science theology was imperfect because its principles, the articles of faith, do not provide scientific certitude.[52] The disagreement among theologians as to the nature of theology and the certitude of its principles did not, however, limit its scope, but served to extend it. For if the theologian did not have the evidence of principles in his own science, he must, in his pursuit of truth, use the procedures and materials of all sciences.[53] It was this comprehensive conception of theology as a speculative science which supported the claims of its masters not only to freedom, but also to authority in almost every sphere.

The theologians of Paris during this period were, in fact, increasingly concerned to define and enlarge their role, the role of the professional intellectual, in the greater world outside the university. Their discussions of their functions are the more significant because they were not simply academic, but the outcome of real and often violent conflict over contemporary issues. In these controversies, defending the truth as they saw it, masters of theology both justified their free-

dom and enhanced their prestige as arbiters and judges of truth in the larger spheres of the Church and secular society.

In one such conflict, inspired by the condemnation of 1277 which he regarded as "a scandal to both masters and students in the university," Godfrey of Fontaines was moved to express his views generally regarding the freedom of the theologian and the problem of doctrinal authority in the Church.[54] Although the limits to be observed in theological teaching and speculation were rarely defined, there seems to have been common agreement that, as Godfrey stated, those articles of faith which have been determined by the authority of Scriptures and the Church should be accepted and affirmed as certain.[55] For no Catholic should hold or declare opinions opposed to these decisions. But, in the view of this master, all other questions, on which there was not this certitude, should be freely discussed, with "great moderation and temperance," according to the method of probability.[56]

Far from moderate in his own opposition to the decree of 1277, Godfrey upheld the right of the theologian not only to seek out, in free discussion, the truth about the articles themselves, but to decide what authority pertained to the bishop in these matters. If, he said, there could be a diversity of views about the doctrines condemned, there could certainly be contrary opinions regarding the validity of a decree that manifestly hindered "the pursuit and knowledge of truth."[57] He himself rejected categorically the right of such prelates as Bishops Tempier and Peckham, with their limited territorial competence, to declare any opinion heretical, and thus to assume that matters of faith could be decided in and for a single locality.[58] In his view, since the condemnation of doctrines as heretical pertained to the whole community of the faithful, they could not be condemned except by that community, or by a council of prelates, or by the pope.[59]

The problem of authority, and especially their own authority, was subjected to more searching examination by this master and his colleagues as a result of their involvement in the current controversy over the mendicant privileges. This new phase of the persistent struggle between the mendicant orders and the secular clergy was opened in 1281, when Pope Martin IV granted to the friars the rights of preaching and hearing confessions without seeking the permission of the bishops.[60] Increasingly resistant to papal policies of centralization and traditionally hostile to their chief agents, the friars, the secular theologians of Paris were vigorous in their opposition to these privileges and in their assertion of their own right to discuss important issues freely. If, one of them remarked, they could hold disputations concerning the Gospel, why could they not also discuss the privileges?[61] In

such matters, they repeatedly insisted, it was the duty of the theologian to uphold publicly what seemed to him true, no matter how much his views might offend the rich and powerful.[62] As Godfrey of Fontaines put it, "there are few who can be blamed for excess of frankness in speaking the truth, but many indeed for silence."[63]

In the discussions of these years, it was not simply their rights as defenders of the truth that these masters were defining, but their functions as judges of truth, their right specifically to investigate the concordance of the actions of popes and prelates with the truths of faith. Since, it was said, papal decrees could be doubtful, theologians should both discuss them and reach decisions concerning them.[64] Already the Paris masters were claiming the authority in matters of ecclesiastical government and doctrine which they were in fact to exercise in the next century, when one of their number could declare that it was the function of doctors of theology in the Church to determine what is true and what is false in the faith, and the function of prelates to define officially what has been discussed and decided by the theologians.[65] But, in spite of the enormous prestige achieved by these masters, throughout this period their own judgments were resisted as strenuously as they themselves on occasion resisted the decisions of popes and bishops.[66] The unresolved problem of doctrinal authority, evident in the debates of the late thirteenth century, grew more acute in the great controversies of the fourteenth century, when the divisions and conflicts of authority in the Church were to culminate in the schism and the conciliar movement.

It is against the background of these commonly accepted, though sometimes conflicting, ideas of freedom and authority that the more specific problems of individual dissent must be considered. For only within the society of masters, safeguarded by rights and privileges, could the individual exercise his functions, and it was corporate rather than ecclesiastical authority that constituted the most direct and effective challenge to his independence. His freedom, both in teaching and in the speculation which was an outcome of teaching, had to be sought in conformity as well as in conflict with his colleagues, within disciplines whose materials and methods were established by custom. Though, in general, the individual apparently enjoyed a large measure of independence in the corporation, there are some notable instances of obstinate adherence to dissenting opinions which illuminate this question more fully.

One of these is the case of the Franciscan, Peter Olivi, a leader of the Spiritual party in his order and one of the most independent and original of late thirteenth century theologians.[67] In 1283, his writings, chiefly his lectures as a bachelor of theology, were examined by

a commission of Paris theologians, who censured a number of his doctrines, including his opinions on the hotly disputed question of poverty.[68] To this censure, Olivi's response was a letter to his judges, a defense of his own views, in which he criticized their procedures and rejected their authority, on the grounds that he could not submit to their opinions, "however solemn or respected," on the Catholic faith or the Sacred Scripture or the determination of pope or general council, unless he was convinced "by the clearer light of reason" that their opinion was truly that of the Catholic faith and the Holy Scripture.[69] On his deathbed, some fifteen years later, this resolute friar, expressing his views still more strongly, asserted that in matters of faith he could adhere to no human opinion, neither his own nor that of anyone else, unless this was demonstrated to him by reason.[70] Without such proof, he did not consider it necessary to agree with anyone, "excepting only the Roman pontiff and a general council."[71]

Olivi's statements are especially revealing, because they point up a most significant characteristic of the conception of freedom which developed in the environment of the university. Even in the case of those individuals who were most independent and even intransigent in their dissent from majority opinion, claims to freedom were almost never founded explicitly on a subjective appeal to the conscience of the individual, but rather on the objective grounds of his intellectual functions. This is not to say that the idea of conscience is not sometimes evident in the assertions of individuals, for their moral obligation to pursue and teach and speak the truth is an important element in their conceptions of freedom. But this obligation seems commonly to have been regarded as one pertaining to individuals as members of a group committed to the performance of certain duties.

The objective character of this idea of freedom is emphasized in the remark of Siger of Brabant that anyone should be condemned who accepted an opinion simply because it was pleasing to him or out of love for the one proclaiming it, and not on the grounds of reason.[72] And when the university master appealed to reason, he had in mind not just the innate intellective capacity, but more particularly, this capacity as it was externalized in those rational procedures on which all of his teaching and speculation were founded. It is significant that in almost every instance in which an individual justified himself or his ideas against criticism or censure, he based his defense on the requirements of these methods. He could thus claim that his statements had been misinterpreted, that they had been divorced from their context of argument and discussion, that he had made these statements disputatively, or that he was proceeding by the method of inquiry rather than asserting something as certain.[73] His opponents might possibly

charge, as they did in at least one case, the censure of Nicholas of Autrecourt in 1346, that this was a "foxy excuse," used in order to express unorthodox or heretical opinions.[74] But, in general, the necessities of those methods by means of which all masters taught, and pursued the truth, provided a most acceptable basis for claims to freedom of discussion.

What these teachers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries owed, in their notion of their functions and freedom, to the Greek ideal of the intellectual life is suggested by the reference of Albertus Magnus to Socrates and Aristotle as fellow-victims of the forces of obscurantism.[75] For medieval masters, this conception was distilled in a work of constant and pervasive influence, the *Nichomachean Ethics,* and especially in those passages in which Aristotle extols the philosopher's life and the intellectual virtues, portraying the great-spirited man as free of speech and devoted to truth.[76] Few phrases of Aristotle were more often repeated by masters of these centuries, and in contexts more significant for intellectual freedom, than the words "friend of truth" by which the philosopher's duty was described.[77] How direct and profound was the impact of the classical ideal of truth and freedom on some masters of arts is evident both in their teaching and in their devotion to an independent philosophy. In his treatise on the philosopher's life, for example, Boetius of Dacia triumphantly asserted the Greek conception of the aristocracy of thought.[78] And in the commentaries on the *Ethics* by several of his late thirteenth century contemporaries at Paris, the intellectual is not only virtuous, obedient to the laws, and useful to the community, but he alone may achieve the highest nobility and perfection possible to human nature. Those whose function is the contemplation of truth are raised above kings and princes.[79]

As to the problem of "truth," while in the ultimate sense, for Christian scholars and thinkers, Truth was One, to be sought but not fully apprehended in this life, in the temporal sphere they were coming to be more concerned with the differentiation of truths than with the search for a single ground of truth. The evolution of divergent approaches to truth was fostered not only by the development of philosophy and theology as independent disciplines, but by procedures in which "an immense variety of discrepant opinions were made to face each other, and were subjected to profound and acute criticism."[80] As masters grew more sharply aware of the complexities of the problem of truth, and sometimes more sceptical regarding the possibility of its discovery, they became more interested in the search for truth than in its definite assertion.

Their concern with what could be said and discussed, in their pur-

suit of truth, rather than with what might be thought or claimed as certain, underlines once again the fact that their ideas of freedom were essentially the ideas of a corporation of teachers. Its members, full of confidence in their intellectual achievements and their corporate power, came to hold a most exalted and comprehensive view of their role in society. But their basic function was teaching, and their fundamental freedom was the liberty of the teacher first explicitly asserted by Siger of Brabant. Whatever the limitations of their freedom, in theory and practice, and whatever their divergences and disagreements, both masters of arts and theologians would have agreed with the statement of Godfrey of Fontaines, which should have meaning also for those who still perform the same functions, that

> to chain and bind men immovably to one opinion in matters concerning which there may be a diversity of views . . . is to hinder the pursuit and knowledge of truth. For since conflict of opinion among learned men will stimulate debate and discussion . . . the truth will be discovered more readily if men are left free to seek out in discussion not what is more pleasing, but what agrees with right reason.[81]

1. The present essay is a slightly revised version of a paper read in a panel on ''Dissent and Conformity in the High Middle Ages'' at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 28, 1954. It is based on portions of my doctoral dissertation, *Intellectual Freedom and Its Limitations in the University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Columbia University, 1952, now available through University Microfilms).

2. Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in libros VIII Politicorum Aristotelis*, Epilogue (*Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, 38 vols., Paris, 1890-1899, VIII, 803-804). *Cf.* his remarks on the opponents of Aristotelianism in *Commentarii in epistolas B. Dionysii Areopagitae*, VIII, 2 (*Opera omnia*, XIV, 910).

3. The official repords pertaining to the history of the university and its faculties are contained in the *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols., Paris, 1889-1897 (hereafter cited as *Chartularium*). There is no general study of the Paris arts faculty in this period; for its intellectual history, and its relations with the faculty of theology, in the thirteenth century, the most useful work is Vol. II (*Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme*) of F. Van Steenberghen's *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites*, 2 vols., ''Les Philosophes Belges,'' XII (1939), XIII (1942). For the faculty of theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see P. Feret, *La Faculté de théologie de Paris et ses*

docteurs les plus célèbres du moyen age, 4 vols., Paris, 1894-1896.

4. The background and the constitutional aspects of this struggle are discussed by H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, (new ed., F M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols., Oxford, 1936), I, 370-395; 550-558. On its varied significance for intellectual freedom, see McLaughlin, *Intellectual Freedom*, pp. 253-257; 304-306; 316-334; 336-338; 372-381.

5. The present state of research concerning Siger of Brabant is surveyed in a recent article by F. Van Steenberghen, ''Siger of Brabant,'' *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951), 11-27. A considerable number of his surviving philosophical works have been published and interpreted by Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites*. and by P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroisme latin au XIIIe siècle*: *étude critique et documents inédits*, 2 vols., Louvain, 1908-1911 (''Les Philosophes Belges,'' VI and VII). Other works have been edited by F. Stegmüller, ''Neuaufgefundene Quaestionen des Siger von Brabant,'' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, III (1931), 172-182; P. Delhaye, *Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote*, ''Les Philosophes Belges,'' XV (1941); A. Maier, ''Nouvelles questions de Siger de Brabant sur la Physique d'Aristote,'' *Revue philosophique Louvain*, XLIV (1946), 497-513; P. C. A. Graiff, *Sigeri de Brabantia Questiones in Metaphysicam*, Louvain, 1939, and *Questions sur la Metaphy-*

sique, "*Philosophes Médiévaux*," I (1948).

6. For the opposition of theologians to the activities of masters of arts, see *Chartularium*, I, 47-48, 70-71, 78-79, 138, 141, and M. Grabmann, *I Divieti ecclesiastici de Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX*, Rome, 1941, especially pp. 57-69. The individuals and works which aroused this opposition are discussed by G. C. Capelle, *Amaury de Bène: étude sur son panthéisme formel*, "Bibliothèque Thomiste," XVI (1932); G. Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210: I. David de Dinant: étude sur son panthéisme matérialiste; II. Alexandre d'Aphrodise: aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique*, "Bibliothèque Thomiste," V (1925) and VI (1926).

7. Summoned to appear before the Inquisitor-General of France in November, 1276, he appealed to the papal court where he spent the years until his death in 1284 (Mandonnet, II, 253-254).

8. Dante, *Paradiso*, Canto X, 1. 136. Pierre Dubois refers to Siger as "precellentissimus doctor philosophie" in *De recuperatione terre sancte*, ed. C. Langlois, Paris, 1891, p. 121.

9. *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, III. 15 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 138, 139-140).

10. The quoted phrase appears in a letter of the university, February, 1254, (*Chartularium*, I, 252).

11. Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, VI (Mandonnet, II, 164); *De aeternitate mundi* (Mandonnet, II, 42). *Cf.* the definition of philosophy by a contemporary master in an anonymous treatise quoted in Van Steenberghen, II, 686-687, n. 5.

12. On the development of these methods, see especially, M. Grabmann, "Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristotelesstudiums im Mittelalter," *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Abteilung* (hereafter cited as *SBA*), 1939, Heft 5, and "Die Sophismataliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXXVI (1940), Heft 1.

13. The phrase "via rationis" is frequently used by masters of this period to describe their methods of teaching and inquiry; see, e.g., Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, II (Fragmentum commentarii) and III. 15 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 29, 138), and Albertus Magnus, *De generatione et corruptione*, I.v.5 (*Opera omnia*, IV, 394).

14. The statutes of the arts faculty, 1272, deploring the abuses arising from current methods of discussion, offer some examples of their freedom (*Chartularium*, I, 499-500). For others, see Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, I, (Mandonnet, II, 145); *De aeternitate*

mundi, III (Mandonnet, II, 140); *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, III. 18 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 150-151); and M. Grabmann, "Die Aristoteleskommentare des Simon von Faversham," *SBA*, 1933, Heft 3, p. 11.

15. Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, III. 19 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 154-156). On the development and use of "probable" argument in the thirteenth century, see J. P. Mullally, ed., The *'Summulae logicales'* of Peter of Spain, "University of Notre Dame Publications in Medieval Studies," VIII (1945), especially pp. 85-87, and K. Michalski, "La Criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIVe siècle," *Bulletin de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, Classe d'histoire et de philosophie*, 1925, pp. 55-62, 116-117.

16. This "radical" minority was described as the "pars Sigerii" (*Chartularium*, I, 523, 526-527).

17. These attitudes are clearly expressed in such works as those of Boetius of Dacia (M. Grabmann, "Die opuscula *De summo bono sive de vita philosophi* und *De sompniis* des Boetius von Dacien," *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, [2 vols., Munich, 1926-1936], II, 200-224), and Siger of Brabant (e.g., *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, 2, and *Quaestiones de anima*, III. 20 [Van Steenberghen, I, 166, 152]).

18. *Chartularium*, I, 499-500.

19. *Ibid.*, I, 486-487 (the condemnation of 1270); 543-555 (the condemnation of 1277).

20. The notion of a "twofold truth" is not to be found in the surviving works of contemporary masters of arts; it was attributed to them by their opponents (*Chartularium*, I, 543, and St. Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. S. E. Fretté and P. Maré, [34 vols., Paris, 1871-1880], XXVII, 112).

21. L. Gauthier, *Accord decisif de la religion et de la philosophie, traité d'Ibn Rochd (Averroès), traduit et annoté*, Algiers, 1905, especially pp. 19-24, 37-38. See also L. Gauthier, *La théorie d'Ibn Rochd (Averroès) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie*, "École de lettres d'Alger. Publication: Bulletin de correspondance africaine," Vol. 41 (1909), 57-59, 108-111, 116-117.

22. M. Grabmann, "Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung," *SBA*, 1931, Heft 2, pp. 55-60. *Cf.* R. Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroistes' sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,*

(hereafter cited as *AHDL*), XVI (1947-1948), pp. 284-291.

23. Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, VI (Mandonnet, II, 163-164), *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, 2 (Van Steenberghen, I, 165-166), *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, II (Graiff, 1948, pp. 27-29); Boetius of Dacia, *De summo bono* (Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, 212, 215). See also Albertus Magnus, *Comm. in epistolas B. Dionysii Areopagitae*, VII, 2 (*Opera omnia*, XIV, 910, 912), *In IV Sententiarum*, D. XLIII, a. 3 (*Opera omnia*, XXX, 509), and unpublished lectures on the *Nichomachean Ethics*, X (Vat. lat. 722, f. 198vb-199ra).

24. Adelard of Bath, *Quaestiones naturales*, ed. M. Müller, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelaltars*, XXXI (1923), 2, 11-12. See also William of Conches, *De philosophia mundi*, II, 1-3 (Migne, *PL*, CLXXII, 57-58), and Alan of Lille, *De planctu naturae*, III (*Ibid.*, CCX, 446AB).

25. Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, VII (Mandonnet, II, 153), *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, III. 18; V. 24 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 151, 363); Albertus Magnus, *De caelo et mundo*, I.1 (*Opera omnia*, IV, 24), *Commentarii in X libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, I. vii. 5 (*Ibid.*, VII, 114), *In II. Sententiarum*, D. I. a.8 (*Ibid.*, XXVII, 22). *Cf.* A. Maurer, "An Averroistic Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Cambridge Peterhouse Ms. 152," *Mediaeval Studies*, XII (1950), 234.

26. Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, VII, IX (Mandonnet, II, 156-157, 169), *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, III. 15; IV.29 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 139-140; 255-256).

27. *Ibid.*, (Graiff, 1939, p. 165).

28. *Ibid.*, III. 16 (Graiff,1948, p. 145).

29. See, e.g., Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones de anima*, III. 6, 7 (Van Steenberghen, I, 130-135); *Quaestiones super Physicam*, VIII. 6 (*Ibid.*, I, 230).

30. *Cf.* Van Steenberghen, II, 618-619, 623.

31. For Siger's conception of "certitude," see *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, II. 19 (Graiff, 1948, pp. 78-79).

32. Dante, *Paradiso*, Canto X, 1. 138. Cf. Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, II (Graiff, 1948, p. 29).

33. On the Oxford masters of this period and their methodological achievements, see A. C. Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science*, 1100-1700, Oxford, 1953, pp. 135-188.

34. B. N. Lat. 14698, f. 130rb, cited by R. Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroistes'...", *AHDL*, XVI (1947-1948), 227.

35. McLaughlin, *Intellectual Freedom*, pp. 140-156.

36. William of Ockham, *Dialogus*, I. ii. 22 (ed. M. Goldast, *Monarchia s. Romani Imperii sive Tractatus de Jurisdictione Imperiali, Regia, et Pontificia...*, 3 vols., Frankfurt, 1668, II).

37. The most complete accounts of Buridan's life and works are those of E. Faral: "Jean Buridan," *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXVIII, 462-605, and "Jean Buridan: notes sur les manuscrits, les éditions et le contenu de ses ouvrages," *AHDL*, XV, (1946), 1-53.

38. The quoted phrase is from a late fourteenth century treatise on natural philosophy, B. N. Lat. 6752 (Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, [6 vols., New York, 1923-1941], III, 573).

39. For examples of this use of "probable" or hypothetical argument, see *Ioannis Buridani Quaestiones super libros quattuor de caelo et mundo*, II. 7, 22 (ed. E. A. Moody, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, pp. 154-160, 227-229); *Acutissimae philosophi reverendi Magistri Joannis Buridani subtillissimae quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis, Diligenter recognitae et revisae a Magistro Dullaert de Gandavo...*, Paris, 1509, VIII. 12, f. 120v-121v.; *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae Magistri Joannis Buridani in ultima praelectione ab ipso recognitae et emissae, ac ad archetypum diligenter repositae...*, J. Badius Ascensius, Paris, 1518, XII. 9, f. 62 c. See also N. Oresme, *Le Livre du ciel et du monde*, II. 25 (ed. A. D. Menut and A. J. Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies*, IV [1942], 270-279).

40. Instances of Buridan's empiricism are especially common in his unpublished *Quaestiones in libris Meteorologicorum Aristotelis*, discussed by Faral, *HLF*, XXXVIII, 548-559.

41. On the influence of Oxford masters at Paris, see Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste*, pp. 191-212. Early fourteenth century disciples of Albertus Magnus are discussed by M. Grabmann, "Die Aristoteleskommentare des Heinrich von Brüssel," *Sb*, 1943, Heft 10, and C. Stroick, *Heinrich von Friemar (c. 1245-1340), Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologisch Stellung in der Scholastik*, Bonn, 1943.

42. P. Duhem, *Le Système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, (5 vols., Paris, 1913-1917), IV, 6-19, 30-38, 60-69, 76-90; Thorndike, III, 253-267.

43. John Buridan, *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones...*, XII. 9, f. 62c, 72; XII. 11, f. 74; *Quaestiones de caelo*

et mundo, II. 7, 22 (Moody, pp. 159-160, 227).

44. *Cf.* Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste*, p. 134

45. *Iohannis Buridani Philosophi trecentis retro annis celeberrimi Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum Asistotelis ad Nichomachum*, Oxford, 1637, III.1, p. 270.

46. For these limitations, see the statutes of 1272 and the oaths of those incepting in arts in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (*Chartularium*, I, 499-500, 586-587; II, 675), and Buridan's remarks in his *Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros...*, IV, 8.

47. John Buridan, *Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum...*, III. 1, p. 270.

48. See e.g., *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones...*, I. 2, f.3; XII. 9, f. 64; *Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros...*, III. 15; *Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum...*, III. 3, pp. 324-326; *Quaestiones de caelo et mundo*, II. 12 (Moody, pp. 180-181).

49. So Henry of Ghent describes the scope of theology, *Doctoris Solemnis Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo socii Sorbonici et Archidiaconi Tornacensis, Disputationes Quodlibeticae de omni genere divinae sapientiae quam Theologiam vocamus refertissimae*, Paris, 1518, Quodlibet VII, q. 29.

50. On the life and works of Godfrey of Fontaines, see P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, (2 vols., Paris, 1933-1934), I, 396-399; *La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, (2 vols., "Bibliothèque thomiste," V [1925], XXI [1935]), I, 149-168; II, 102-104; M. de Wulf, *Études sur la vie, des oeuvres, et l'influence de Godefroid de Fontaines: un théologien-philosophe du XIIIe siècle*, "Les Philosophes Belges" (hereafter cited as *PB*), I, (1904).

51. The quodlibets of Godfrey of Fontaines have been edited by M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer, J. Hoffmans, *Godfridi de Fontibus Quodlibeta, PB*, II-V, XIV (1904-1933). For a discussion of the general character of the quodlibetic disputations, see Glorieux, *La Littérature quodlibétique*, I, 1-89; II, 1-44.

52. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibets IV, q. 10 (*PB*, II, 261-264); VIII, q. 7 (*PB*, IV, 79-81); IX, q. 20 (*PB*, IV, 288). *Cf.* J. Leclercq, "La Théologie comme science d'après la littérature quodlibétique," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XI (1939), 360-385.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 374.

54. Quodlibet XII, q. 5 (*PB*, V, 103).

55. Quodlibet III, q. 5 (*PB*, II, 195-197).

56. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

57. Quodlibets XII, q. 5 (*PB*, V, 100); VII, q. 18 (*PB*, IV, 95).

58. Quodlibets III, q. 5 (*PB*, II, 207); IX, q. 5 (*PB*, IV, 294).

59. Quodlibet III, q. 9 (*PB*, II 217).

60. *Chartularium*, I, 592-593 (the bull *Ad fructus uberes*). On this controversy, see especially P. Glorieux, "Prélats français contre religieux mendiants," *Revue d'histoire de l'église de France*, XIV (1935), 309-331, 421-495; P. Gratien "Ordres mendiants et clergé seculier à la fin du XIIIe siècle," *Études franciscaines*, XXXVI (1924), 499-518; K. Schleyer, *Die Anfänge des Gallikanismus im 13. Jahrhundert: der Widerstand des französischen Klerus gegen die Privilegierung der Bettelorden*, Berlin, 1937.

61. Henry of Ghent in H. Finke, *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII*, Münster, 1902 pp. v-vi.

62. E.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibets VII, q. 20; X, q. 16; Gervais of Mont Saint-Eloi, Quodlibet, q. 55 (Glorieux, *Littérature quodlibétique*, I, 137).

63. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XII, q. 6 (*PB*, V, 105).

64. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibets XII, q. 24; XV, q. 15; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet III, q. 10 (*PB*, II, 217).

65. *Chartularium*, III, 595 (*Tractatus de schismate*, 1391, possibly written by John Gerson).

66. Notable instances of the resistance of individuals to the decisions of Paris theologians—in addition to the case of Peter Olivi, discussed below—are the cases of Arnald of Villanova in 1300 and, later in the fourteenth century, of Denis Foullechat and John of Monteson (*Chartularium*, II, 86-90; III, 114-124, 182-185; 491-530).

67. On Olivi, see especially F. Ehrle, "Petrus Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften," *Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte*, III (1887), 409-623; D. Douie, *The Nature and Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli*, Manchester, 1932, pp. 81-119; L. Jarraux, "Pierre Jean Olivi, sa vie, sa doctrine," *Études franciscaines*, XLV (1933), 129-153, 227-298, 513-529.

68. "Chronicle of the 24 Generals," *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, III, 374.

69. A part of Olivi's "Letter to his Judges" was published by F. Ehrle, *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte*, III, 418-421.

70. L. Jarraux, "Pierre Jean Olivi...," *Études franciscaines*, XLV, 144, and L. Wadding, *Annales Minorum seu trium ordinum a San Francisco institutorum (1208-1540)*, (8 vols., Lyons, 1625-54), V, 375-380.

71. In spite of this reservation, some of Olivi's opinions were not, in fact, agreeable either to the pope or to a general council, for his apocalyptic doctrines were censured by Pope John XXII

(*Chartularium*, II, 338-339), and the
Council of Vienne condemned a doctrine
concerning the soul closely similar to
that of Olivi (*Corpus iuris canonici,
Clementin.*, I. i. 1).

72. Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Meta-
physicam*, IV. 32 (Graiff, 1948, p. 261).

73. See, e. g., the remarks of Bernard of
Trilia (P. Glorieux, "Le Mémoire justi-
ficatif de Bernard de Trilia, O. P.
(1286)," *Revue des sciences philoso-
phiques et théologiques*, XVII (1928),
407-412, and the statement of Nicholas
of Autrecourt (*Chartularium*, II, 578).

74. *Ibid.*, II, 581-582.

75. See above, n.2.

76. *Nichomachean Ethics*, I. 6, 1096a,
1103a, 1125a.

77. *Ibid.*, 1096a.

78. Boetius of Dacia, *De summo bono* ...
(Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistes-
leben*, II, 209-216).

79. R. Gauthier, "Trois commentaires
'averroistes' ... ", *AHDL*, XVI, 292-
293.

80. The quoted phrase is from E. F. Jacob,
Essays in the Conciliar Epoch, Man-
chester, 1943, p. 88.

81. Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XII,
q. 5 (*PB*, V, 100-101).

THE REFORMATION AND THE DECAY
OF MEDIEVAL IDEALS*

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Over a generation ago Lucien Febvre wrote a short article on the origins of the Reformation which he called "Une question mal posée."[1] Today the question remains just as "mal" as it ever was, and the modern historian who ventures forth into these eristic fields of study will find that time has in no way mitigated the full vigor of the historiographical and theological controversy that surrounds the Protestant Reformation. Some scholars have endeavoured to find the secret of the upheaval in the political machinations of unscrupulous princes and the dynastic ambitions of rival sovereigns. Others of a more social and economic bent prefer some variant of the school of economic determinism. The institutional historian tends to see the Reformation as part of the growth of the centralized national state while yet others say that the revolt was the result of corruption and abuse within the mother institution itself—the Catholic Church. Those who see the movement as part of the vast intellectual revolution of the era, hail the Protestant revolution as the "coming-of-age" of medieval Europe—the emancipation of the laity and the lay mind from the tutelage of the ecclesiastical.[2] It is unnecessary to enumerate further. The only point which I have to contribute along these lines is to say that all of these suggested reasons fail to explain adequately three aspects of the Reformation which historians at least have tended to ignore.

First, the intensity of the appeal of the Protestant doctrines should not be underestimated. It seems impossible that men should have died in agony merely as a symptom of some unseen economic-social-political force. When Hugh Latimer turned to Nicholas Ridley as they stood chained to the stake and said "Be of good comfort, master Ridley, and play the man. We shall this day light such a candle, by God's grace, in England, as I trust shall never be put out,"[3] Latimer was not speaking as the victim of a shapeless and terrifying monster known as an economic force which was inevitably leading him to his martyrdom. We sometimes forget we are still dealing with human history and though words cannot adequately describe the experience of a martyr at the stake, it is assuredly not an expression

of some economic or political force. There is an emotional and psychological phenomenon here which the historian ignores at his peril.

Secondly, there is the problem of the speed with which the Reformation occurred. Consider for a moment the rapidity with which the new creed was accepted. If we date the movement from Luther's posting of the 95 theses in 1517, the revolt had within a single generation grown to international proportions and was shaking the foundations of almost every country of Europe. In contrast, if we date the rise of modern communism from the publication in 1848 of Karl Marx's *Manifesto* it was over sixty years before communism made its first major and permanent conquest in Russia and over a hundred years before it reached what we profoundly hope is its crest. One needs only to realize the lapse of time between the death of Christ and the official adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire in order to appreciate the really extraordinary speed with which the Protestant doctrines spread.

Finally, I would emphasize the internationalism of the Reformation. Only in the most restricted sense was it a German phenomenon spreading out from a central point at Wittenberg. The revolt was a European crisis and ought to be studied on a European level and not as a part of a particular national history.

These then are the aspects of the religious upheaval of the 16th century which still seem to have eluded the historian's scrutiny. Whether it is actually possible to find answers to these problems is, of course, quite another matter, but I suggest, merely as a possible starting point, that the secret to these riddles should be sought for in the distortion of medieval ideals and institutions which characterizes the closing years of the Middle Ages. What I have to say, however, should not be dignified by the description of a "re-interpretation"; at most it is merely a re-emphasis of certain characteristics of Martin Luther's society.

Professor Strayer once wrote that "No civilization can endure unless its members are occasionally willing to sacrifice immediate personal advantage for ultimate social gain. Obviously, this willingness to cooperate for the good of the group requires general agreement on values and objectives."[4] Social cooperation also requires that the "values," the "objectives" or the ideals of a society must be considered both worthy of attainment and possible of attainment. It is this aspect of the late medieval world which should be emphasized—the conflict which existed between the officially sanctioned ideals of society and the actual practices of the average man. The 15th century does not present a very agreeable picture. It is the judgment of one historian that the age produced no appealing characters except John Huss,

Joan of Arc and Savonarola,[5] and it is an interesting commentary upon the times that they should have burned all three of them. However, the men and women of the 15th century were probably no more evil or corrupt than those of other periods; they were simply more uncertain and insecure. The underlying dilemma lay in the fact that it was increasingly difficult to realize in one's own life the ideals of medieval society. The church preached that the surest road to salvation was to be found in the seclusion of a monastery where the temptations of the world could be minimized. Should this prove to be impossible, then the average man was expected constantly to remind himself that it was his duty to approach God as closely as possible and that this life was a testing ground studded with pitfalls to ensnare the unwary sinner. Despite the lurking dangers, however, the church always extended the hope that with reasonable caution and care the ordinary man might expect salvation. Unfortunately, as life became more complex and commercial, the pitfalls became more numerous and more difficult to avoid. Though the church fathers might warn that "Riches exist for man, not man for riches,"[6] most reflective people were well aware that merchants and bankers were growing fat and prosperous and daily risking their immortal souls with apparent impunity. Possibly the most vicious denunciation of the entire economic structure was made by a protestant divine when he wrote:

"All the world is running after those trades and occupations that will bring the most gain. The study of the arts and sciences is set aside for the basest kind of manual work. All the clever heads, which have been endowed by God with capacity for the nobler studies are engrossed by commerce, which nowadays is so saturated with dishonesty that it is the last sort of business an honorable man ought to engage in."[7]

Not only were individuals failing to make the necessary sacrifice to maintain their ideals but the church itself was forsaking those ideals. Ideally the church was catholic and universal; in fact, it was racked by schism and degrading internal anarchy throughout most of the century. In theory the church was designed to minister to things of the spirit; in fact popes and cardinals, bishops and abbots were worldly prelates more interested in the flesh pots and the lawyer's brief than in the "cure of innumerable souls." On almost every level of society the gulf between what was and what ought to be, though perhaps no greater than in the past, was at least much more apparent than before. In a way the artist Cellini unwittingly symbolized this dichotomy between the ideal and the real, between the divine and the profane, which plagued the fifteenth century when he described his design for a large medallion which was to be used as a button on Pope Clement's gown. The work consisted of two elements—a large diamond supplied by

Clement and an effigy of God sitting in his majesty. There was nothing modest about Cellini's description of his masterpiece:

> "I had laid the diamond exactly in the middle of the work, and over it I had represented God the Father sitting in a sort of a free, easy attitude, which suited admirably well with the rest of the piece, and did not in the least crowd the diamond."[8]

For Cellini and the Italian Renaissance, of course, there is no dilemma, since, for the most part, they were willing to live the life of the diamond, of the profane, and let God the Father shift for himself. In the north of Europe, however, men wanted both; they sought some way of harmonizing, without destroying, their ideals with the realities of life.

The effect of this tension within the medieval structure can be seen in two aspects of the 15th and early 16th centuries. It can be perceived first in the gloom, despair and almost pathological sense of guilt which pervades so much of the literature of these years and in the rather unhealthy and neurotic emphasis placed upon the theme of death. Secondly, the growing strain became manifest in what I can only describe as the tendency to replace the qualitative approach to life with a quantitative one.

It is not necessary to reiterate Huizinga's thesis or to present examples of the depression which seems to have settled upon the soul of Europe. I would like to point out, however, that just as many, if not more, examples of necrophilia, the black mass, witchcraft and the Villonesque literature of despondency can be found in the early 16th century as in the previous age so ably described by Huizinga. The calamities of the previous century were still vivid in men's minds— the black death, the civil and national wars, the schism, the atrocities, heresies and brutalities remained a part of the conscience of Northern Europe. We should not allow the humanistic optimism of a man such as Erasmus to blind us to the morbid fascination with death which still existed. This undertone of fear and the obsessive preoccupation with death is clearly seen in a sermon of Bishop Longman of Lincoln preached in 1536. This is the warning he thundered from the pulpit.

> "I was born and came into this world bare and naked, and bare and naked I shall go from it. . . . This fair body of thine which you make so much of, which you deck so preciously, which you set so much by: it shall away. . . . It is but earth, ashes, dust and worm's meat. . . . Serpents, worms and toads shall inherit thy body . . . shall gnaw, eat and devour thy beautiful face, thy fair nose, thy clear eyes, thy white hands, thy goodly body. Remember this thou lord and lady. Remember this thou Christian man and woman."[9]

Even such a balanced individual as Sir Thomas More could not

refrain from somberly reflecting upon the injustice inflicted by the
living upon the dying:

> "When a rabble of fleshly friends, or rather of flesh flies, skip about thy
> bed and thy sick body, like ravens about thy corpse, now almost carrion,
> crying to thee on every side, "What shall I have?" Then shall come thy
> children and cry for their parts; then shall come thy sweet wife, and
> where in thy health haply she spake thee not one sweet word in six
> weeks, now shall she call thee sweet husband and weep with much work,
> and ask thee what shall she have. . . ."

Sir Thomas at the age of 42 was not only interested in the social prob-
lems involved in the act of dying, but he could not keep his mind from
its more physical aspects. With almost clinical accuracy he described
the dying man in the final moments of life:

> "lying in thy bed, thy head shooting, thy back aching, thy veins beat-
> ing, thy heart panting, thy throat rattling, thy flesh trembling, thy mouth
> gaping, thy nose sharpening, thy legs cooling, thy fingers fumbling, thy
> breath shortening, all thy strength failing, thy life vanishing and thy
> death drawing on."[10]

In fact, one needs only to remember that the greatest of all dances of
death was done by Holbein, that the cult of the cemetery of the Inno-
cents in Paris was still immensely popular, and that the popular cus-
tom of having cadavers represented on tombstones reached its height
in the mid-16th century in order to realize that the neurotic, the ab-
normal, the dying was an integral part of the Reformation years.

Finally, we have what I described as the quantitative approach to
life—the assumption that if something is good, then it must be three
times as good when repeated thrice over. In fact, there seems to be a
direct relationship between loss of faith and increase of form and
ceremony. In almost every aspect of medieval life one finds this aim-
less reiteration of the ceremonial as if sheer weight of repetition
could make acceptable what one actually doubted. It has sometimes
been pointed out that this process of galloping mechanization was
striking at the very heart of the medieval creed, the mass itself.[11] If
the benefits accruing from the sacrifice of the Mass were to be desired,
then the logical assumption followed that the more masses you heard
or paid for, the more fruits and benefits you would obtain. For ex-
ample, Henry V of England in his will ordered and paid for the saying
of 20,000 masses for his soul, while the Earl of Oxford on a less royal
scale financed the saying of 2,000 masses. Moreover, there was grow-
ing up around the mass a number of quantitative beliefs such as that
a man never grew old while attending mass and if he could attend
mass constantly one might expect to live forever. It was Savonarola
who put his finger on and condemned most vigorously this tendency
of his age to obscure with the weight of elaboration and repetition
the thing worshipped, when he warned:

"All fervour and inward worship are dead, and ceremonies wax more numerous, but have lost their efficacy. Wherefore we are come to declare to the world that outward worship must give way to inward, and that ceremonies are naught, save as a means of stirring the spirit."[12]

It might be argued that the same process was taking place in art—in the development of high, or what is sometimes called baroque gothic. Certainly the totality of concept of a medieval cathedral seems to break down in the face of a superabundance of intricate details and designs, and the form and method of expression seems to become more important than the idea expressed. This is no place for a discussion of medieval art, but I suggest that in art also one will find this same replacing of the qualitative with the quantitative.

The late Middle Ages is riddled with examples of this same process. It was not mere coincidence that the closing years of the medieval world should have heard more crusades preached than in any previous century yet few could be found who seriously espoused such a cause; or that long and ornate vows were in vogue yet their effect was usually mitigated by some tricky qualification; or that the chivalric code was never more arid and demanding or never more honored in the breach than in the 15th century.

These then are the characteristics of the later Middle Ages which bear most directly upon the Reformation, for it is here that we can detect the explanation for the speed, internationalism and conviction bred by the Protestant revolution. In relating these movements to the Reformation I want to turn briefly to the life of Martin Luther who in a very real sense was the embodiment of a late medieval man. One cannot read his life without sensing the despondency which weighs so heavily upon his mind and the sense of guilt which dominates his early career. If there is any one thing predominant in this youthful Luther, it is his conviction that he did not merit salvation. Like his age he was fearful, oppressed and insecure. He endeavoured to relieve this gloom through a preoccupation with form and ritual on the assumption that the observance of detail, of the rules of his monastery, could substitute for conviction. In the midst of his despair he turned to the only way out open to him—to the reiteration of the old, to endless fasting, praying, mortification of the flesh, and rigid self-discipline. And the less they satisfied, the more he was induced to reassert them. "True it is," Luther confessed in later life, "I was a good monk, and I kept the rules of my order so strictly that I may say that if ever a monk got to heaven by monkery, it was I."[13] Luther's actions seem to me to be very similar to those of the Earl of Oxford and his 2000 masses. Well might Dr. Staupitz's condemnation of Luther's methods stand as an indictment of his entire age when he warned: "Thou art a fool, God is not angry with thee, it is thou who art angry with God."[14]

If indeed Luther was plagued by troubles common to his century, then, when he found personal peace of mind, and the sense of forgiveness, his solution was the answer to the despair of his contemporaries.

Luther's solution to his mental and spiritual anguish was, of course, the doctrine of Justification by Faith. It is not necessary to reiterate the details of the new creed. Two aspects of Luther's solution, however, should be noted. First of all, Luther afforded for his age a method by which a man could bridge the gap between the ideal and the real, and in a very immediate sense he overcame the dichotomy between the divine and the profane. In transforming the whole world into a monastery Luther may have been insisting on a more difficult spiritual standard than the medieval world which had been content with its double road to salvation—the path of the saint and the path for those of merely mortal clay. But Luther's ideals when translated into the patterns of normal life meant that salvation and the bliss of paradise could be attained within this world and not by renouncing this world. In a way the ideal life was made more available, and in making it more available, he somehow made it more worth-while. Moreover, he made it possible for men to live with the knowledge that the path of the saints could not in fact be attained, for, as Professor Bainton has said, "The Christian is bound every day to fail, yet he is never sunk. He is at once a sinner and yet saved."[15] It is very consoling to realize that the impossible is not expected of you and that even as a pedestrian sinner, the gates of the kingdom of heaven are open to you. Whether this ideal is very far removed from the original medieval concept is difficult to say, but it was certainly a marked change from the distortion of ideals so characteristic of late medieval society, and it did apparently supply the north of Europe with a solution to its problems.

Secondly, I would emphasize the sense of hope and optimism which accompanied Luther's discovery. The endless days and nights of anguish and terror vanished. So also did the repetition of ceremonies; likewise the feeling of guilt. There are endless passages bubbling over with this sense of joy and I merely quote from one of the most famous.

"Thereupon I felt myself to be reborn and to have gone through open doors into paradise. The whole of Scripture took on a new meaning, and whereas before the 'justice of God' had filled me with hate, now it became to me inexpressibly sweet in greater love. This passage of Paul became to me a gate to heaven. . . ."[16]

Though the idea that the "just shall live by their faith" was the key to heaven for Luther, it was also the magic formula which seemed to lift the burden, the gloom and depression which had settled upon the soul of much of northern Europe. In order to appreciate the in-

ternational nature of the problem let us turn to another reformer, who quite independently of Luther seems to have reenacted with only slight variation Luther's early history.

Little Thomas Bilney was a student at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and like his German contemporary he also was headed for the bar. Also like Luther, Bilney was an obsessively conscientious individual who was tortured by a sense of his own inadequacy and sinful nature. And he too turned to the quantitative way out of his difficulties. Sir Thomas More wrote of Bilney's early addiction to form for form's sake saying that Bilney was "very fearful and scrupulous and began at the first to fall into such a scrupulous holiness that he reckoned himself bounded so straitly to keep and observe the words of Christ after the very letter, that, because our Lord biddeth us when we will pray [to] enter into our chamber and shut the door to us, he thought it therefore a sin to say his service abroad, and always would be sure to have his chamber door shut unto him while he said his matins."[17] Thus did this introverted and conscience-stricken young man attempt to find solace. Again like Luther, Bilney turned to the Scriptures to find relief and though he was working quite independently, his solution bears striking resemblance to that of the Wittenberg monk. In 1516 he was reading Erasmus' translation of the New Testament when, as he relates in his own words, "he chanced upon this sentence of St. Paul's, 'It is a true saying and worthily of all men to be embraced, that Jesus came into the world to save sinners of whom I am the chief and principle.' "[18] Bilney no less than Martin Luther found consolation in his discovery, a sense of the lifting of sin and oppression, and as he confessed he found "marvellous comfort and quietness so much so that his bruised bones leaped with joy."[19]

It would appear to me that both Luther and Bilney are part of their age—the waning of the Middle Ages. These men were the leaders, the articulators, but they had followers by the legions only because they were themselves part of this movement. That Thomas Bilney was burned at the stake for his mild Protestantism while Luther lived to lead a vast revolutionary movement is eloquent evidence of the importance of local variations, of political forces, and of chance, but the initial inspiration which moved these men was the same, as it was the same in all Europe. If the Reformation is viewed as a part of the closing years of the Middle Ages and as a solution to problems caused by the decay of medieval ideals and institutions, then the speed with which the revolt gained momentum becomes understandable; its European and international aspect becomes fully recognizable; and finally the conviction and courage of the martyrs becomes comprehensible since they now have something worth dying for: they had

found "marvellous comfort and quietness" in the intimate knowledge of a God both more merciful and more powerful than the visible church.

1. L. Febvre, "Une question mal posée: les origines de la réforme française et le problème général des causes de la réforme," *Revue Historique*, CLXI (1929), pp. 1-73.
2. The most available summary of the causes of the Reformation is James MacKinnon, *The Origins of the Reformation*, London: 1939.
3. John Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*, ed. G. Townsend, London: 1847, vol. VII, p. 550.
4. J. R. Strayer and D. C. Munro, *The Middle Ages*, New York: 1942, p. 440.
5. Charles Oman, *The Sixteenth Century*, New York: 1936, p. 33.
6. This quotation was taken from R. H. Tawney (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Pelican edition; 1947, p. 35) who has improved considerably upon St. Antonino's original statement that "Production is on account of man, not man of production." See Bede Jarrett, *S. Antonino and Mediaeval Economics*, London: 1914, p. 59.
7. Martin Bucer; quoted in J. S. Schapiro, *Social Reform and the Reformation*, Columbia University Dissertation, New York: 1909, p. 22.
8. *Memoirs of Benvenuto Cellini*, Trans. Thomas Roscoe, London: 1883, p. 104.

9. J. A. Longman, *A Sermon spoken before the Kinge his Maiestie at Greenwiche, upon Good Fryday*, London: 1536, Sig. Eii - Eiii.
10. Sir Thomas More, *English Works*, edit. Campbell, Reed and Chambers; London: 1931, vol. I, pp. 468-470.
11. Norman Sykes, *The Crisis of the Reformation*, London: 1938, p. 25.
12. Quoted in P. Vallari, *Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola*, London: 1888, p. 113 from Savonarola's "Della Orazione Mentale."
13. Quoted in R. H. Bainton, *Here I Stand, A Life of Martin Luther*, New York: 1951, p. 45. See also Charles Beard, *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany*, London: 1896, pp. 157-162.
14. Quoted in Beard, *Martin Luther*, p. 162.
15. R. H. Bainton, *The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century*, Boston: 1952, p. 53.
16. Quoted in R. H. Bainton, *Here I Stand*, p. 65.
17. Sir Thomas More, *English Works*, London: 1557, pp. 207-208; James Gairdner, *Lollardy and the Reformation in England*, London: 1908, vol. I, p. 399.
18. John Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*. vol. IV, p. 635.
19. *Ibid*, p. 635.

CLIO IN THE WILDERNESS: HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IN PURITAN NEW ENGLAND*

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In the spring of 1697 the Reverend John Higginson of Salem finished writing a laudatory "Attestation" for Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana*. Higginson was eighty-one. He had lived in New England for nearly seventy years, and sixty of them had been devoted to the ministry. He had, he wrote, *"seen all that the Lord hath done for his people"* in the Puritan colonies and rejoiced that a younger colleague had recorded it in a volume of history and biography, because he was sure that the book was, in substance, purpose, and scope *"according to truth"* and would be of "manifold *advantage* and *usefulness.*" In elaboration of this he listed in his "Attestation" some ways in which he thought the Magnalia would serve "great and good ends."[1]

One item on the list was clearly dictated by the special circumstances of the year 1697, when the Puritans were eager to prove themselves loyal subjects of a Protestant monarch, in opposition to his Jacobite foes. Higginson hoped that Mather's book would serve as a token of affection from New England to Old and from the Congregationalists here to Anglicans abroad and might help to bring about unity among all English Protestants. This was an argument for the timeliness of Mather's offering. The rest of Higginson's evaluation of it emphasized its timelessness.

For one thing, the book performed the "plain scriptural duty of *recording the works of God unto after-times.*" God was surely entitled to have "the *glory* of the great and good *works*" he had "done for his people in these ends of the earth"—what human means could prove his claim to this glory more effectively than a history? Furthermore, there were the words of Moses (Deuteronomy 8:2): "Thou shalt remember all the way wherein the Lord hath led thee in the wilderness these forty years, to humble thee, and to prove thee, and to know what was in thy heart, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments or no." This plea to the Children of Israel, when they stood at the gates of the Promised Land, to remember the testing God had subjected them to in the wilderness, searching their hearts and proving his power, applied perfectly, as Higginson saw it, to the New Englanders. Their *"wilderness*-condition" had also been full of *"humbling, trying,*

distressing providences." They had had their Massahs and Meribahs
just as the people of *Exodus* had, and like them had deviated into
faithlessness and hardness of heart. But God had allowed them to sur-
vive, and it was well that a history should remind them of the trials
they had endured on the shores of Massachusetts Bay. They should
be reminded too, Higginson thought, of the faithfulness of their fa-
thers so that they might in turn "set *their hope in God, and not forget
his works, but keep his commandments.*" (Psa. 78:7). "The true
original and *design* of this plantation," Higginson declared, should
"not be lost, nor buried in *oblivion.*" The fourth verse of the 140th
Psalm, and the fifth of the 105th—"He hath made his wonderful
works to be remembered" and "Remember ye the marvellous works
which he hath done"—made it plain to devout believers in the absolute
authority of the Bible and in the providential character of the found-
ing and development of New England that the story should be kept
fresh in men's minds. And thinking of the hundreds of biographies,
long and short, crowded into the *Magnalia,* Higginson recalled
Proverbs 10:7, *"The memory of the just is blessed,"* and rejoiced that
the names of those *"instruments"* in" God's hand who had founded and
directed New England were now "embalmed, and preserved, for the
knowledge and imitation of posterity."[2]

In still another way Mather's bulky book could be serviceable.
A truthful church-history would confute misrepresentations of New
England by its enemies, and a record of God's benevolence to the
colonists would put their critics in an awkward position unless they
were prepared to deny God's providential power. And finally, history
and biography could serve as warnings to the unrighteous, past,
present, and future. There was Biblical evidence (Hosea 4:7) that
when a people increased and multiplied they might fall into evil ways,
but history could serve as a witness against such backsliders. It might,
Higginson wrote, "through the mercy of God . . . be . . . a means to
reclaim them, and cause them to *return* again into the Lord, and his
holy ways, that he may *return* again in mercy unto them; even unto
the *many thousands of* New-England."[3] The aged minister of Salem,
like Cotton Mather himself, was sure that the colonists were degenerat-
ing and that, whatever their material successes might be, their moral
state left much to be desired. For him, as for Mather, one function of
the *Magnalia* was to serve as a jeremiad.

The attitudes toward history and biography which Higginson
reveals are the standard ones most frequently and most clearly ex-
pressed by Puritans and others, here and abroad, in the seventeenth
century. Most of them have been sufficiently elucidated by literary
and intellectual historians—notably Professor William Haller and

Professor Perry Miller.[4] Perhaps they account sufficiently for the interest which the early New Englanders showed in the reading and writing of histories and lives, but it is at least possible that there is still another source for that interest. Less easily defined, less often expressed, and, it may be, not often consciously recognized by the Puritans themselves, it may none the less have affected the way in which they read—and wrote—history and biography. It seems possible, to state the case in the simplest terms, that one reason for the Puritan's attitude toward these types of writing may have been his feeling that not only did he live in critical times and share the problems which beset his nonconformist brethren everywhere, but also faced peculiar crises of his own, arising from his "*wilderness* condition,"[5] and in order to contend with them needed whatever help histories and lives could give.

In this day there was general agreement that the study of history, as Bacon wrote, made men wise and that Cicero was right in calling history the witness of times, the light of truth, the life of memory, and the herald of antiquity.[6] Anyone with difficulties to surmount and decisions to make needed wisdom and the light of truth, and would do well to heed messengers or witnesses from the past. The greater the crisis, the greater the need; the more the Puritans felt that their crises were major and special, the more diligently they pored over histories, sacred and profane.[7]

Biography could, probably, be even more useful. A Dutch scholar, Professor Jan Romein, suggested in his *Die Biographie*,[8] that an interest in biography and the writing of it is stimulated in periods of crisis. In such periods individualism arises as a consequence of the feeling that established authority and ancient traditions are lost or threatened. Harassed individuals no longer confident of the laws and inherited ideas by which they had lived might find guidance in the experience of other men, recorded by biographers. Therefore, according to Professor Romein, it is not surprising that advances in the art of biography were made in the Renaissance. There was then increased concern with the individual; there were large areas of intellectual life in which many men came to doubt the validity of some previously accepted ideas and values. The Reformation, too, stimulated biography in so far as it emphasized individual piety and man's personal walk with God as the keys to sanctity, rather than his relation to a church as an institution. More emphasis was put upon the "disposition of the heart" ("*gesinnung des Herzens*"), the private faith and piety, rather than upon the observance of the outer forms of worship and discipline imposed by clerical authority. The result for biography was to emphasize character more than deeds, the inner life more than the outer,

with the result that the writers of lives sought new means to portray their subjects as individuals rather than types. The Reformation and the growth of Protestantism created a "crisis" which affected the development of biography and helped to bring about a change in its methods and objects.[9]

Whether or not Professor Romein's suggestion is universally valid, it fits neatly the observable facts of English literary history in the seventeenth century. There was in that century a clear development of interest in biography on the part of English writers, and also a clear tendency toward more analysis of character, more assessment of the inner life, and more attempt at the presentation of the full quality of personality. The volume of biographical writing increased. Ten pages chosen at random from the late Donald Stauffer's bibliography of English biographical writings before 1700[10] show thirty-four written in the centuries before 1600 and fifty-nine between 1600 and 1700. The word "biographer" seems to have entered the English language in 1663, preceded by "biographist" a year earlier. "Biography" seems to have been first used in 1683.[11] Presumably the words came into use because "lives" and "writers of lives," used hitherto, seemed out of place in relation to a genre the methods of which had altered and the seventeenth-century practitioners of which—Izaak Walton, Thomas Fuller, Richard Baxter, Gilbert Burnet, among others —were working toward a fuller three-dimensional presentation of individual character and personality.

The theory that "crisis" stimulates biographical interest is tempting in this case, since there can be no doubt that England in the seventeenth century was undergoing not one "crisis" but many. A century in which there were two major revolutions, the execution of a king, an interregnum, and the restoration of monarchy; violent disputes about theology and polity; the rise of a variety of religious sects, notably the Society of Friends; major advances in science, new concepts in astronomy, new theories of knowledge and new studies of the behavior of the mind; a continuing debate about the problem of sovereignty, altercations between advocates of essentially democratic ideas and the supporters of absolutism, and even more intense argument about the rival claims of reason and faith—such a century was certainly one of crisis in which groups and individuals were forced to examine themselves and their beliefs and to contend with tensions set up by the weakening of old sanctions and the need for new definitions of value.

Particularly important for our purposes is the fact that there seems to be a clear relation between religion and the development of biography in the seventeenth century, particularly in so far as that

development tended toward more analysis of personality and character and less exclusive emphasis on deeds. A surprising number of the seventeenth-century English biographies which seem today most fully revealing of their subjects as individuals were written by ministers and theologians; of those which were not, a high proportion dealt with the lives of men for whom religion was a major concern. Izaak Walton was a layman, but his best biographies were of churchmen—as James Russell Lowell said, "he had . . . a special genius for bishops."[12] Thomas Fuller, an assiduous and witty writer of shrewd, albeit brief, biographical sketches, was an Anglican divine. So was Gilbert Burnet. Richard Baxter, whose life of his wife seems strangely modern in its detailed study of her psychic ailments, which in spite of her faith tormented her almost beyond endurance, was a Puritan. So was Lucy Hutchinson, whose life of her husband is a minor biographical classic. Thomas Sprat, in his life of the poet Cowley, was a distinguished exponent of the new methods in biography, and was an Anglican cleric. In England in the seventeenth century most of the best biographies, from the point of view of full portraiture, were written by or about religiously-minded authors.

Throughout the Christian era the devout had commemorated saints, but the depiction of them as individuals rather than as types of sainthood or symbols of virtue was relatively rare until after the Reformation, and was then most common among Protestants who did honor to their own martyrs and saints. It was natural that this should be so. Protestantism as the English nonconformists or, more loosely, Puritans, knew it in the seventeenth century involved a personal concentration on the quest for holiness, a personal study of the Word, and an attempt to apply its teachings to one's own course in life, without the intervention of a church between the believer and God, and with no complete equivalent for the Catholic confessional as a constantly available source of direction in cases of conscience. Inevitably the Protestant emphasized the individual and the individual religious experience; inevitably the details of the believer's inner life were of as much interest as the details of his acts. As a man "thinketh in his heart, so is he" (Prov. 23:7), the Protestant read, and he knew from St. Matthew that the righteous were not to "think evil in their hearts." (Matt. 9:4). Therefore he searched his heart, tried to stamp out evil thoughts, and, when he was tempted by unruly passions, cast about for means of quelling them. Prayer helped, so did the hearing and reading of sermons, and the patient searching of the Bible. But beyond these aids there was biography.

André Maurois has said, "There is no greater influence on men's conduct than the knowledge of the conduct of others. . . . Biography is

a type of literature which more than any other touches close upon morality."[13] And, one may add, it is a type of literature which may enable the distressed to profit by the experience of others. What better way for the faithful to learn what the truly righteous had thought "in their hearts," how they had faced down temptations and conquered passions, and had proved themselves holy in spirit and mind as well as in deed, than to read lives which revealed not only their actions but their characters, their triumphs over themselves, their meeting of the inner problems which beset all seekers for secure faith and true holiness? Such lives were more than historical exercises; like history they gave useful examples for behavior, but more than history they offered aid to those in the throes of inner crisis.

In colonial New England the need for occasional solace from biography can have been no less than in England, and almost certainly it was greater. The colonies were, in principle at least, founded to serve God; the settlers, however many indifferent or carnally-minded there may have been among them, lived in a society directed by the devout and covenanted with God. They were spiritual pilgrims as well as actual voyagers and pioneers. In their theology the progress toward true holiness was slow and complex. Divine election first, then vocation, justification, and finally salvation were stages on a long road. "Conversion" manifested itself in many ways and usually only after testing by doubts and fears. Nothing could be farther from the truth, so far as the colonial Puritans are concerned, than Maurois' statement that "the Reformation, with its theory of predestination, discouraged the possibilities of change in human personality."[14] We know enough of the New England way with its emphasis on a theology which involved every believer in a long effort to make himself over according to a compact with God, and enough of the process of preparation for conversion in which they believed, to realize that the colonial Puritans recognized "change in human personality" as not only possible but also an essential part of the quest for righteousness. When a man underwent the experience of "conversion" he underwent a change of personality; when he struggled year after year to live up to his bargain with God in the covenant, he tried to adapt himself to a pattern of holiness which required virtue of mind and heart as well as of behavior and left no element in "personality" untouched.[15]

That the task was hard and involved genuine crises of spirit is obvious to anyone who reads the Puritan diaries and autobiographies of early New England. Michael Wigglesworth's diary[16] is a painful revelation of a sensitive man tortured by his sense of guilt and fear of damnation. The picture Thomas Shepard gives in his autobiography is that of a man in a personal crisis: "sick with my beastly car-

riage . . . lying hid in the corne . . . where the Lord . . . did meet me with much sadness of hart & troubled my soule for . . . my sins."[17] It is worth remembering that he wrote of the experience in order to help his son and others who might in their turn face grave conflicts within themselves. Or think of Samuel Sewall, the sturdy Puritan layman, finding a lovely morning somehow "metaphoric, dismal, dark, and portentous."[18] Remember his visits to the Reverend Mr. Thacher to whom he confided the torments of his mind, and recall how even after he had been admitted to the church, he experienced "unbelief."[19] Cotton Mather, smug as he may seem to us, once lay on the floor of his study and cried unto the Lord with "bitter Confessions of . . . Loathsomeness."[20] John Norton, writing his life of John Cotton, regarded biography as a testimony to "many full and glorious triumphs over the World, Sin and Satan, obtained by persons in like temptations, and subject to like passions with ourselves."[21]

Such testimony was tonic for the tempted and passionate, locked in a bitter struggle with the world and the devil. In their isolated towns and villages, with the sound of sermons always in their ears and made conscious by the very atmosphere of man's precarious state, such struggles were common, and for those engaged in them biography surely was therapeutic. History could perform all the functions in Higginson's list, even to the commemorating of great men, but biography, in the sense of a record of the inner life of the worthy, did more by helping the would-be saints in their daily search for means of conquest over their unruly selves. The best biographies written in Puritan New England are saved from the flatness of mere eulogy by the use of devices intended to reveal personality. Their subjects are treated not as stereotypes of this or that virtue, but as men with hearts and minds, involved in their full share of the inner conflicts which bedevil erring humanity, and, it would seem, tormented by an especially acute sense of the critical nature of their earthly adventure.

If the Puritan colonists did have this sense to a greater degree than most Protestants abroad and so required more of the guidance and consolation which histories and biographies might offer, it was probably in part because of their situation as pioneers in a new land, to some extent cut off from the Old World. The writings of the early New Englanders suggest that they on occasion looked eastward with nostalgia and that a feeling of loneliness here sometimes affected their ideas about the value of history and biography and about the best ways of writing them. The colonists were expatriates, and must sometimes have missed their fellow-believers and fellow-scholars in England and Europe. However confident they were about the importance of their "errand into the wilderness"[22] and the rightness of their

cause, they must have had sometimes in the back of their minds unspoken doubts as to whether they, isolated pioneers in a wilderness, could perform the great tasks they had undertaken. They had come here, covenanted with God, and dedicated themselves to building "a Citty upon a Hill,"[23] hoping for a new Reformation for Old England as well as New. But even from the beginning there were some grounds for misgiving, and as time went on it became painfully clear that they might never reach their goal. However much they achieved, it was still very little judged by the standards of the rest of the world or measured by their own lofty aspirations. They founded a college, but they knew it was not and could not be for years an Oxford or Cambridge. They had printers and booksellers, but only a little of the scholarly writing to be found in London was readily accessible here. They had scholars, trained in the English or the American Cambridge, but they were handicapped because their chances for communion with their intellectual equals was limited. They had to build their own churches, their own schools, their own ecclesiastical and civil government, and maintain their own covenant with God, separated the while by "a dreadfull and terrible Ocean of nine hundred Leagues in length"[24] from their supporters abroad. They knew that there were many overseas who called them upstarts, dangerous innovators, and subverters of the established order. Most Anglicans regarded them as outcasts and they were disliked and distrusted even by the Presbyterians, for many years the most powerful English nonconformists. How avoid in Boston, or New Haven, a feeling of isolation, which, if yielded to, could breed doubt and fear? How escape an uneasy suspicion that their promised land was in relation to the world outside only a tiny refuge for a handful of the faithful? As Mr. Miller has written, the colonist by 1660, forced to realize that the eyes of the world were not fixed on his questing in the wilderness, as he had hoped they might be, could "be reduced to writing accounts of himself . . ."—or of his compatriots —"in a desperate effort to tell a heedless world, 'Look, I' "—or we— " 'exist!'" His greatest difficulty would be . . . the problem of his identity."[25]

Nor was there much in their daily existence to relieve their loneliness, their homesickness for the Old World, and their doubts about themselves and their role in life. There were perils in their Canaan which must have enhanced this feeling of isolation, even of exile. Some members of their own flock toyed with dangerous doctrines; the Indians, whether or not they were children of the Devil, often behaved as though they were; the French were too near for safety. The conditions of daily living were strange and difficult for transplanted Englishmen. It was not easy to serve God in an uncharted and inhos-

pitable land. "The mighty ocean which they had passed . . . was now as a maine barr and goulfe to separate them from all the civill parts of the world" they were faced by "a hidious and desolate wildernes, full of wild beasts and willd men" and wherever they looked "the whole countrie, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage heiw."[26] The Plymouth colonists, when they left England for Holland, were leaving "their native soyle and countrie, their lands and livings, and all their friends, and famillier aquaintance." The adventure seemed to many "almost desperate, a case intolerable, and a misserie worse then death" but, according to Bradford, "these things did not dismay them (though they did some times trouble them)."[27] The Puritans who came to Massachuestts Bay were no doubt equally undismayed but equally certainly "some times" troubled by the hardships of their expedition.

Much other evidence in Puritan literature shows that its authors looked back to England with, if not regret, at least an acute feeling of some of the pains of their becoming a people set apart. Samuel Mather, after graduating from Harvard in 1643 and preaching in Rowley and Boston for a few years, was providentially guided by God into more fruitful fields. In Cotton Mather's words, he who "holds the stars in his right hand" (Cf. Rev. 1:16, 20) inspired Samuel "with a strong desire to pass over into England" and made it possible for him to "move in an orb, where his influences could be more extended than they could have been by any opportunities to be enjoyed and improved in an American wilderness."[28] Elsewhere Cotton Mather called the New England pioneers "cottagers in a wilderness,"[29] the Atlantic, "a River of *Lethe,*" and himself, a Rude *American*" in a "remote corner of the New World."[30] When Cotton's father, Increase, came back to Massachusetts in 1661, after preaching in England, it was in a mood of resignation, not elation, and he hoped someday to go abroad again. He did, in 1688, and when he returned to Boston he was again afflicted by longing for the Old World. However devoted the Puritan in colonial New England was, he did not want the Lethe which separated him from England to make him oblivious to it or it to him, nor could he forget in his "remote corner" here the larger "orb" beyond the Atlantic.

It may well be that both history and biography were means of making his loneliness in the wilderness, his doubts about his identity and his place in the larger scheme of things, his homesickness for England and Europe, and his uncertainties about the importance of his noble venture and its likelihood of success, more bearable for the colonial Puritan than they might otherwise have been. His enemies, "sons of Bolsecus" writing with "tory-pens," reviled and ridiculed him and argued that "it was a just thing to banish" the Puritans "into

the cold swamps of the North-America."[31] When he heard such things
it must have been hard for the Puritan not to feel that he was if not
deservedly an outcast at least so contemptuously regarded that he must,
if he was to keep his respect for himself or for his endeavor, find re-
assurance about its own importance and his own. Any book or sermon,
any pious example, which helped to dignify the Puritans in their own
eyes and represent their achievement not as a trivial episode in British
annals but "an essential maneuver in the drama of Christendom,"
might be consoling.[32] And, for the scholars among them, anything
which refuted the notion that they were cut off from the great scholarly
traditions of the Old World must have been precious. Therefore it is
not surprising, perhaps, that the best colonial histories and biographies
often suggest a desire on the part of their authors to dignify the colon-
ists by portraying them as actors in a crucially important chapter of
Christian history, heirs and ambassadors of a great tradition, and
heroes worthy to be compared with those of antiquity.

Bradford, for example, is not content to tell the story of the found-
ing and progress of Plymouth simply as the tale of a handful of men
"used to a plaine countrie life, and the inocente trade of husbandrey,"
pursuing unimportant concerns in a corner of the world out of reach
of their enemies. Instead he takes pains at the very beginning to set
their doings in a historical framework which lends them dignity and
elevates them into "great and honourable actions . . . enterprised, and
overcome with answerable courages."[33] According to him, ever since
"the first breaking out of the lighte of the gospell in . . . England"
Satan had been at war with the Protestant saints, and had resorted at
last "to his anciente strategems, used of old against the first christians"
and had sown "errors, heresies, and wonderfull dissensions" among
them. Hence came "the vile ceremoneys" and "unproffitable Canons,
and decrees" of the Anglican church; hence the persecutions under
Bloody Mary; hence the emigration to Plymouth.[34] Bradford's portrait
of the pilgrims is not one of reckless rebels and subverters of order
but of saints dedicated to the conservation of principles Christ estab-
lished for his church, and of saints who had been able to triumph over
the wars, oppositions, and strategems of Satan.

Edward Johnson in his *Wonder-working Providence,* the first
general history of New England, uses different means for the same
purpose. Writing after the defeat of Charles I, when the cause of non-
conformity seemed to have prevailed, he began his book with a breath-
less sentence:

> "When England began to decline in Religion, like luke-warme Laodicea,
> and instead of purging out Popery, a farther compliance was sought not
> onely in vaine Idolatrous Ceremonies, but also in prophaning the Sab-

bath, and by Proclamation throughout their Parish churches, exasperat-
ing lewd and prophane persons to celebrate a Sabbath like the Heathen
to Venus, Baccus and Ceres; in so much that a multitude of irreligious
lascivious and popish affected persons spred the whole land like Grashop-
pers, in this very time Christ the glorious King of his Churches, raises
an Army out of our English Nation, for freeing his people from their
long servitude under usurping Prelacy; and because every corner of
England was filled with the fury of malignant adversaries, Christ creates
a New England to muster up the first of his Forces in; Whose low condi-
tion, little number, and remoteness of place made these adversaries tri-
umph, despising this day of small things, but in this hight of their pride
the Lord Christ brought sudden, and unexpected destruction upon
them."[35]

In this outburst, the New Englanders are a new army called up by
Christ; New England is their training camp; and the campaign they
are destined for is led by Christ against his enemies. Here, surely, was
a way of elevating New England history above the level of "small
things" so that its people could forget their "low condition, little num-
ber, and remotenesse of place" and think instead of the glories of heroic
deeds in Christ's army. Clumsy as his writing was, there is no doubt
that Johnson's allegorical translation of the colonists into God's cham-
pions must have stirred his hearers to renewed confidence in their
dignity, in spite of the jeers of their enemies. It is worth noting, too,
that in his breakneck sentence Johnson finds room for Laodicea,
Venus, Bacchus, and Ceres, as well as for the grasshoppers of
Isaiah 40:22 and Christ himself. This apparent jumbling of pagan
mythology, and the Old and New Testament is not a mere display
of scraps of learning. The same device appears again and again in
Puritan histories and biographies written by far more expert pens
than Johnson's, and it is clear that there must have been some justi-
fication for it other than authorial vanity.

Look, for example, at John Norton's life of John Cotton which he
called *Abel Being Dead Yet Speaketh*. Cotton is likened not only to
Abel, but some of his traits and some events in his life or in New Eng-
land history of his times are compared to the acts and characteristics
of Junius, Xenophon, Pericles, Luther, Solon, Paraeus, Quintilian,
Jacob, Melancthon and Moses. New England is compared to Patmos
and Norton lists others who like Cotton underwent the tribulations
of the wilderness. These were Moses, Ezekiel and Christ himself as
well as John.[36]

The same mixture of Biblical, classical, and historical allusions
appears in other colonial histories and biographies, especially in Cot-
ton Mather's, whose extravagant use of the device has earned him
reproaches for his vanity and pedantry. But it is probably unfair to
see in the *Magnalia's* crowding allusions to the historical or mythical
lore of the ages merely a manifestation of human weakness. The more

one looks at Mather's work the more clear it becomes that his choice of a stylistic method, out of fashion in 1697, and what is usually thought of as his self-glorifying display of erudition, must have been at least partly dictated by his desire to persuade his Puritan readers—and, no doubt, himself—that they were the heirs of the ages, custodians of the tradition of humane letters as well as theological truth, and themselves in some degree counterparts to the great figures of antiquity. In his life of Governor William Phips, Mather says that he must "in a way of Writing, like that of *Plutarch*" search "the *Archives* of Antiquity for a *Parallel*."[37] Plutarch was for Mather "the incomparable";[38] drawing parallels for his New England subjects from "the archives of antiquity" was one of his favorite devices. Any reader who will spend even a few minutes with the *Magnalia* will find dozens of cases. Bradford, Mather points out, had traits in common with Moses and also with Paul and was worthy of Plato's "description of a governour."[39] Winthrop has points of likeness to Nehemiah, Lycurgus, Numa, Jacob, David, and Valentinian.[40] Great men in New England were pillars of cloud by day and of fire by night.[41] Cotton is compared to Chrysostom, Augustine, Calvin and Beza. Increase Mather, to whom Boston in some ways, was a new Rome,[42] called President Charles Chauncy of Harvard, Charlemagne, and a teacher of the "Sons of the Prophets." Cotton Mather likens Chauncy to the "venerable martyr Polycarp," to a "commander" in a "learned camp," and finally dubs him "the Cadmus of Harvard." As Professor Williams of the Harvard Divinity School has recently shown, these allusions are not mere exhibitions of the Mathers' learned vanity; they are used to relate Harvard and its president to the histories of universities and the transit of learning from east to west. It is not necessary to repeat Mr. Williams' exposition of the passages in question, but it is relevant to point out that here, as in the other cases mentioned, Puritan biographers and historians link the story of New England and its heroes with a variety of other chapters in history and a host of the powerful and wise, throughout the ages.[43] This way of writing must have had, for some at least, the effect of increasing their own feeling of dignity and of proprietorship of an ancient and honorable tradition preserved by the just and learned, pagan and Christian, from earliest antiquity.

The emphasis on the tradition as a learned one, the special birthright of scholars, is significant. One of the New England Puritans' problems was to combat the anti-intellectualism of some of their ostensible allies.[44] Among those we loosely call "Puritans" there were some who were definitely anti-intellectual, holding that worldly learning was unnecessary for those who would be saved by faith alone or claiming direct inspiration which made books unnecessary. The leaders of the New England churches from the beginning warred against

such misguided folk and the Reverend Nicholas Noyes of Salem supplied a "prefatory Poem" for the *Magnalia* which emphasizes the value of the book as a corrective for those who denied the value of scholarship for God's servants. He attacks ignorant "enthusiasts'" and likens those who know nothing of their past history to Habajah's sons, excluded from the priesthood.[45] They are "bastards cast forlorn at any door,"

<div align="right">put to seek their father,
For want of such a *scribe* as COTTON MATHER.</div>

There was, Noyes thought, need for a learned tradition in a well-ordered society. And in the course of his argument he draws a parallel between the benighted in New England and the sons of Habajah, and in another line, at least by implication, between Mather and Aaron.[46]

Whether the writer be Mather or Noyes, Norton or Johnson, full understanding of early New England historians requires some comprehension of the significance which the method of drawing parallels had for them. They were deeply versed in the Bible and well read in the classics, and when they wrote history and biography they seem to have often used their learning in ways which suggest that they were motivated in part by a desire to define and preserve a tradition for the new colonies, so that their people might not be children vainly seeking for fathers.

Other writers than those of New England, before and after the day of the Puritans, have drawn parallels between past history and present or the great men of old and modern leaders. But the colonial biographies and histories seem to show more frequent and thorough use of the device than most books of the sort, written elsewhere in the seventeenth century and earlier. The weight given by the New Englanders to the drawing of parallels suggests that they felt it to be especially useful for their purposes. Their comparisons of ancient and modern and their allegorization of the settlement of Massachusetts can be explained in part at least if one accepts the idea that the biographers and historians wanted to establish for themselves and their companions an ancestry extending back to the farthest antiquity. Some of the pages in colonial books most easily dismissed as pedantic exhibitions of useless learning can be read instead as efforts to give the Puritans in the New World the welcome shelter of an ancient family tree. The more spreading its branches the better. Pagans were pagans and papists papists, but truth and wisdom were precious even when uttered by impious lips. If the classics of Greece and Rome could be related to the Bible, and shown to be often entirely consonant with it, well and good. The more complete the roster of those who had surmounted trials like their own could be shown to be, and the more imposing the galaxy of

those who had cherished the same values, the better for the colonists' state of mind. If they could be convinced that they were in their way prophets, sages, and warriors for truth like those of old, they could perhaps conquer some of their anxieties about what the modern psychiatrist might call "belongings" and "status," in their lonely realm in the "Westerne end of the World."[47]

Modern readers are apt to find tiresome Johnson's efforts at allegory, Mather's crowding comparisons and learned allusions, and the repetitions throughout early New England literature of the idea that the Puritan's adventure was a significant stage in the working out of God's providential design for world history. It is easy now to think of these things as pedantic inflations or wanton distortions of historical fact. But it is not probable that the readers for whom Norton, Johnson, and the Mathers wrote felt as we do. For one thing, the reasonably well informed among them knew something about the then respected science or art of typology, on which, it is worth noting, Cotton Mather's uncle wrote an important book.[48] Typology was "the discovering and expounding in the records of persons and events in the Old Testament prophetical adumbrations of the Person of Christ or of the doctrine and practise of the Christian Church." It was used apologetically to prove the antiquity of Christian faith and to refute heretics. It was also extended to give objects, characters, and events in the Old Testament allegorical significance and developed into tropology which made virtually every character and object in the Bible a metaphor or symbol of enduring significance.[49] Thus it became not too difficult for thorough-going typologists or tropologists to relate the mythology and history of Greece and Rome to those of the Hebrews and to find in the classics as well as in the Bible exemplifications of the continuing providential plan of God, foreshadowed in the Old Testament and revealed in a variety of forms throughout the whole history of mankind. Thus Nisus, in the Greek myth, who was shorn of a lock of purple hair, lost his kingdom, and was eventually transformed into an eagle, was held to be a kind of metaphor, distorted by the fable-making tendency of the Greeks, for Samson, who was also, of course, a type of Christ.[50] Thus the word "wilderness," so dear to the New Englanders, could mean to a diligent typologist not only the actual wilderness but, metaphorically, the whole world in its relation to the truly righteous man, alone and wandering among it iniquities.[51] Not many of the laity in colonial Boston or New Haven can have been expert typologists or explorers of the metaphorical possibilities of the Bible, but most of them must have had enough knowledge of typological ways of thought to be more interested than readers now can be in the allegories and parallels involving both the Bible and the classics, given to them by biographers and historians. And their interest may

well have enabled them now and then to find on the printed page, as the writers probably meant them to, means of assuaging their loneliness in a "howling dessert" by reminding them that they still partook of a great tradition, had had their own heroes comparable to those of Greece and Rome as well as Israel, could emulate the great days of Athens and Sparta, and produce scholars who were or might be Cadmuses, Charlemagnes, Polycarps, Moseses, Platos, Plutarchs and Lycurguses. With such teachers and leaders even exiles who had crossed "a terrible ocean, into a more terrible *desert*"[52] could reassure themselves with the idea that they might conquer their hardships and, provided they proved themselves worthy of their ancestry and firm in their resolve not to lapse from the great tradition of which they were heirs, might hope for a glorious future.

John Higginson wrote at the end of his enumeration of the valuable services Mather's *Magnalia* might perform, summarized at the beginning of this paper, "In the approaching days of a better *reformation*" surely "the saints in those times of greater light and holiness" will accept "the *sincere, though weak* endeavours of the servants of God, that went before them."[53] The task of the biographer and historian of the *"voluntary exiles"*[54] in the colonies was to make it plain that these exiles would ultimately be accepted by the saints in happier and holier days to come. This must have cheered those who, in their dark hours, suffered from loneliness in a "hideous, boundless, and unknown" wilderness.[55] Little people in small towns, inexperienced pioneers in a raw country, must have responded eagerly to assurances that they were co-partners with the best men in all ages and would have at last full standing in the company of the saints.

The suggestions made in this paper are not capable of absolute proof since no historian can fully explore all the recesses of the Puritan's heart and mind. But they accord with what we do know most about in Puritan thought and feeling and, indeed, the thought and feeling of other men in other times and places.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in an address on "Prospects in the Arts and Sciences" at Columbia University, December 26, 1954, used the image of the "village," the intimate environment in which each man works.[56] There he is closely related to his companions but beyond the village boundaries there is always a larger open world. The artist, and certainly the Puritan conscious of his divine mission, cannot be content in complete isolation from that world. In Dr. Oppenheimer's words: "The artist depends on a common sensibility and culture, on a common meaning of symbols, on a community of experience and common ways of describing and interpreting it . . . His audience . . . must be man, and not a specialized set of experts among his fellows.

"To-day that is very difficult. Often the artist has an aching sense of great loneliness, for the community to which he addresses himself is not there; the traditions and the history, the myths and the common experience, which it is his function to illuminate and to harmonize and to portray, have been dissolved in a changing world." The Puritan, artist or not, wanted to speak to man, not merely to men. He longed to convey the truths to which he was devoted to the larger open world and not simply to his fellow-believers in the intimacy of what was quite literally for most colonists the village. His history, symbols, and myths were already dissolving, for his world, like ours, was changing, but he still had his confidence in them and by reasserting them in history and biography could assuage the "aching sense of great loneliness" which must have sometimes been forced upon him when he looked out at the world beyond the village gates.

If so, it seems safe to say that the Puritan wrote and read biography and history partly because they helped him in his effort to establish his own relation to the traditions, symbols, myths, common experience, common sensibility and common culture of the world outside his little province. If he could establish this relation, he could ease his feeling of isolation and his worries about his "status" and "belongingness" in the whole human community. If he read lives and histories diligently enough he might better understand himself and his intimates in the village, and be more confident of his dignity and "identity" and theirs. He longed for weapons of defense against loneliness and remedies for inner conflicts. Because his need was great he ranged widely in an attempt to satisfy it. Thence, as well as from the humanistic tradition in which he had been bred, came an acceptance of counsel from Greek and Roman antiquity hardly less ready than that he gave to the final truths of Holy Writ.

He was a Christian first, and a humanist second, but a humanist he was, at least in his reliance on the classical tradition. Especially in history and biography, he tried to keep alive and to bring into a comprehensive unity, the wisdom he could glean from classical moralists, pagan myths, and fables, and the whole historical record of man's experience throughout the ages. He tried constantly to use the wisdom thus acquired in the service of Christ. Both for the acquisition of wisdom and for its proper use, history and biography were indispensable means.

1. Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana* (Hartford, 1855), I, 15.
2. *Ibid.*, I, 15-16.
3. *Ibid.*
4. William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York, 1938), especially pp. 100 ff., 302-303; Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, *The Puritans* (New York, 1938), Chapters I and V; Kenneth B. Murdock, *Literature and Theology in Colonial New England* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), Chapter III.

5. Mather, *Magnalia*, I, 16.

6. Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, 9, 36. Cotton Mather quotes the substance of Cicero's sentence but changes its order, which more nearly corresponds to that in Ben Jonson's "The Mind of the Frontispice to a Booke," *The Poems of Ben Jonson*, ed. Bernard H. Newdigate (Oxford, 1936), p. 125. The "frontispice" is that of Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* (London, 1614), a book Mather probably knew.

7. Murdock, *Literature and Theology*, pp. 67-70.

8. Trans. U. Huber Noodt (Bern, 1948) from *De Biografie: Een Inleiding* (Amsterdam, 1946).

9. *Ibid.*, 17, 27-30.

10. Donald A. Stauffer, *English Biography before 1700* (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), pp. 287-372.

11. See the Oxford *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, s.v. "biography."

12. James Russell Lowell, "Walton," in *Latest Literary Essays and Addresses*, Vol. XI of Riverside Edition of Lowell's writings (Cambridge, 1897).

13. André Maurois, *Aspects of Biography*, trans. S. C. Roberts (New York, 1929), p. 134.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

15. Perry Miller, " 'Preparation for Salvation' in Seventeenth-Century New England," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV (June, 1943), 253-286.

16. *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXXV (1951), 310-444.

17. *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXVII (1932), 361.

18. *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, Fifth Series, V, 11.

19. *Ibid.*, Fifth Series, V, 38, 39, 46, 47.

20. *Ibid.*, Seventh Series, VII, 438.

21. John Norton, *Abel Being Dead Yet Speaketh* (London, 1658), p. 4.

22. This phrase comes from the title of Samuel Danforth's election sermon, May 11, 1670, printed in Cambridge, Mass., 1671, as *A brief Recognition of New-Englands Errand into the Wilderness*. See Perry Miller, "Errand into the Wilderness," in *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, X (January, 1953), 3-19. Note the discussion of the meaning of "errand" on p. 3 and passim.

23. John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity," *Winthrop Papers* (Boston, 1931), II, 295.

24. Edward Johnson, *Wonder-working Providence*, ed. J. Franklin Jameson (New York, 1910), p. 49.

25. Miller, "Errand into the Wilderness," p. 18.

26. William Bradford, *History of Plymouth Plantation 1620-1647*, ed. Worthington C. Ford (Boston, 1912) I, 156.

27. *Ibid.*, I, 28.

28. Mather, *Magnalia*, II, 43.

29. *Ibid.*, I, 239.

30. Cotton Mather, *The Triumphs of the Reformed Religion in America: The Life of the Renowned John Eliot* (Boston, 1691), p. 6 and dedication.

31. Mather, *Magnalia*, I, 233.

32. Miller, "Errand into the Wilderness," p. 14.

33. Bradford, *History of the Plymouth Plantation*, I, 29, 60.

34. *Ibid.*, I, 3-4.

35. Johnson, *Wonder-working Providence*, p. 23.

36. Norton, *Abel Being Dead*, passim.

37. Cotton Mather, *Pietas in Patriam: The Life of his Excellency, Sir William Phips* (London, 1697), p. 3.

38. Mather, *Magnalia*, I, 29.

39. *Ibid.*, I, 113, 114.

40. *Ibid.*, I, 118, 131.

41. Cotton Mather, *Johannes in Eremo* (Boston, 1695), p. 15.

42. Increase Mather, "To the Reader," in Cotton Mather, *Johannes in Eremo*, p. 7.

43. For the Mathers on Chauncy see George H. Williams, "An Excursus: Church, Commonwealth, and College" in *The Harvard Divinity School: Its Place in Harvard University and in American Culture*, ed. George H. Williams (Boston, 1954), pp. 296-299.

44. Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*, second printing (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 76ff.

45. Mather, *Magnalia*, I, 19.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Johnson, *Wonder-working Providence*, p. 63.

48. Samuel Mather, *The Figures or Types of the Old Testament* (Dublin, 1683).

49. J. R. Darbyshire, "Typology," in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York and Edinburgh, 1922), XII, 500.

50. Samuel Mather, *The Figures or Types*, p. 131. As Samson was confounded with Nisus so Moses was confused with Mercury "out of some broken remembrances and traditions, though corrupted with fabulous Inventions.... They call their *Mercurius, Interpres Divum*, and paint him with a Rod twined with Serpents." (p. 117) So famous was Noah's story that (repeating the formula) "the Heathen have some broken Remembrances and Traditions of it... their *Bacchus*... with a little alteration... comes from *Noah, Noachus, Boachus*, and *Janus* from the Hebrew *Jagin, vinum*... they had heard ... about his planting a Vinyard...." (p. 90) Hence Cotton Mather contrives a double parallel: to Janus, alias Noah was ascribed a double face "because of the view which he had of the two

worlds, the *old* and the *new*. The
covenant which God established with
Noah, was by after-ages referred unto,
when they feigned Janus to be the pres-
ident of all *covenant and concord* ....
Moreover, the mythical writers tell us,
that in the reign of this Janus, all the
dwellings of men were hedged in with
piety and *sanctity*; in which tradition
the exemplary *righteousness* of Noah
seems to have been celebrated..."
Without more ado Mather turns to a
man "who, when 'tis considered that
he crossed the *sea* with a renowned
colony, and that having seen an *old
world* in Europe ... he also saw a *new
world* in America ... where he with his
people were admitted into the *covenant*

of God; whereupon an hedge of *piety*
and *sanctity* continued about *that*
people as long as *he* lived; may there-
fore be called the Noah or Janus of
New-England. This was Mr. Francis
Higginson." (Mather, *Magnalia*, I,
355).

51. Benjamin Keach, *Tropologia, or A
Key to Open Scripture Metaphors* (Lon-
don, 1681-82) Book IV, p. 391.
52. Mather, *Magnalia*, I, 69.
53. *Ibid.*, I, 17.
54. *Ibid.*, I, 16.
55. Johnson, *Wonder-working Providence*,
p. 248.
56. The quotations from Dr. Oppenheimer
are from the *New York Times* for De-
cember 27, 1954.

THE MORAVIANS DURING THE FRENCH
AND INDIAN WAR

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In 1754 the English colonies were concentrated along the Atlantic seaboard and the river valleys leading thereto. To the west of this more-or-less densely populated strip lay a vast wilderness permanently inhabited only by Indians and dotted with the isolated military garrisons and trading posts of the French. Because of conflicting claims and a faulty knowledge of geography, neither England nor France had been successful in convincing the other nation of the validity of her territorial claims. Three wars—King William's (1689-1697), Queen Anne's (1702-1713), and King George's (1744-1748) had been fought in an effort to solve this troublesome question, but in 1754 the problem was much the same as it had been in 1689.

The French had because of exploration and commercial exploitation, laid claim to the almost boundless central portion of North America—the entire region drained by the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. To defend these claims, a chain of French forts had been erected from Cape Breton Island and the St. Lawrence Valley to the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, the French were successful in enlisting the Algonquin Indian tribes as auxiliaries to their regular troops.

The inhabitants of the colony of Virginia were particularly alarmed by these moves, as in 1749 the Ohio Company had been organized by Virginians for the purpose of opening up the Ohio Valley to English (and particularly Virginia) settlers. When Governor Dinwiddie learned that a French fort was being erected at Presque Isle (on Lake Erie), another to the south, Fort LeBoeuf, and a third on the Allegheny named Venango, in December of 1753 he sent George Washington, who was then a young man of twenty-one years, to the French military authorities in the region with orders for their immediate evacuation of the territory. As the French refused to yield to Dinwiddie's demands, the governor encouraged the company to erect a fort at the fork of the Allegheny and the Monongahela Rivers. The workmen who had begun this task were soon forced to return to Virginia, whereupon the French completed the fort and named it Fort Duquesne. Meanwhile, under Washington's command, a relief expedition had been sent westward, but before reaching the fort, Washington learned that the company employees had surrendered. After erecting a stockade which he called Fort Necessity, the Virginian troops were

attacked by the French and on July 4, 1754 Washington himself was forced to surrender and to return to Virginia.

On June 19, 1754 commissioners representing the several colonies assembled at Albany, New York, at the request of the English government for the purpose of making a treaty of alliance with the Iroquois Indians and to work out a system whereby the interests of the colonists, as well as those of the Crown, might be defended against the threatened inroads of the French. On July 10, 1754 the commissioners adopted a "Plan of Union," but the colonies, fearing that the "Plan" would yield too much power to the crown and would place an unequal burden upon the several colonies, rejected it.

Even though the British government had instigated the Albany Convention, Britain did not want to become involved in what was hoped by the home government would remain a purely colonial affair.[1] Nevertheless, early in 1755 two regiments of British troops commanded by Major General James Braddock landed at Hampton Roads, Virginia. After several unfortunate delays these troops moved toward Fort Duquesne in early summer. Before reaching this objective, Braddock and his regulars and colonial militia suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the French and Indians, and during the course of this battle on the Monongahela, the General was mortally wounded. The defeated army retreated eastward under command of Colonel Thomas Dunbar and arrived at Philadelphia late in August.

In September 1755 the French marched against Fort Edward in northern New York. The English army at Lake George, commanded by Sir William Johnson, marched eastward to prevent the attack, fell into an ambush, and suffered defeat. In 1756 the French, through the capture of Fort Oswego on the southern shore of Lake Ontario, became masters of the entire Great Lakes region, and on August 9, they captured Fort William Henry on Lake George, thus extending their control over Lake George and Lake Champlain as well.

In June 1757 William Pitt assumed control of the British government. This master statesman planned three systematic expeditions against the French in North America: one against the fortress of Louisbourg, another against Fort Duquesne, and a third against the French strongholds at Ticonderoga and Crown Point. To carry out these plans he raised a British army of 22,000 troops and succeeded in enlisting a similar number of colonials.

The following year the tide of fortune turned in favor of the British. In July of 1758 Louisbourg was surrendered by the French. In August came the fall of Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario, and the French-controlled territory was thus cut in half. In November of the same year the French, realizing that the superior British forces would

make defense futile, destroyed and abandoned Fort Duquesne, giving the English control of the Ohio Valley. In 1759 Fort Niagara was captured from the French and the Lake Erie region passed into English hands. With this great advantage, a British army was then able to compel the enemy to abandon Ticonderoga and Crown Point, while a second army under General Wolfe on September 12, 1759 captured Quebec. Then in 1760 Montreal, the last French stronghold in North America, was taken by the English. Three years later, by the Peace of Paris, France lost all her North American territory except two small fishing islands off the coast of Newfoundland.

When hostilities began on the Ohio the Germans in British North America were largely indifferent to the situation. Living as they did on farms in remote and isolated districts,[2] they were little aware of the anxiety of the inhabitants of the cities and seats of government. Even those Germans who lived in the more thickly populated areas to the west and north of Philadelphia were largely members of nonresistant sects and were likewise disinterested. As the scene of the conflict moved eastward, however, the Germans were made aware of the realities of the conflict and each German-speaking religious group reacted to the situation in ways which reflected its theology and polity. The Lutherans and other "church people"[3] quickly made the cause of the British their own. Their clergy gave moral support to the British side and the laity enlisted in the colonial militias in not inconsiderable numbers.[4] The Mennonites and other "sect people" took a pacifist position and, other than contributing to various kinds of humanitarian "war relief," stood aloof from any active participation. In each of these cases the course of action—or inaction—was the one almost to be expected. In the case of the Moravians, who were, of the German-speaking people in British North America, the least understood, no definite course could have been predicted. It was this group which was, perhaps, most profoundly affected by the war and the one in which compromise of principle and concession to difficult circumstances was most clearly to be noted.

The Moravian Brethren represented the link between the "sect people" and the "church people." As they adhered strictly to the church year, used liturgical worship, and had a church polity combining features of both the episcopal and presbyterial systems, they resembled the "church people." On the other hand, as they had no distinctive creed, were strongly pietistic,[5] made use of the "lot" in deciding important religious and personal matters, used such practices as the "Love Feast," the "Kiss of Peace," and "foot washing,"[6] were opposed to oaths, and were (before the middle of the century, at least) ardent pacifists, they resembled the "sect people." Unlike either group, the Moravians were the first communitarian society in America.[7]

The Moravians believed that "in gratitude to our Lord Jesus Christ, for the blessings conferred on them, . . . [it was] their duty to use their best endeavor to propagate the gospel among the heathen,"[8] and in keeping with this spirit a band of Moravian missionaries, interested in converting the Indians, arrived in Georgia in 1735. Finding the situation which resulted from military preparations against a threatened Spanish invasion completely to their disliking, the band fled in 1739 and 1740 to Pennsylvania where they settled at Nazareth on a tract of land owned by George Whitefield. Shortly thereafter they purchased land to the south of Nazareth and there built a community which they called Bethlehem. In 1743 Whitefield sold Nazareth to the Brethren, who thereupon confirmed their title to the land through a treaty with the Indians.[9]

Seeking to extend their missionary operations to the southward, the members of the *Unitas* in 1749 accepted an offer of Lord Granville whereby the Moravians became owners of some one hundred thousand acres of land in North Carolina.[10] At the time the land was acquired the Moravians knew little about its topography and location other than that it was, as yet, an unsurveyed tract beyond the frontier.[11] Consequently, on August 25, 1752 an exploring party headed by Bishop August Gottlieb Spangenberg left Bethlehem and arrived at Edenton, North Carolina,[12] early the following month.[13] Accompanied by Lord Granville's chief surveyor, William Churton, the party moved westward. After passing by several less desirable sites, the survey was finally made on the "three forks of Muddy Creek."[14] Financial difficulties, however, compelled the Brethren to relinquish some of the more remote and detached areas and the result was that this effected a compact, almost contiguous tract of well-drained land which came to be known as Wachovia. On November 17, 1753 the first group of permanent settlers arrived on the Wachovia Tract and immediately began the work of providing homes for themselves.[15]

By 1754 Moravian congregations flourished in Bethlehem (1742),[16] Philadelphia (1743), Nazareth (1744), Lititz (1745), Emaus (1747), Fredricksburg, Lebanon (1747), Lancaster (1749), Oley (1743), Heielberg (*circa* 1744), and Bethel (1744) in Pennsylvania;[17] at Bethabara in North Carolina (1753); and at Graceham-on-the-Monocacy in Maryland.[18] In addition to these regularly organized congregations, the Moravians had Indian missions at numerous points on and even *beyond* the frontier. At Pachgotoch (Kent), Connecticut, the number of Indians attached to the Moravian's mission at one time numbered over one hundred.[19] Smaller mission posts were to be found at Wechquetank (in present Monroe County), Gnadenhutten (Weissport), Meniolagomekak (eight miles west of present site of Wind Gap), and Shamokin (Sunbury), Pennsylvania.[20]

Compared in numbers to the Reformed and Lutherans, the Moravians were a pathetically small group,[21] but their influence among the Germans and upon the colonial authorities was altogether out of proportion to their size. In 1749 the Moravians had secured a Parliamentary indemnity from bearing arms and taking oaths,[22] and in Georgia, a decade before the granting of this indemnity, the Moravians had made themselves unwelcome by refusing to bear arms against the Spanish. Furthermore, in 1747 Governor Gooch of Virginia had denounced the members of this group along with the "New Lights" and the Methodists,[23] and in 1745 the government of the colony of New York had ordered the Moravian Mission at Shecomeko in Dutchess County to be dissolved because it was believed that the missionaries were attempting to induce the Indians to support the French.[24]

As the tension between the British and the French increased the popular disfavor of the Moravians became even more marked, for certainly in time of international conflict any group with pacifist inclinations would be regarded with disfavor. Soon the various colonial governments accused them of being in league with the Indians in a plot to overthrow the English government and to turn control of the Atlantic seaboard over to the French—an accusation made because of a misunderstanding of the purpose of the long annual or semi-annual missionary journeys which took the Brethren through the Indian country of Virginia, western Pennsylvania, New York, New England, and even into Canada.[25] In certain quarters the Brethren were even suspected of actually being Jesuits, as they wore black robes and prominently displayed the crucifixes which they carried.[26]

Among the other German-speaking religious groups the Moravians were equally unpopular, for the Lutheran and Reformed people felt that the missionary journeys were made, not for the purpose of converting the Indians, but of proselyting among the frontier membership of these communions. Consequently, the Brethren received a cold welcome in the "church" communities on the frontier.[27] In Philadelphia, the Moravian representative on the Board of Trustees of the Public Lecture Hall became so odious that no Moravian successor was appointed.[28]

On October 1, 1752, James Burnside, a Moravian from near Bethlehem, was elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly as representative of Northampton County. The following year a "Governor's man" defeated the Moravian in his contest for re-election but in 1754 Burnside was again elected. Although Burnside died in 1755, William Edmonds, also a Moravian, was elected to succeed him. When Edmonds was defeated by William Allen in 1756 the Reverend William Smith wrote to a friend in Easton:

"I hope the County will never [again] disgrace itself by putting in any
Moravian whose principle for ought we know may be Popish. They are
against defence and . . . even refused to sell Powder to the Protestants
tho' it is said [that] they furnished the Indians with it. . . . It would be a
Shame to send down [to the Assembly] a Moravian at such a dangerous
time."[29]

According to Heckewelder—a Moravian historian, naturally a de-
fender of his group, and perhaps inclined to exaggerate—certain
enemies of the Moravians declared that to destroy the hated sect "root
and branch, would not only be doing God a service, but also a means
of averting his wrath which they otherwise might incur by suffering
them to live, they being the same as the Cananites of old, an accursed
race, who by God's command were to be destroyed." The same chroni-
cler asserted that in New Jersey a public declaration was made by the
authorities that "Bethlehem should be destroyed, and that a carnage
should be made, such as never had been heard of in North America
before." Heckewelder further recorded that a party of 100 men had
actually set out for this purpose but upon reaching Bethlehem they
were treated in such a civil manner by the Brethren that they returned
to New Jersey with none other than kind feelings toward the Mor-
avians.[30]

Governor Belcher of New Jersey, early in November of 1755,
issued an order to seize all arms and ammunition of the Moravians
within his colony, and on the thirteenth of the same month he wrote
to Governor Morris of Pennsylvania urging him to take a similar step
in his own colony.[31]

While the governments of the several colonies were making the
lives of the Moravians increasingly difficult, the Brethren were totally
ignorant of any hostile disposition of the Indians, and only after four-
teen persons had been killed in an Indian raid upon the Moravian set-
tlement at Shamokin did the *Unitas* realize that their faith in the red
men had been unwarranted.[32]

Through the treachery displayed at Shamokin the Brethren were
convinced of the real disposition of the Indians, but it was not until late
in November that the people of Pennsylvania and adjoining colonies
were fully certain of the true position of the Moravians. About thirty
miles northwest of Bethlehem at the confluence of the Lehigh River
and the Mahoning Creek (the present site of Lehighton), the Brethren
had conducted an Indian mission since 1746. In 1754 the settlement,
which was known as Gnadenhutten, was moved across the river (to
the present site of Weissport) and re-named New Gnadenhutten. Here
the missionaries lived among their Indian converts in a prosperous,
well-ordered village. With the attack upon Shamokin the Moravians
at Gnadenhutten were fully aware of the danger, but still they deter-

mined to remain at their post. On the evening of November 24, 1755, while the missionaries were eating supper the hostile Indians attacked, killing (of the whites in the community) seven men, three women, and one child. Only two men, one woman, and one child escaped. The entire village was burned to the ground and the survivors fled to the settlements at Nazareth and Bethlehem.[33]

One of those who escaped, David Zeisberger, rode full speed to Bethlehem where he aroused Bishop Spangenberg from his sleep to tell him the doleful news. At five o'clock in the morning the Bishop called the congregation together and told the Brethren the horrible news of the massacre.[34] Having discharged his sad duty, the Bishop proceeded at once to Nazareth where he again repeated the mournful tale.[35] Almost immediately Bethlehem became an armed fortress: the principal buildings were surrounded by a stockade, arms and ammunition were hastily brought in from New York, and small stones were even placed inside the windows of the women's quarters so that the occupants could, in case of an attack, hurl them at the invaders.[36]

All of these extensive military preparations found the pacifist Moravians caught on the horns of a dilemma. No one better realized this peculiar situation than Bishop Spangenberg who, in a sermon delivered to the congregation on December 19, 1755, urged his people to cast aside their fears and their repugnance toward the friendly Indians who had taken refuge in Bethlehem along with the whites; yet, four days later he wrote to friends in New York:

"We are of the opinion that governments ought to protect their subjects. Rulers are servants of God, & the sword is given them by a Superior Power, who is King of King & Lord of Lords. The sword given them they hold not in vain, but they are to protect the weaker ones & save the innocent. It is not only permitted unto them to oppose and punish all who will hurt, kill, steal &c., but it is their duty to do so, & if they neglect this their office they will be answerable for it to their Master."[37]

In the same letter, however, Spangenberg justified any exemption from military service which the Moravian clergy might claim, for he declared that ministers of the gospel should not bear arms. On the other hand, he justified the military activity of the Moravian *layman* by declaring that it is the duty of the layman to defend the lives of his family.[38]

The good Bishop doubtless expressed the stoical attitude of his congregation when, in this same letter, he wrote that the Brethren had praised the Lord for "taking so many of our Brethren & Sisters all at once like a sacrifice to himself," and that they had "mourned for those poor creatures [the Indians] who were Satan's instrument in doing evil." Following a most Christlike expression of charity, "Oh how we wish they may once repent & be pardoned," Spangenberg asserted to

his New York friends that the Moravians would under no circumstances retreat from Bethlehem, but that they would pray for divine protection and put their trust in God.[39]

Into this Moravian fortress poured hundreds of refugees—both whites and friendly Indians— and throughout the war years Bethlehem was the scene of much coming and going. One writer estimates that in the year of 1755, alone, 320 whites and 710 Indians visited or passed through the village.[40] On January 4, 1756 the inhabitants and refugees at Bethlehem were greatly encouraged by a letter from the governor promising the erection of a fort at Gnadenhutten. Three days later Benjamin Franklin arrived in the village on his way to Gnadenhutten where he was to supervise the erection of Fort Allen. Franklin was cordially received by Bishop Spangenberg,[41] who, upon hearing Franklin's expression of surprise at the fact that the pacifist Moravians had armed the town to the teeth, explained—probably without justification—that non-resistance was not one of the essential Moravian tenets, but that to guarantee the liberty of conscience of certain individuals among their number, the entire body had obtained exemption from compulsory military service.[42] During Franklin's short stay in Bethlehem he attended worship at the Moravian Church and was entertained at his meals by the skilled musicians of the country.[43] Furthermore, when the Franklin expedition set out for Gnadenhutten, the Brethren sent teams and wagons loaded with tools and supplies.[44]

A second distinguished visitor to Bethlehem was Governor Denny who arrived unexpectedly on August 7, 1757. The Governor spent the night at the Crown Inn, but unlike Franklin, he declined the hospitalities of the Brethren. While Denny's coolness was the cause of considerable embarrassment to the elders of the community, the young men of Bethlehem ignored the slight and played instrumental music from barges which floated down the Lehigh below the Governor's room in the "Crown."[45]

In September of 1757, Teedyuscung, "King" of the Delaware Indians, took up quarters in a lodge which he had erected near "the Crown," and remained until April 16, 1758. Here the "King" held court, received letters from the Delaware villages in distant parts, and made a nuisance of himself with his drunkenness and disorderly conduct.[46]

All the while, as the "dignitaries" were coming and going, the Moravians were caring for the almost countless red and white refugees who would remain within the stockade for varying lengths of time. In caring for the homeless, the Brethren were assisted by the Quakers of Philadelphia and vicinity. As early as December of 1755 the Quak-

ers had raised the sum of £200 Pennsylvania currency which was spent for bedding, food, and other necessities for use at Bethlehem.[47]

While Christian Indians, as well as whites, enjoyed the hospitality of the Brethren, the former—many of whom had taken up permanent homes in the community— attempted to work for their keep by laboring in the fields, making baskets and brooms, and by carrying peace messages to hostile Indians when no other person would undertake the dangerous task.[48] As Bethlehem had become uncomfortably overcrowded, it was decided to relocate a number of the Indians at settlements to be made close by. In 1758 several families were settled at Nain, two miles from Bethlehem[49] and in 1760 a second group of families was located at Wechquetank, twenty-four miles to the north.[50] On several occasions the lives of the Indians at Nain and Wechquetank were endangered by fanatics who were of the opinion that the only good Indians were dead ones. In the fall of 1763 most of the inhabitants of the two Indian villages were taken to Philadelphia so as to better insure their safety.[51] Not all of the objection to the harboring of the Christian Indians came from the whites. Teedyuscung, who was an apostate Moravian convert, violently protested the activities of the Brethren, declaring that the Indians were being held in the villages against their will.[52]

Because of the missionaries' knowledge of the various Indian tongues, both the Governor of Pennsylvania and Sir William Johnson wanted to hold Indian conferences at Bethlehem; however, to this plan Spangenberg objected, and the conferences were held at Easton instead.[53] While the Moravians would not allow the conferences to be held in their midst, they regarded the meetings with great interest and sent observers to each. David Zeisberger attended the conferences at Philadelphia, Lancaster, and Easton,[54] where he and his companions noticed with sorrow that the Indian women of Teedyuscung's party were wearing dresses made from tablecloths which had been stolen from Gnadenhutten following the massacre there.[55]

As the Indians returned homeward from the various conferences, Bethlehem served as a convenient stopping place. When Teedyuscung visited the village after the treaty at Easton in 1761, the members of his retinue confessed that the Moravian settlements had been their stumbling block and that, could these settlements have been liquidated, they would have laid waste the entire region southward to Philadelphia.[56]

When the first attack was made upon the Moravian settlement at Shamokin, the Brethren at Nazareth immediately began preparing for possible invasions and in the fall of 1755 all children of the settlement were moved to Bethlehem.[57] The transfer was completed none

too soon, for during the fortnight following the fall of Gnadenhutten refugees poured into Nazareth from the Blue Mountain region to the north and the Brethren, forgetting their scruples against military activity, lamented the fact that they had few arms and little ammunition. The Whitefield house was stockaded,[58] and sentry boxes, made of green logs which were chinked with mud so as to render them virtually fire-proof, were erected near the principal buildings. At night four men kept watch in each box. In February of 1756 a stockade was erected around the cattle yard, and in May of that year the stockade at the Whitefield house was reinforced, because the building housed 253 refugees, many of whom were children. Also early in 1756 the local garrison was augmented by a company of Pennsylvania troops.[59] Here, as in Bethlehem, Christian Indians enjoyed security, supporting themselves by working in the fields and by making brooms, shovels, and baskets, commodities which were profitably sold for them by the Brethren in New Brunswick and in New York.[60]

At the Rose Inn, immediately north of Nazareth on the Minisink Road, the Brethren provided quarters for refugees as well as for the provincial troops who were stationed in the region.[61] At Friedensthal (one mile north of Nazareth) where the Moravians operated a grist mill, at Gnadenthal (two miles northwest of Nazareth), and at Christian's Spring (immediately north of Gnadenthal on the Monocacy Creek) where the Brethren operated a mill, smith's shop, and stable, refugees also found shelter. At these places, too, regular night watch was kept.[62] The Moravian churches at Fredricksburg and Lebanon were also used as fortresses during the raids and as homes for the refugees. Here, too, a number of victims were buried in the adjoining churchyards.[63] At Bethel the church also served as a fort, and four Reformed victims of an Indian ambush in 1756 were buried in the Moravian graveyard there. On this occasion a detachment of soldiers from nearby Fort Swatara afforded protection to the two hundred mourners.[64]

The North Carolina Moravians fared somewhat better than those of Pennsylvania. Although they had settled in this colony for the purpose of Christianizing the Indians, the contacts with the red men had been few, and even though they were in constant correspondence with their headquarters at Bethlehem, they little realized that the colonies were anticipating a conflict until October 30, 1754, when Colonel Schmidt of the Carolina militia, without asking permission of the Brethren, held muster of five companies in the meadow adjoining the settlement. Colonel Schmidt explained the purpose of the military activity, but the Brethren protested the intrusion declaring that the marching would ruin their grass. These protests were met with

insults, and the soldiers, who were conducting themselves in a most disorderly fashion, loudly beat on their drums and fired off guns to scare the horses which belonged to the Bethabara community.[65]

During the early years of the war there were no mass flights from the Carolina frontier similar to those which occurred in Pennsylvania in 1755 and 1756. When the raids on the frontier began, however, Bethabara, like Bethlehem, became a center for the refugees. Early in the summer of 1755 small groups of people came to the settlement from the more remote frontier areas, and with the arrival of these frontiersmen who had fled eastward because of false alarms, the Brethren stationed nightly watches about the settlement. By mid-August the scare had subsided. The little village was much encouraged by the arrival on November 3rd of seven married couples and ten single men from Bethlehem, bringing the total membership in the community to sixty persons.[66] During the winter, however, the community received a copy of a newspaper in which was reproduced a letter accusing the Moravians of being in league with the French. To say the least, they were much concerned lest the newspaper be circulated in Carolina and ill-will be thereby incurred.[67]

The next summer again found the Brethren somewhat in conflict with the civil authorities of North Carolina when a messenger from a local justice brought a petition to the governor "related to military affairs." When asked to sign the petition, the Moravians claimed exemption under the terms of the indemnity granted to them by Parliament. The messenger departed from Bethabara in a bad humor, but on the following day one of the Brethren called on the justice to explain that since the terms of the indemnity were to be considered binding upon Parliament, the terms were consequently binding upon the Moravians, and, that while the Brethren could not show bad faith by acting contrary to their legal obligations, the Bethabara community would contribute money and co-operate in other ways for the defense of the colony.[68] The Brethren made good this promise for when shortly thereafter new refugees arrived at the settlement, a palisade was erected for their protection.[69] Not wishing to depend entirely upon human resources for their security, "hourly intercessions" were introduced. Brother Christian Henrich stated the beliefs of the group when he wrote in the Bethabara diary, "In these troubled times prayer was the best safeguard and weapon. . . ."[70] Indeed, it was the religious life of the community which gave it a unity which was unknown in the regions from whence the refugees came. No opportunity was lost for religious observances and the Moravians co-operated gladly when the governor, at various times throughout the period of conflict, ordered the churches of North Carolina to observe days of

"fasting, humility, and prayer."[71] So great was their trust in Divine Providence that even the false report of the complete destruction of both Bethlehem and Nazareth failed to alter their faith. Upon hearing the report, the diarist at Bethabara could write only, "Lord, thou hast never made a mistake in Thy ruling, Thou art still our Master, and our faithful God."[72]

On March 12, 1757 the Brethren addressed a petition to Governor Dobbs in which they stated that while they could not engage in military affairs, they had erected a stockade, kept nightly watch, and had done everything possible to insure the safety of those who had come to Bethabara for protection. They requested that the governor "authorize the said watch under . . . [his] Hand and Seal, and [that he] . . . appoint Mr. Jacob Loesch to be chief overseer of this above mentioned watch." The governor complied with the request by issuing the captain's commission and by recognizing the "watch" as an independent company in the North Carolina militia.[73]

Encouraged by this official recognition of their efforts, the Brethren continued the fortification of Bethabara with new vigor. During the summer and fall of 1757 the fortifications were extended and the nearby hills were cleared of trees so as to prevent the Indians from concealing themselves there prior to making an attack upon the settlement.[74] While these preparations were going on refugees continued to seek shelter within the stockade. Indians were also passing through the village in increasing numbers. During the year 1757 one hundred and fifty Indians either passed by the village or stopped to enjoy the hospitality which was afforded both whites and red men.[75] When eight Cherokees appeared at the Bethabara saw mill they were cordially received and given clay pipes, but when the Indians insisted upon spending the night at the mill, twelve Moravians kept watch. In the morning the visitors prepared breakfast and then proceeded peaceably on their journey.[76] Throughout the war Indians continued to stop at the settlement on their way from the Cherokee Country to Virginia.[77] These red-men called this haven "the Dutch fort, where there are good people and much bread."[78]

By 1759 the fires of warfare had crept close to Bethabara, for in April the Cherokee attacked settlements on the Yadkin thirty miles away,[79] and in May attacks were made at the village on the Tenaret only twenty miles away.[80] Month by month, the raids occurred nearer to Bethabara: in February 1760 the savages surprised the people along Dobbs Creek, and in March houses were again burned on the Yadkin— this time but eight miles from Bethabara. Fortunately for the Moravians, this was the closest point at which the red men attacked. Later the Indians admitted that during 1760 they had been scared away

before a number of proposed attacks by the sound of the watchman's horn or by the ringing of the bells for morning or evening services.[81] It would have been almost a humorous incident for a watcherby to see the savages slowly creep upon the peaceful village to make a murderous attack, and, upon hearing the ringing of the church bells which summoned the people to service, to see these bloodthirsty red men scamper away for fear the bells were warning the settlers of the attack.

As the refugees came in almost countless numbers during 1759 and 1760 the community found itself in a great state of disorder. Indian spies were frequently seen at the mill,[82] and provincial rangers often passed through the settlement on their way to the Yadkin.[83] Nevertheless, while food was lacking in the surrounding country, Bethabara was well supplied with the necessities of life,[84] and religious services were continued without interruption. Occasionally the worship would be conducted in English for the benefit of the colonial troops, and when sickness threatened to incapacitate the entire band crowded within the stockade, the Brethren fearlessly ministered to the physical wants of their guests.[85]

Not until late in 1761 did the refugees begin to leave for their former homes, and not until 1763 did the last of the Indian alarms drive the frontier people back to the stockade for protection. Even after the refugees had departed the Brethren took an active interest in their welfare and sent grain to needy families in North Carolina and Virginia.[86]

While the Moravians at Bethabara were passing through these trying times, for some reason known only to themselves, they decided that a new settlement should be begun three miles west of Bethabara.[87] The new village which was called Bethania was laid out on June 30, 1759, and on July 10 two small houses were begun. Eight days later the first nine inhabitants took up their abode in the newly-built homes, and in the spring of the following year Bishop Spangenberg organized the Bethania Congregation. The experiences of the Moravians here were similar to those of the inhabitants at Bethabara. Regular watch was kept as Indians were seen frequently in the vicinity. In the fall of 1760 a company of North Carolina militia offered to stay in the village, but the Brethren declined the offer with thanks, preferring to provide their own defense.[88]

No discussion of the Moravians during the French and Indian War could be complete without mention of Christian Frederick Post. Post was a Moravian missionary who had married an Indian woman and who enjoyed an unusual reputation for honesty and fair dealings among the Indians. In 1758 when the British forces moved westward to attack Fort Duquesne, General Forbes sent Post in advance (and

alone) to visit the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos on the Ohio to se-
cure their neutrality. Post succeeded in convincing the Indians that
the French cause was a lost one and that the red men had nothing to
gain by remaining in alliance with what were certain to be the losers
in the coming struggle for the Forks of the Ohio. Post was so con-
vincing in his argument that most of the Indian allies of the French
deserted Fort Duquesne. The French, unable to hold the position
without assistance from the Indians, burned Duquesne and fled to
Canada.[89] Forbes and his men were thus able, thanks to the services
of the Moravian missionary, to gain control of the Ohio Valley vir-
tually without firing a shot.

The war, unfortunately, brought about the temporary suspension
of a greater part of the Moravian missionary activity. The mission at
Pachgotoch in Connecticut suffered greatly when a party of unidenti-
fied Indians killed four white inhabitants of Stockbridge, Massachu-
setts. The residents there suspected the Moravian Indians of Pachgo-
toch and ordered them not to enter Stockbridge under pain of death
and insisted that the missionaries were harboring murderers within
their settlement. The indignant citizens searched the mission but failed
to find evidence which would incriminate any of the Indian converts.
In 1775 the male Indians were forced into the Massachusetts Militia
much against the wishes of the missionaries. Throughout the war four
Moravians (including one woman) remained at the post where daily
worship continued and the Indian school remained open in spite of all
difficulties.[90]

During the summer of 1754 David Zeisberger and Charles Fred-
rich went to New York to visit the Indian converts at Onondaga, where
they remained until June of the following year. At this same time
Adam Grube visited the Wyoming Valley, being there at the time of
the destruction of Gnadenhutten, and later traveling eastward to the
present site of Scranton.[91]

As the work of the missionaries became increasingly difficult,
it was decided to hold a missionary conference at Bethlehem. On Sep-
tember 8, 1755 there assembled at that village four bishops, sixteen
missionaries, and eighteen "female assistants." The problems involved
in the work were candidly presented to the assembly, but the group
resolved to continue operations and even expand, when possible, into
new territory.[92]

While the missionary activity of the Brethren suffered, no
efforts were spared to keep in constant communication with the
various Indian missions as well as with the headquarters of the
Unitas at Herrnhut. Indeed, throughout the war years there was
a more or less regular movement of Moravians back and forth across

the Atlantic on ships owned by the group. In 1754, 1755, and 1756 the *Irene* made successful sea journeys between New York and London. In 1757, however, the vessel made her fourteenth and last voyage. Having set out from New York on November 20 of that year, she was overtaken ten days later by a French privateer. The French crew boarded the *Irene,* robbed the passengers of their belongings, and placed the vessel in charge of a prize crew. Running into foul weather, all aboard the sinking ship were obliged to enter a small boat which reached Louisbourg on February 5, 1758. Here the Moravians were held as prisoners of war until their release by General Amherst upon his capture of the fortress. With the purchase in 1760 of the *Hope,* communications with Herrnhut were again restored.[93]

During the war years the Moravians increased in numbers. In 1753, the year before the outbreak of the conflict, the Moravians in British North America numbered 812. In 1761, the year after which (with the fall of Montreal) the actual fighting came to a close, they numbered 1,140. Although the gain was due largely to natural increase, there were regular immigrations from Germany to North America,[94] and in this respect, of the German-speaking religious groups, the Moravians were unique.

Economically, the Moravians prospered during the war years. The number of acres under cultivation was greatly increased[95] and by 1757 the Brethren at Bethlehem began to sell handicraft products outside the community.[96]

The war years also brought about the first steps in the dissolution of the "General Economy," or the communal economic system under which the Moravians had lived. The "Economy" had been one of the greatest sources of Moravian strength, as the collective resources of a sizable number of settlers had enabled the group to make highly desirable land purchases. Also, the division of labor within the group made possible a more comfortable sort of living than that enjoyed by the other German settlers. Whether the Brethren's material prosperity of the late 1750's came because of the war or in spite of the war, would be difficult to determine. This prosperity, nevertheless, largely prompted the dissolution of the "Economy" in 1762.[97]

By way of summary it may well be said that the Moravians in their own way contributed appreciably to the ultimate victory of the British cause. The guard duty performed at the Moravian settlements in Pennsylvania and North Carolina seems to have had the effect of strengthening the line of colonial defense and in all probability helping to prevent a large-scale Indian attack upon the thickly settled coastal

region. Christian Frederick Post's dangerous mission to the Ohio Valley was the most important single factor in the French desertion of Fort Duquesne. But perhaps even more significant was the "war relief," the direction of which the Moravians accepted as their special province and which they performed in most creditable fashion.

For the Indians, the Moravians also rendered useful service. Although they did not share the Quakers' ideas that the war was the result of the white man's mistreatment of the red man, the Brethren recognized the difference between friendly and hostile Indians and did all in their power to prevent white fanatics from indiscriminately murdering the red men.

So far as the Moravians themselves were concerned, the conflict forced them to contract their missionary operations, a fact which caused them much distress, for it was the missionary enterprise which was their chief reason for existence as a religious group. Economically, the war had no harmful effect upon the group, for although they were obliged to abandon the "General Economy," the years following the war were years of great prosperity for the members of the *Unitas*.

Superficially, it would seem that much of the story of the Moravians between 1754 and 1763 was nothing more than the common frontier experience. Examined more closely, however, it at once becomes apparent that the response to the demands of the time was made in a way altogether unlike that of the other people of the frontier. In every dangerous situation the Moravians had the advantage of unity of purpose, if not always the advantage of numbers. Furthermore, it was in meeting the challenge of the times that the Moravians compromised their pacifist principles and by so doing won the respect and admiration of the English-speaking colonists. It was in this way that the Moravians emerged from the war as simply another denomination of Christians, and the way was cleared for the Moravians to take their place in the broader picture of colonial life.

1. Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 8 vols to date (Caldwell, Idaho and New York, 1931-1954), VI, 20.

2. For the locations of German settlements and communities see the present writer's "German Settlements in British North America Before the French and Indian War," *Social Studies* XLIV (December, 1953), pp. 283-290.

3. The "Church people" were the members of such religious groups as were recognized by the governments of the various German states, *i.e.*, they were members of the Lutheran, Reformed, and Roman Catholic Churches. "Sect people" belonged to such groups as the Mennonites, Amish, and Dunkers.

4. See the present writer's "The Lutheran Church During the French and Indian War," *The Lutheran Quarterly*, VI (August, 1954), pp. 248-256.

5. Jacob John Sessler, *Communal Pietism Among Early American Moravians* (New York, c. 1933), pp. 100, 137-138, 142.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-204.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 76 ff.

8. John Heckewelder, *A Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren Among the Delawares, and Mohegan Indians, From its Commencement, in the Year 1740 to the Close of the Year 1808* (Philadelphia, 1820), p. 17.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19.

10. *Records of the Moravians in North Caro-*

lina, Adelaide L. Fries, ed. (3 vols., Raleigh, 1922), I, 22.

11. *Ibid.*, II, 516-517.

12. *Ibid.*, I, 27.

13. *Ibid.*, II, 517.

14. *Ibid.*, I, 27.

15. *Ibid.*, I, 78-80.

16. The dates refer to the organization of the congregation.

17. Paul De Schweinitz, "The German Moravian Settlement in Pennsylvania, 1725-1800," *Pennsylvania German Society Proceedings*, IV (1894), p. 69; H. M. M. Richards, *The Pennsylvania-German in the French and Indian War* [*Pennsylvania German Society Proceedings and Addresses*, vol. XV], (Lancaster, Pa., 1905), p. 308; Daniel Miller, "The Early Moravians in Berks County," *The Pennsylvania-German*, X (Jan., 1909), p. 28, (Feb., 1909), p. 68; Daniel Miller, "The Moravian Church in Bethel," *The Pennsylvania-German*, XI (Jan., 1910), p. 28.

18. Lucy Forney Bittinger, *The Germans in Colonial Times* (Philadelphia, 1901), p. 179.

19. Samuel Orcott, *The Indians of the Housatonic and Naugatuck Valleys* (Hartford, Connecticut, 1882), p. 178.

20. Augustus C. Thompson, *Moravian Indian Missions* (New York, 1882), pp. 289-290.

21. In 1753 they numbered but slightly more than 800 souls. J. J. Sessler, *Communal Pietism*, p. 74. See also Theodore Emanuel Schmauck, *The Lutheran Church in Pennsylvania, 1638-1820* [*Pennsylvania German Society Proceedings*], I, 227.

22. A. Gertrude Ward, "John Ettwein and the Moravians in the Revolution," *Pennsylvania History*, I (January, 1934), 198.

23. John Walter Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (Charlottesville, Va., 1907), p. 109; Albert Bernhardt Faust, *The German Element in the United States* (2 vols., New York, c. 1909), I, 204.

24. "Spangenberg's Notes of Travel to Onondaga in 1745," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, II (April, 1878), p. 424, editor's notes; E. B. O'Callaghan, *Documentary History of the State of New York* (4 vols., Albany, 1850-1851), III, 613-621.

25. Faust, *op. cit.*, I, 203; Oscar Kuhns, *The German and Swiss Settlements of Colonial Pennsylvania: A Study of the So-Called Pennsylvania Dutch* (New York, 1901), p. 203; Arthur D. Graeff, "The Relations Between the Pennsylvania Germans and the British Authorities (1750-1756)," *Pennsylvania German Soc. Proc.*, I, 70; Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 41-44.

26. Graeff, *op. cit.*, I, 70.

27. Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia*, p. 109; Faust, *op. cit.*, I, 204.

28. Originally one trustee had been appointed to represent each sect found in the city. Franklin, *Autobiography*, in Nathan G. Goodman, ed., *Benjamin Franklin's Own Story* (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 128.

29. Charles R. Roberts, "Pennsylvania-Germans in Public Life During the Colonial Period," *The Pennsylvania-German*, X (April, 1909), pp. 154-155.

30. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 42-44.

31. *Archives of the State of New Jersey*, First Series, VIII, Part 2, 160, 165.

32. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, p. 41.

33. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 44-46; Bittinger, *op. cit.*, p. 192; M. S. Henry, *History of the Lehigh Valley* (Easton, Pennsylvania, 1860), pp. 317-319; Kuhns, *op. cit.*, p. 204; Albert S. Bolles, *Pennsylvania, Province and State* (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 331-332.

34. Bolles, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

35. James Henry, *Sketches of Moravian Life and Character* (Philadelphia, 1859), p. 114.

36. Franklin, *Autobiography*, p. 156.

37. John W. Jordan, "Bishop Augustus Gottlieb Spangenberg," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, VIII (July, 1884), 235-237.

38. *Ibid.*, 237.

39. *Ibid.*, 237-238.

40. John W. Jordan, "The Bethlehem Ferry, 1743-1794," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XXI (1897), 107.

41. "Franklin in the Valley of the Lehigh, 1756" [Extracts from the diary of the Moravian congregation at Bethlehem], *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XVIII (1894), 377.

42. Franklin, *Autobiography*, p. 156.

43. "Franklin in the Valley of the Lehigh," 378.

44. Franklin, *Autobiography*, p. 157.

45. "The Old Crown Inn, Bethlehem, Pa.," *The American Historical Record*, I (April, 1872), 148.

46. *Ibid.*, I, 148.

47. George S. Brookes, *Friend Anthony Benezet* (Philadelphia, 1937), pp. 212-219. These pages consist of correspondence between Anthony Benezet and Bishop Spangenberg.

48. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 50-51.

49. Augustus C. Thompson, *Moravian Missions* (New York, 1882), p. 290.

50. Orcott, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Heckewelder, *Narrative*, p. 57.

51. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 67-75; Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

52. C. Hale Sipe, *The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1929), pp. 335, 340.

53. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, pp. 51-52.

54. Edmund De Schweinitz, *The Life and Times of David Zeisberger*, pp. 242-246.
55. Hubertis Cummings, *Richard Peters: Provincial Secretary and Cleric, 1704-1776* (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 214.
56. Heckewelder, *Narrative*, p. 58.
57. H. M. M. Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
58. Bittinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.
59. Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.
60. Edmund De Schweinitz, *The Life and Times of David Zeisberger*, p. 240.
61. Richards, op. cit., pp. 174-178.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-172; James Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
63. H. M. M. Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-311.
64. Daniel Miller, "The Moravian Church in Bethel," *The Pennsylvania-German*, XI (Jan., 1910), 29.
65. *Records of the Moravians in North Carolina*, I, 110
66. *Ibid.*, I, 133-140.
67. *Ibid.*, I, 150.
68. *Ibid.*, I, 170.
69. *Ibid.*, I, 159.
70. *Ibid.*, I, 168.
71. *Ibid.*, I, 160, 172, 189.
72. *Ibid.*, I, 162-163.
73. *Ibid.*, I, 182-183.
74. *Ibid.*, I, 181.
75. *Ibid.*, I, 177.
76. *Ibid.*, I, 166.
77. *Ibid.*, I, 186, 189, 191, 192.
78. G. D. Bernheim, *History of the German Settlements and of the Lutheran Church in North and South Carolina* (Philadelphia, 1872), p. 158.
79. *Records of the Moravians in North Carolina*, I, 209.
80. *Ibid.*, I, 211.
81. *Ibid.*, I, 227.
82. *Ibid.*, I, 230-231.
83. *Ibid.*, I, 211.
84. *Ibid.*, I, 206.
85. *Ibid.*, I, 231-232.
86. *Ibid.*, I, 234, 236, 240, 273-276.
87. *Ibid.*, 208; Faust, *op. cit.*, I, 232.
88. *Records of the Moravians in North Carolina*, I, 211-214, 227-233.
89. Christian Frederick Post, "Journal," *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* (Cleveland, 1904), I, 185 ff; Anthony Benezet to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, July, 1763, in George S. Brookes, *Friend Anthony Benezet*.
90. Samuel Orcott, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-180.
91. Edmund De Schweinitz, *The Life and Times of David Zeisberger*, pp. 216-219.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
93. John W. Jordan, "Moravian Immigration to Pennsylvania, 1734-1765," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XXXIII (1909), 228-248.
94. J. J. Sessler, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
95. In 1748 there were 675 acres under cultivation at Bethlehem and Nazareth. In 1756 the number of acres under cultivation in these two places was 1,800. In 1759 it was 2,454. J. J. Sessler, *op. cit.*, p. 88
96. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
97. *Ibid.*, pp. 182 ff.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY AND
AMERICAN THEOLOGY

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The Scottish Philosophy is no longer in good repute despite its proud reign in another day. Indeed, few, if any, schools of philosophy have been given such disdainful treatment by historians as Common Sense Realism; and few, if any, philosophers have had to suffer such ignominious re-evaluations as Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, who were once lionized as the founders of a great and enduring philosophical synthesis. Yet the very decisiveness of this reversal creates at least two challenging problems, one philosophical and the other historical. *First,* was the Scottish Philosophy as undistinguished as posterity has judged it to be? (To this I would answer with a qualified negative, but the subject is outside the purview of the present essay.) *Second,* why, when its ultimate rejection was so complete, did the Scottish Philosophy for over a century play such a large and variegated role in Western thought, being in its origins a forceful liberalizing religious movement, in France the near-official "middle-way" of the Restoration and July Monarchy, and in America the handmaiden of both Unitarianism and Orthodoxy? The account which follows is directed to this second question as well as to the factors in Scottish and American intellectual history which demonstrate the importance of asking it.

An approach to the matter through a study of the inter-relation of the philosophy and Christian theology has a number of advantages. It permits reassessment of the common notion—of which Taine's reference to the "churchwarden-philosophy" is typical—that this philosophical movement was essentially a reactionary effort to shore up the ruin of orthodox theology. This view, it seems to me, requires modification.[1] A theological angle of vision also serves to emphasize the depth to which Scottish Realism penetrated American thought; and it would appear that the extent of its propagation is not generally recognized. Finally, this approach provides a case study on the effects of philosophical apologetics which may not be without a certain theological relevance.

* * *

That the "Scottish Renaissance" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is not just a state of affairs imagined by professional Scotsmen, is being made abundantly clear as the subject receives closer and more sympathetic study. It was a genuine cultural efflorescence which placed the Scottish universities in the European forefront and

made Edinburgh one of the literary capitals of the world. Nor is it simply a work of piety to point out that during the eighteenth century Churchmen and sons of Churchmen played a major role in that flowering. Their contribution, however, and the whole cultural resurgence, took place against the background of ecclesiastical discord. Rebellion had been endemic in Scotland since before the Reformation. Objections to Anglican episcopacy had long been a source of violence in certain quarters, and Jacobite resistance had been exceedingly troublesome in others.[2] But during the eighteenth century the Church of Scotland in common with most of Western Christendom was subjected to the special stresses and strains created by the new science and the seductions of Deistic rationalism. The Patronage Act of 1712, which followed close upon the unification of Scotland and England and the establishment of Presbyterianism in Scotland, did much to exacerbate this theological unsettlement. By this act the powers of appointment to over 500 clerical livings were transferred to the Crown and over 400 to local lords and land-owners. Since many appointments were unacceptable to local congregations, open rioting was frequent and judicial conflict almost continual. There followed a series of secessions from the State Church which were to culminate in the great Disruption of 1843 and the founding of the Free Church of Scotland.[3]

Within the Kirk itself two opposing parties gradually took form. Dominant during the latter part of the mid-eighteenth century was the "Moderate" party, the defenders of decorum and lawful government. In a minority until very late in the century, but in closer relations with a majority of the nation's active church-members, was the "Evangelical" or "Popular" party. There were the expected social distinctions between the groups, and this factor in turn was related to the profound economic changes in Scotland which had been accelerating since the Act of Union in 1707. But the basic religious differences were serious. The Evangelicals lent a far more sympathetic ear—and hand—to the English Revivalists (especially Whitefield); they lamented the passing of the old Calvinistic austerities; and they were far more insistent on doctrinal purity.[4] The Moderates, on the other hand, though nominally orthodox, tended much more to emphasize eloquent preaching, ethics, natural theology, scholarship, and free philosophic inquiry. William Robertson (1721-93), the great historian and Principal of the University of Edinburgh, was their leader and exemplar.[5] An Evangelical leader described a "Moderate man" as one who "expelled *mortification, self-denial, humility* and *silence,* from among the number of the virtues. . . ." He then went on to outline the *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* that a young man must cultivate if he wished to gain preferment under the Moderate regime. ". . . a kind of fellow-feeling with heresy" was the requirement of Maxim I; "the air and manner of a

fine gentleman," of Maxim V. The others could be grouped under these two heads.[6] "A Moderate sermon is like a winter's day," observed Thomas Chalmers, "short and clear and cold."[7] These Moderates, thus accurately if somewhat invidiously characterized, gained control of the Church of Scotland during the "Age of Robertson." The conflict which accompanied their victory, however, was also focussed on the universities in which the Scottish Philosophy was being incubated.

In each of the four Scottish universities one may observe the profound change that took place during the early eighteenth century. In the south the struggle was more bitter than farther north, and St. Andrews became more somnolent than *renaissante;* but, in general, the case of Glasgow is typical. There the transition could be dated to the "unapostolic succession" in the chair of theology from the rigid Calvinist, James Woodrow, to the moderate John Simson in 1708. Simson was harrassed by almost continual trials for heresy and in 1727, despite solid university backing and his own professions of orthodoxy, he was suspended.[8] But the conservative victory was short-lived. Two years later Francis Hutcheson was made professor of moral philosophy and in 1743 his friend, William Leechman, later to be Principal of the university, was made professor of theology. By mid-century the Moderate spirit was regnant not only in Glasgow but, after similar struggles, in Aberdeen and Edinburgh as well.[9] In view of the controversy that such a result entailed, it is more accurate to see the Scottish Philosophers as a liberal vanguard, even as theological revolutionaries, than to preserve the traditional picture of genteel conservatives bringing reason to the service of a decadent orthodoxy.[10]

Having made these precisions, one may now trace the emergence of the Scottish school of "Natural Realism." The search for precursors, however, leads into an infinite regress. One must, of course, mention the father of all common sense philosophies, Aristotle, and his mediaeval champion, St. Thomas, as well as the great Thomistic mediator of the English Reformation, the judicious Richard Hooker. Also to be included is that prince of all moderates, John Locke, in whose shadow the entire movement flourished. Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton were crucial as symbols of the experimental approach; yet in mitigating empiricism the influence of the Cambridge Platonists, Richard Pierce, and Bishop Butler, was vital. In the near background Shaftesbury was significant, though as excitants and *provocateurs* certain non-academic critics like David Hume and Lord Kames were as important as anyone.[11] For the title of "founder" there is more than one candidate. Sir William Hamilton gave the laurel to Gershom Carmichael, regent of St. Andrews, professor of moral philosophy at

Glasgow, editor of Pufendorf, and teacher of Hutcheson.[12] James McCosh, on the other hand, named George Turnbull, sometime regent at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and teacher of Reid, as "the first metaphysician . . . to announce unambiguously and categorically that we ought to proceed in the method of induction in investigating the human mind."[13] On these foundations Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid carried the work to completion. Dugald Stewart became its salesman to the world. Adam Smith of Glasgow and Adam Ferguson of Edinburgh, both of whom produced notable works of moral philosophy, made their chief contributions in other fields. On the periphery many lesser figures, like Hugh Blair, George Campbell, James Oswald, and James Beattie, to mention but a few, gave great popularity, and at times considerable notoriety, to Scottish thought.[14] What we have, nevertheless, is a broad and diversified movement of Moderate philosophy challenging the old Calvinistic tradition in both the Established Church and in the universities.[15] It remains to consider the truly central figures in this movement.

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was called in 1729 to the philosophy chair at Glasgow, and he taught with increasing renown until his death. Yet his fame rests on his early treatises, the cardinal doctrines of which are suggested by the two charges of heterodoxy brought by the Presbytery of Glasgow: (1) that through the moral sense man gains a knowledge of good and evil independent of God or revelation; and (2) that the promotion of happiness for others is the standard of virtue. Hutcheson's ethic was too utilitarian to be palatable to the Common Sense Realists and he later modified it himself; but his "empirical" analysis of consciousness and his delineation of many "senses" or faculties of the mind—including the moral sense or faculty —were fundamental links between the thought of Locke and the psychological investigations pursued by Reid and Stewart. This inward view and the systematic description of the landscape there beheld is his great legacy to the Scottish Philosophers.[16]

The archetypical Scottish Philosopher is Thomas Reid (1710-1796), regent at King's College, Aberdeen, and active member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society from 1752 to 1763 and thereafter successor to Adam Smith in moral philosophy at Glasgow. While still a parish minister, Reid was awakened from his Berkeleian slumbers by Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature* (1738-40). His own *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764) was an effort to trace Hume's "skepticism" back to the errors of "representationalism" or what Reid called the "ideal theory," and to put in its stead a realistic theory of perception. In the full statement of his mature thought published two decades later, however, Reid was en-

gaged, as well, on the wider front of refuting materialism, ethical relativism, and kindred errors. This led him into alliance with rationalists like Richard Price.[17]

Reid's philosophy can be summarized in terms of four major conclusions—and it might be added that these four points, or most of them, take central place in the thought of any typical proponent of the "Scottish Philosophy":

I. Philosophy depends on scientific observation, with the primary object of such observation being self-consciousness and not the external behavior of other men. (The *a priori* extension of Newtonian physics to the mental realm was held to be illicit just as "external" observation was felt to imply deterministic conclusions right from the outset.)[18]

II. The observation of consciousness establishes principles which are anterior to and independent of experience. Some principles, like that of substance or cause-and-effect, are *necessary,* others, like the existence of things perceived, are *contingent,* but all are in the very constitution of the mind and not the product of experience. (It is at this point where Reid most clearly foreshadows the Kantian revolution in philosophy.)[19]

III. Nothing can be an efficient cause in the proper sense but an intelligent being; matter cannot be the cause of anything but is only an instrument in the hands of a real cause. (This notion of agency or *power* is revealed by self-consciousness.)[20]

IV. The first principles of morals are self-evident intuitions; moral judgments, therefore, are not deduced from non-moral judgments, for they are not deductions at all.[21]

Of all the exponents of this system none was more important than Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) who in 1785 succeeded Adam Ferguson in the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Stewart added little or nothing to his master's system; but his rhetorical gifts and great erudition attracted the cultivated circles of Edinburgh and his books won a wide international audience.[22] In France, Royer-Collard and his disciples, Cousin and Jouffroy, virtually established Common Sense Realism as the official philosophy of the schools and universities.[23] And in America, though imposed by less authoritarian methods, the Scottish Philosophy became almost as pervasive.

* * *

It would be futile to try to discover the first entrance of the Scottish Philosophy into America; but since Reid's *Inquiry*—the *sine qua non*—was not published until 1764, the honor of being the first real ambassador should probably be assigned to John Witherspoon, who after long and almost coercive supplications finally left his native land in 1768 to become president of the College of New Jersey in Princeton. Witherspoon was not an ideal emissary, however, even though some have credited him with anticipating Reid's "discoveries," because his Evangelical bias blinded him to the real genius of the

movement. Yet before his term as president ended, the "French mania" and Deism were becoming dangerously popular. Believing as his whole generation seemed to, moreover, that the then regnant views of Locke and Berkeley led inexorably to the "skepticism" of Hume or, worse yet, to the materialism of Condillac and the French *ideologues,* they saw no other recourse but to defend orthodox theology with weapons forged in the Scottish universities for quite another kind of battle.[24]

As a result of Witherspoon's powerful influence, Reid *did* supplant Berkeley at Princeton, and due to the powerful advocacy of Archibald Alexander, the first and for a year the only professor in the Princeton Theological Seminary, and Charles Hodge, his great colleague and successor, the Scottish Philosophy was carried by Princeton graduates to academies, colleges, seminaries, and churches all over the country.

To a consideration of Alexander and Hodge I will return in due course; but to illustrate the impact of Scottish Realism on American doctrinal developments, it is advantageous to shift to the other end of the theological spectrum and consider, in turn, a series of early theologians at Harvard, Yale, Andover, and Princeton, beginning with the most liberal and proceeding progressively through various degrees of conservatism.[25]

At Harvard the moderate Calvinist, David Tappan, Hollis Professor of Divinity (1792-1803), introduced Scottish texts into the curriculum.[26] Among his most distinguished students was William Ellery Channing, and Channing's oft-described religious awakening was wrought by the reading of Francis Hutcheson. It was the *Treatise on the Moral Sense* which convinced the future Unitarian of the essential goodness of man and fortified those conceptions of "disinterested benevolence" which the earlier preaching of Samuel Hopkins had impressed upon him. Later it was Adam Ferguson, especially through his *History of Civil Society* (1766), who convinced Channing of the social nature of moral improvement. Finally the reading of the more rationalistic writers—Reid, Stewart, Price, and Jouffroy—provided him an escape from the hedonism that seemed to flow from sensationalist premises. "Price," he confessed, "saved me from Locke's Philosophy." And in the years that followed, though Channing never accomplished a systematic expression of his views, these influences undergirded the Christian "perfectibilitarianism" (to use Professor Patterson's term) which was his legacy to American thought.[27]

By 1810 Harvard was for all practical purposes a Unitarian institution, and the Scottish Philosophy became almost official both

in the College and the new Divinity School. Under the Alford Professors, Levi Frisbie, Levi Hedge, James Walker, and Francis Bowen, there was an unbroken succession of emphatic Scottish advocacy down to 1889. Of this group James Walker is typical. He was called in 1839 to the Alford Chair of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, and from 1853 to 1860 he was president of Harvard University. In the ante-bellum period he was, after Channing, probably the most respected figure in the Unitarian movement. Walker published no systematic work, but his *Sermons* are, in substance, chapters in moral philosophy. The Scottish imprint is unmistakable as he brings his eloquence to bear on the subjects of virtue, conscience, natural theology, and the role of reason. For use in his religion and ethics classes he even prepared special editions of both Reid and Stewart. James Bowen, his successor, added other editions of Stewart and Hamilton. How Scottish views fitted in to the liberal Christian theology of early Unitarians is too apparent to require further elaboration here.[28]

The Unitarian movement, however, was an extremely limited phenomenon. Although it had by 1833 wrested almost a hundred of the old Congregational parishes from Orthodox control, the old saying that its preaching was limited to the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the neighborhood of Boston is substantially true in the geographical sense—though not in the theological.[29] In New England as a whole the theology of Andover and Yale was far more influential; and in the great Yankee diaspora of the nineteenth century, Unitarianism was left behind. For the evangelical response to infidelity, the greatest spokesman was probably Timothy Dwight, the grandson of Jonathan Edwards who became president of Yale in 1795. Yet Dwight, too, was a transitional figure who moderated the "Consistent Calvinism" of the Edwardsians. The impact of wide reading in the Scottish philosopers is clearly visible.[30] The implications of his deviations are made clear in the theology of his greatest pupil, Nathaniel William Taylor, who was called as the professor of theology in the new divinity school at Yale.

Taylor was dissatisfied with the character of the campaign against Unitarianism being waged by the professors at Andover. He let it be known, indeed, that he thought Leonard Woods had set back the Orthodox cause by fifty years![31] Taylor would probably wince at being considered in such close proximity to Unitarians; but the fact remains that he, like them, deplored the extremes of Consistent Calvinism. The "New Haven Theology" thus bears the same relation to the moderating theology of Dwight as the "Harvard Theology" bore to that of Tappan. In both camps, moreover, the need for apologetics

was urgently felt. Taylor became as convinced as ever was Channing of the need for *rational* theology; and to each of them the Scottish Philosophy came like manna from heaven. "Those who find fault with Metaphysics," Taylor stated in his lectures, "are generally those who know nothing about it, and here as everywhere else, we are not to wonder when dogs bark at strangers." But he adds a *caveat* that one would expect from one of the greatest revival preachers in Connecticut: "No proposition in mental philosophy is of any value, unless its statements can be reduced to the simple language of life. We must," he insisted, "identify it with the principles of common sense."[32] Nor is this a mere common-sensical reference to "common sense." Taylor's mental and moral philosophy is steeped in Scottish thought—and is of the same dye.

There are two ways of stating the central thesis of Taylor's theology. Perhaps first is his classic assertion that God could not prevent sin in a moral system. Man was the author of sin, not God. Man's sinful deeds were willed, not caused by any created, physical attribute of human nature. Sin was in the sinning. The will, he said, was a self-originating power; man was a free agent. To prove it he invoked the arguments of Reid and Stewart who, like him, were at odds with any "doctrine of inability" whether sprung from deterministic philosophy or predestinarian theology. In this sense Reid is to Taylor what Locke was to Edwards. Yet Taylor was no Arminian: it was still certain that man would sin. "Certainty, with power to the contrary," then, is Taylor's other famous slogan.[33]

When the cry of heresy went up, as it did soon and often, Taylor replied that his was the *faith* of a Calvinist but that the distinguishing features of Taylorism were mere "philosophical theories" employed to *explain* those doctrines. He was right—but more so than he knew, for his critics were also right in insisting that these "explanations" constituted a new divinity.[34]

Of these critics, Leonard Woods was understandably among the most zealous. The leading living champion of Nathaniel Emmons' brand of Hopkinsianism, he had been called as Abbot Professor of Theology to the new "sacred West Point" of Orthodoxy established at Andover. In the famous controversy with Henry Ware of Harvard he had contributed to one of the great debates on human nature in American religious history; but by general consensus he had been bested. His genius was more suited to pointing out deviations from orthodoxy than to defending Christian doctrine from its critics. Yet in spite of himself, Woods, too, was a transitional figure. His argumentation bears the Scottish impress. But unlike Channing he was in no position to put it to frankly humanistic purposes. He was a literal-

minded man who lost the pole star of Edwards' theocentrism and became lost in a wilderness of doctrine.[35] His hand-picked successor, Edwards Amasa Park, took new ground perforce; and for our present purpose he merits closer study.

Park was acutely aware of both his theological heritage and his philosophical baggage. A man of massive erudition and great theological acumen, he was the last creative figure in the New England Theology. It is a tragedy that posterity has remembered him only as the lonely, isolated mossback fighting a losing battle against liberal changes at Andover itself.[36]

Park, too, was a Common Sense philosopher. "New England divinity has been marked by a strong, practical common sense," he declared. "Our later theologians . . . were adepts in the philosophy of Reid, Oswald, Campbell, Beattie, Stewart; and this has been termed *the philosophy of common sense.*"[37] Park even fulfills the classic requirement of being one who could, with what his biographer calls "sarcastic wit," think he had refuted Bishop Berkeley by kicking a stone.[38] For Stewart's compositions he had the highest praise. He insisted, moreover, that natural theology reclaim the place it held in the thought of Butler, Paley, and Stewart.[39] For the place of reason in theology he was more advanced than Taylor.[40] On the question of freedom of the will he took the position of Scottish introspectionist thought. He found what Reid had found: a free will that made man responsible for his acts and which ruled out any doctrine of man's passive sinfulness. The "theology of the feelings," he admitted, often spoke in violent paradoxes on this subject; but not the theology of the intellect, for it proclaims only the "certainty of wrong preference" not the "inability of right."[41] Park stood with Taylor.

It was left for Charles Hodge of Princeton—the great theological arbiter of mid-century Presbyterianism—to condemn *all* of the foregoing thinkers and schools of thinkers as heretics. Hodge was a Professor of *Polemical* Theology, and that meant defending true doctrine from its perverters within the fold. He was, as Park once remarked, more afraid of the ghost of Semi-Pelagius than the ghost of Pelagius.[42] Hodge stood firm on the Westminster Catechism which he had memorized as a child and on Turretin's systematic works which he studied as a seminarian at the feet of Archibald Alexander.[43] ". . . a new idea never originated in this [Princeton] seminary," he boasted; and to any theologian who did practice innovation he could justify his own confidence with the remark that "A man behind the walls of Gibraltar, or of Ehrenbreitstein, cannot, if he would, tremble at the sight of a single knight, however gallant or well-appointed he may be."[44]

Yet Hodge brought truly unique gifts to his task. Intensive studies in Germany and his awareness of the new critical and historical studies gave an authority to his pronouncements that was scarcely equalled in America. His long experience in biblical exegesis and his Old School Presbyterian loyalties, meanwhile, strengthened him against the charms of romantic idealism in all its forms. Even in the thinking of his two close friends, Tholuck and Neander, he could only lament the visible influences of Schleiermacher. Pantheism, he insisted, was the worst form of Atheism.[45]

But this is not the whole story. Hodge was also the culmination of the Witherspoon tradition and the chief protegé of Alexander. The Scottish Philosophy, for weal or woe, was as vital to that tradition as Turretin. Consider, for example, Alexander's *Outlines of Moral Science* which Hodge, in lieu of any work on the subject by himself, considered to be the epitome of correct ethical reasoning.[46] Any reader unaware that its author was one of the nation's most inflexible champions of Old School Calvinism would assume on reading this book by itself, that it was written, perhaps, by some mild English Latitudinarian bent on mediating the views of Butler, Reid, and Price. What is important here, though, is that these attitudes brought into Hodge's *Systematic Theology* what one Dutch Calvinist critic called the "stains of humanism."[47]

Hodge might condemn the innovations of Edwards or fulminate against the Semi-Pelagianism of Taylor; he might castigate Park's memorable distinction between "The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings" as a reduction to poetry of all doctrine; he might denounce all Unitarianism as a form of infidelity."[48] Yet the irony remains: Hodge himself is caught up in the anthropocentrism of Scottish Philosophy. Safe in Ehrenbreitstein as he was, he did not at first try to establish a rationalized mediate position between divine sovereignty and human freedom as New England Theologians had done. This double truth was to him a sacred mystery.[49] But later his confidence in "philosophical speculation" seems to have grown, and in his *Systematic Theology* he ventured upon a full metaphysical reconciliation. His central thesis was that "a free act may be inevitably certain as to its occurrence."[50] The foundations of his ethic and his conception of natural theology, moreover, are Scottish rather than Calvinistic. Hodge reveals the influence of Scottish anthropology with special clarity in his interpretation of the doctrine that man's nature, not just his acts, but his *nature,* is "truly and properly sin." Despite his reiterations of dogmatic formulae, the optimism of the Scottish Renaissance interposes itself and separates his theology from that of John Knox and John Calvin.[51]

My theological cross-section is now sufficiently drawn. It began with a brief portrayal of the situation in Scotland and its universities, where Common Sense Realism came into being as the Moderate voice of the Enlightenment against a background of violent ecclesiastical strife. We have witnessed the introduction of Scottish thinking into the nerve-center of American Presbyterianism by John Witherspoon and into the Moderate Calvinist tradition then developing at Harvard by David Tappan. We have seen it accomplish the liberation of Channing and nourish the confident Unitarianism of James Walker. It also appeared in the influential lectures of Timothy Dwight, and through his chief disciple, Nathaniel Taylor, came to occupy a central place in the "New Haven Theology." It informed the response to liberalism which was excogitated at Andover, first by the orthodox Hopkinsian, Leonard Woods, and then by his successor, Edwards Amasa Park. Finally, at Princeton the Witherspoon tradition was planted in the new seminary by Archibald Alexander and carried into the vast, polemical system of Charles Hodge. It remains to assay the meaning of this amazingly diverse philosophical conquest.

The first and most obvious observation is that the leading thinkers of the American Calvinistic tradition experienced in acute terms the need for an apologetical philosophy. This was in no significant way akin to that felt by medieval scholastics who were more interested in proving the orthodoxy of Reason than the reasonableness of Orthodoxy. In America the need stemmed from a concrete situation: the religious decadence of the Revolutionary epoch and the fear, felt particularly in the post-war period, that French infidelity was engulfing the universities. That such "scares" stimulated the apologetical spirit in Harvard, Princeton, and Yale is a familiar matter of record.[52] Put in another way, the American Calvinistic tradition was suffering from a serious *malaise;* secular rationalism was eating away its vitals, and the *tour de force* accomplished by Edwards and his distinguished successors did not change the total circumstance. Consistent Calvinism, in fact, only made the great Judeo-Christian paradoxes seem more incomprehensible and uncongenial. Rational defense was required.

The second observation is that the Scottish Philosophy countered precisely those intellectual currents which the philosophy-reading and church-going public of the later eighteenth and earlier nineteenth century had reason to fear. It not only got around Hume's "skepticism" by a *reductio ad absurdum* but short-circuited all the major metaphysical heresies.

The Scottish Philosophy was an apologetical philosophy, *par excellence.*[53] And the secret of its success, I think, lay in its dualism, epistemological, ontological, and cosmological. Its other advantages

were auxiliary. Reid's theory of knowledge affirmed a clean subject-object distinction. The world which men perceived was in no sense constituted by consciousness. On the mind-matter problem dualism facilitated an all-out attack on both materialism and idealism, as well as the pantheism that either type of monistic analysis could lead to. Furthermore, by a firm separation of the Creator and His creation, the Scottish thinkers preserved the orthodox notion of God's transcendance, and made revelation necessary. Dualism also made possible a synchronous affirmation of science on one hand, and an identification of the human intellect and the Divine Mind on the other. Scottish philosophers could thus be monotonously consistent in their invocations of Bacon or Newton and at the same time certify those rational processes of man which lead toward natural theology and even contemplative piety and away from relativism and romantic excesses.

The Scottish Philosophy, in short, was a winning combination; and to American theologians, even if they felt the need for philosophic support only subconsciously, it was the answer to a prayer. It was, moreover, free enough from subtlety to be communicable in sermons and tracts. It came to exist in America, therefore, as a vast subterranean influence, a sort of water-table nourishing dogmatics in an age of increasing doubt.

Yet a price was paid for this philosophical sustenance and a consideration of this exaction constitutes my third observation.

At the outset, however, an exception must be made of the Unitarians. They could adopt and use the philosophical system of fellow moderates in Scotland. For the better part of a century they could grow with and within the tradition because their needs harmonized with its basic presuppositions. Nor did these presuppositions put their theology under stress. On the contrary, the "Scottish period" of Unitarianism was its "Augustan Age" of growth and expansion.[54]

Such was not the case with Orthodoxy. In the seminaries and universities their theology lost its Reformation bearings; "the Augustinian strain of piety" suffered. The belief that Christianity had a proclamation to declare lost its vitality. Park hemmed-in the Scriptures with so many criteria of interpretation that they came to be only an external support to his theological system.[55] And for Hodge doctrine became less a living language of piety than a complex burden to be borne.

The forces leading to this result were manifold—many of them not philosophical at all—but three contributions of the Scottish Philosophy are salient. The *first* is attributable to the humanistic orientation of the Hutcheson-Reid tradition. As this philosophy was adopted, the fervent theocentricity of Calvin, which Edwards had striven to

reinstate, was sacrificed and a new principle of doctrinal interpretation was increasingly emphasized. Self-consciousness became the oracle of religious truth. Man's need rather than God's Word became the guide in doctrinal formulation. Flowing from this first reorientation was a *second*. The adoption of the benign and optimistic anthropology of the Scottish Moderates by American Calvinists veiled the very insights into human nature which were a chief strength of Calvin's theology. This revision, in turn, affected the whole complex of doctrine and infused the totality with a new spirit. In a *third* and more general way, Scottish Realism accelerated the long trend toward rational theology which had developed, especially in England, during and after the long Deistic controversy. Combined as it was with an all too facile dismissal of Hume's critique,[56] Reid's influence on subsequent thinkers in the Scottish tradition served to reinforce the prestige of thinkers like Locke, Butler, and Paley, who were reinterpreted in accordance with the typical Scottish emphasis.[57] There resulted a neo-rationalism which rendered the central Christian paradoxes into stark, logical contradictions that had either to be disguised or explained away. Reformed theology was thus emptied of its most dynamic element. A kind of rationalistic *rigor mortis* set in.

In conclusion we may say, therefore, that the profound commitment of orthodox theology to the apologetical keeping of the Scottish Philosophy made traditional doctrines so lifeless and static that a new theological turn was virtually inevitable. Certainly there is no mystery as to why end-of-century theology in America turned with such enthusiasm to evolutionary idealism, the social gospel, and the "religion of feeling." It was in search of the relevant and the dynamic.

1. Hippolyte A. Taine, *History of English Literature*, H. Van Laun, tr., 2 vols., (New York, 1871), II, 71.
2. "There have been more rebellions in Scotland than in any other country;" declared Henry Thomas Buckle, *History of Civilization*, 2 vols. (New York, 1872), II, 125. Most of the vol. is devoted to Scotland. Only in 1745 had the Jacobite Pretender been defeated at Culloden. His supporters naturally opposed the establishment of Presbyterianism. Covenanters had as violently opposed the imposition of Anglican episcopacy by James I and Charles II. See also G. D. Henderson, *Religious Life in Seventeenth Century Scotland* (Cambridge, 1937) and John P. Lawson, *History of the Scottish Episcopal Church from the Revolution to the Present Time* (Edinburgh, 1843).
3. The main seceding churches, after various mergers, were reunited with the national church in 1929.
4. Norman L. Walker, ed., *Religious Life in Scotland* (London, 1888) presents the "Evangelical" view, esp. in Part III.
5. Dugald Stewart's adulatory *Account of Life and Writings of William Robertson* is an illuminating estimate of one Moderate by another. His account of Reid is in the same vol., *Works*, 7 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1829), VII. Alexander Carlyle's *Autobiography* (Boston, 1861) provides invaluable insights on the universities, movements, and religious leaders by an outspoken Moderate.
6. John Witherspoon, *Ecclesiastical Characteristics: or, The Arcana of Church Policy, Being an Humble Attempt to Open the Mystery of Moderation*, *Works*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1800-1801), III, 109, sq. First published in 1753, followed by rev. eds. and *A Serious Apology* (1763).
7. "Moonlight preaching ripens no har-

vest,'' he went on to complain; quoted by Hugh Watt, *Thomas Chalmers and the Disruption* (Edinburgh, 1943), 6.

8. John Macleod, *Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History Since the Reformation* (Edinburgh, 1943), 208; Henry F. Henderson, ''Professor Simson's 'Affair','' *The Religious Controversies of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1905), ch. I, incl. bibliog.; H. M. B. Reid, *The Divinity Professors in the University of Glasgow, 1640-1903* (Glasgow, 1923) esp. chs. vi, viii; *Fortuna Domus* (Glasgow, 1952), a memorial coll. of historical essays; Thomas Reid, ''Statistical Account of the University of Glasgow,'' *Works*, Sir William Hamilton, ed. (Edinburgh, 1854), 721 sq.

9. Andrew Dalzel, *History of the University of Edinburgh*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1862), II; Alexander Grant, *The Story of the University of Edinburgh*, 2 vols. (London, 1884); James M. Anderson, *The University of St. Andrews: An Historical Sketch* (Edinburgh, 1878); *Votiva Tabella: A Memorial Volume of St. Andrews University* (St. Andrews, 1911); Robert S. Rait, *The University of Aberdeen: A History* (Aberdeen, 1895).

10. Like their counterparts in the state universities of Germany these professors were generally conservative politically; and for similar reasons. Yet the peculiar position of Scotland modified their politics. In 1745 the authorities of Edinburgh in filling the chair of moral philosophy preferred William Cleghorn, a Deist, to David Hume: a Deist could be converted, but ''a Jacobite could not possibly become a Whig.'' Grant, *University of Edinburgh*, II, 338.

11. The best index to acknowledged precursors are the references in the works of Reid and Stewart; but see Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. i, vii; *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, ch. vi. Basically, however, these are my general remarks on the place of Scottish Realism in the history of philosophy.

12. Hamilton, *Works of Reid*, 30n.

13. James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy* (New York, 1874), 99. An extremely informative ''labor of love;'' but not without bias. See A. T. Ormond, ''James McCosh as Thinker and Educator,'' *Princeton Review*, I (July, 1903), 337-361.

14. Beattie has been immortalized by Dr. Johnson's assertion that he had confuted Hume once and for all—and doubly honored by being the favorite of that philosopher-king, George III. Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 2 vols. (London, 1902), I, ch. viii, par. 9; Herbert M. Luckock, *The Church in Scotland* (London, 1893), 305n.

15. The literature on the Scottish philosophers, however inadequate, is far too vast to list here. Among older writers W. R. Sorley, James Seth, Henry Laurie, Victor Cousin, Adolphe Garnier, and others, including those cited elsewhere herein, have written extensive accounts. Certain modern works have been especially valuable: Torgny T. Segerstedt, *The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy* (Lund, 1935); D. Daiches Raphael, *The Moral Sense* (London, 1947); Arthur N. Prior, *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* (Oxford, 1949); A. D. Woozley's introduction to his new ed. of Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (London, 1941); and Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, 1945) which also includes a bibliography of the major writings of the leading Scottish philosophers.

16. Hutcheson's implicit ''necessitarianism'' was unacceptable to Reid and Stewart who were indebted to him more for method and approach; in ethical doctrine Hume was a more direct heir. On Hutcheson see Thomas Fowler, *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson* (London 1882); William R. S c o t t, *Francis Hutcheson* (Cambridge, 1900).

17. See ''MSS. Papers'' publ. by McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy*, App. III; Richard Price, *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, D. Daiches Raphael, ed. (Oxford, 1948), passim, esp. 280; Raphael, *Moral Sense*, chs. iv, v; Segerstedt, *Problem of Knowledge*, ch. i; A. Campbell Fraser, *Thomas Reid* (Edinburgh, 1898), esp. letter, Reid to Price, 110 sq.

18. Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. vii; McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy*, 2-7. These are the grounds for the Scottish Philosophers' despair for ''high'' metaphysics; see esp. Théodore Jouffroy's introductions to his French translations of Reid and Stewart. By the same token, however, the principle is important in the history of psychology. See Gardner Murphy, *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (London, 1949); Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society*, ch. v; and Hamilton, *Works of Reid*, App. D. George S. Brett supplies certain necessary qualifications, *History of Psychology*, 3 vols. (London, 1912-1921), III, ch. i.

19. See Andrew Seth, *Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume* (Edinburgh, 1899); A. D. Woozley, *op. cit.;* James F. Ferrier, ''Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense,'' *Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1866), II, 407-459; Donald K. Marshall, ''The

Restoration of Logic in Thomas Reid,'' Ph. D. Thesis (microfilmed), Univ. of Chicago, 1939.

20. Reid, *Active Powers*, Essay I, IV; "Essay on Power,'' publ. in part by Fraser, *Reid*, 120 sq.

21. Reid, *Active Powers*, Essay V, vii.

22. See Henry Grey Graham's felicitous account, *Scottish Men of Letters* (London, 1901), esp. ch. xv.

23. The writer has a larger study of the Scottish Philosophy in France in preparation; but see Emile Boutroux, "De l'influence de la Philosophie Ecossaise sur la Philosophie Française," *Etudes d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, 5th ed. (Paris, 1925), 413-43.

24. L. H. Butterfield, *John Witherspoon Comes to America* (Princeton, 1953); Varnum L. Collins, *President Witherspoon*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1925); Leonard J. Trinterud, *The Forming of an American Tradition* (Philadelphia, 1949); Samuel Miller, *A Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century*, 2 vols. (New York, 1803), II, 10-14; John Witherspoon, "Lectures on Moral Philosophy," *Works*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1800-1801), III, 267 sq.; *ibid.*, "Remarks on an Essay on Human Liberty," *Scots Magazine*, XV (1853), 165-170.

25. This is not Ivy League provincialism, but a consideration of four of the oldest centers of theological training in the country: The divinity schools are usually dated Andover, 1808; Harvard, 1811; Princeton. 1812; and Yale 1822. Others could be included in this study: e.g., the College of Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), on which see Sydney A. Temple, Jr., *The Common Sense Theology of Bishop White* (New York, 1946).

26. Tappan, *Sermons* (Cambridge, Mass., 1807) with a memoir; Ahlstrom "The Middle Period," *The Harvard Divinity School*, George H. Williams, ed. (Boston, 1954), 127-130 and works cited there.

27. William H. Channing, *The Life of William Ellery Channing* (Boston, 1880), 29-35; Robert L. Patterson, *The Philosophy of William Ellery Channing* (New York, 1952); Herbert W. Schneider, "The Intellectual Background of William Ellery Channing," *Church History*, VII (1938), 3-23.

28. Ahlstrom, *op. cit.*, *passim*, and works cited there.

29. W. Norman Pittenger attributes the remark to Paul Elmer More, but it may be still older. *The Historic Faith and a Changing World* (New York, 1950), 57.

30. Charles R. Keller, *The Second Great Awakening in Connecticut* (New Haven, 1942); Charles E. Cunningham, *Timothy Dwight* (New York, 1942); Roland

Bainton, *The New England Way of Training for the Ministry at Yale* (publ. forthcoming), ch. v.

31. See Sidney E. Mead's biography, *Nathaniel William Taylor* (Chicago, 1942), 145, 107, 156, and *passim*. See this work also on Timothy Dwight.

32. MS. "Lectures on Mental and Moral Philosophy," opening remarks (anon. student notes, Yale Divinity School Library). Taylor's *Concio ad clerum* (New Haven, 1828) stirred the greatest controversy. On his rational cast of mind see *Lectures on the Moral Government of God*, 2 vols. (New York, 1859), I, ch. xiii; "What is Truth?" *Revealed Theology* (New York, 1859), 461-480.

33. See *Moral Government*, II, ch. vii; "Mental and Moral Philosophy," *passim*. Frank H. Foster exaggerates the significance of Taylor's adoption of a three- rather than a two- faculty psychology; *Genetic History of the New England Theology* (Chicago, 1907), 243-47.

34. Bennet Tyler, who became the first president of the new seminary at Hartford, was Taylor's major critic; but space limitations prevent consideration of his "anthropocentric Calvinism." See Joseph Haroutunian, *Piety versus Moralism* (New York, 1932), 277-278; Curtis M. Geer, *The Hartford Theological Seminary, 1834-1934* (Hartford, 1934).

35. The Scottish influence on Woods is seen most clearly in his "Essays on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," *Works*, 5 vols. (Andover, 1849-50), V, 35-103, and in his detailed "Course of Study" in systematic theology, IV, 549-91. For his part in the "Wood'n Ware Controversy," see *Works*, IV. Ware's *Letters, Answers, and Postscript* (Cambridge, Mass., 1820, 1822, 1823) have not, to my knowledge, been collected; but see Joseph Grannis, "Henry Ware," B. A. Thesis, 1954, Harvard University Archives.

36. Frank H. Foster's *Life of Edwards Amasa Park* (New York, 1936) though adulatory does scant justice to the man. On the Andover crisis see Daniel D. Williams, *The Andover Liberals* (New York, 1941); H. K. Rowe, *History of Andover Theological Seminary* (Newton, 1933).

37. "New England Theology," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, IX (1852), 191.

38. Foster, *Park*, 472.

39. Review of Stewart's *Active and Moral Powers*, *Bib. Sac.*, VII (1850), 191-193; "Natural Theology," *ibid*, III (1846), 241-284.

40. "Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings," *ibid*, VII (1850), 543, 549; Foster, *New England Theology*, ch. xvii; "Thoughts on the State

of Theological Science and Education in our Country,'' *Bib. Sac.*, I (1844), 745.

41. *Bib. Sac.*, VII (1850), 549. This sermon on the theology of the intellect and feelings to the Mass. Conv. of Cong. Ministers in 1850 was one of Park's most memorable pronouncements. It involved him in a protracted controversy with Hodge; see Foster, *New England Theology*, 263-69, 484, for an outline of Park's theology.

42. Foster, *Park*, 156.

43. Francois Turretin (1623-1687), principally of Geneva, was an arch-conservative defender of the Synod of Dort decrees, strenuous critic of Moïse Amyraut and the Saumur school of theology, and an author of the Helvetic Consensus (1675). His *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* (1679-85) is a major document of Calvinistic scholasticism. For Hodge's opinion of it, see Archibald A. Hodge, *Life of Charles Hodge* (New York, 1880), 553 sq.

44. A. A. Hodge, *Hodge*, 521, 553; Charles Hodge, *Essays and Reviews* (New York, 1857), 584n (vs. Park).

45. Hodge's journal and letters relating to his studies in Germany are fascinating; A. A. Hodge, *Hodge*, 104-225; on pantheism, see his *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols. (New York, 1872), I, 299-334, esp. 333.

46. Published posthumously (New York, 1852); Review of *Outlines of Moral Science, Biblical Repertory & Princeton Review*, XXV (1853), 1-43, presumably by Hodge; Hodge, *Sys. Theol.*, II, 280-309. On Hodge's admiration for Alexander: A. A. Hodge, *Hodge*, *passim*, esp. 551 sq. See also James W. Alexander, *Life of Archibald Alexander* (New York, 1854).

47. Ralph J. Danhof, *Charles Hodge as a Dogmatician* (Goes, The Netherlands, n. d.) 192; a critique by an ultra-conservative.

48. *The Bib. Rep. & Princeton Rev.* was the vehicle of his polemics, the central ones of which are collected in *Essays and Reviews;* but his *Sys. Theol.* is also combative at every point.

49. *Essays and Reviews*, 583.

50. *Sys. Theol.*, II, 296. This chapter is ''philosophical speculation'' from start to finish. Its consonance with Alexander's *Moral Science* is remarkable.

51. See *Sys. Theol.*, on cosmological argument, I, 201 sq.; on rational intuition, I, 193; on ''Realistic Dualism'' as regards the nature of man, II, 46, 61; his critique of Edwards on mankind's unity with Adam, II, 216-27; and esp. his chapters on ''Sin'' and ''Free Agency,'' II, 130-309. At times (e.g., II, 263) Hodge himself draws back from his conclusions. Actually the influence of rational humanism is diffused throughout the work and is discernible not so much in particular as in the nuance of the whole.

52. Herbert M. Morais, *Deism in Eighteenth Century America* (New York, 1934) and G. Adolf Koch, *Republican Religion* (New York, 1933) describe the challenge; above-cited works on Channing, Dwight, and Witherspoon, the response.

53. Macleod refers to it as ''the Scottish Apologetic Philosophy of Common Sense;'' *Scottish Theology*, 213.

54. This is approximately the period of Channing's adult life, c. 1805-1840. Its spirit is gracefully, though condescendingly, described by Octavius B. Frothingham, *Boston Unitarianism* (New York, 1890).

55. ''Remarks on the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review,'' *Bib. Sac.*, VIII (1851), 177-180.

56. The epigoni, both in their histories and philosophical treatises, constantly treat Hume as a philosophical curiosity. The now forgotten Beattie reprimanded Reid for being ''rather too warm an admirer of Mr. Hume.'' Quoted by Fraser, *Reid*, 114.

57. The word ''reinterpreted'' is important. Scottish Philosophers were everywhere emphatically eclectic (in France they took the name ''Eclectic''). But, they were not omnivorous. If, for example, they applauded Paley's natural theology, they w a r n e d against his, ''selfish ethic;'' e.g. Review of Alexander's *Moral Science*, *Bib. Rep. & Princeton Rev.*, XXV, 4.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

"Origen of Alexandria's Interpretation of the Teacher's Function in the Early Christian Hierarchy and Community" by Carl V. Harris. (University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa.) Duke, 1952. Directors: Professors Ray C. Petry and Thomas A. Schafer.

This dissertation is an attempt to understand Origen of Alexandria's interpretation of the teacher's function in the early Christian hierarchy and community. The aim is to set forth an estimate of Origen's thought and personality which does justice to the various sides of his work. The writer recognizes in him a balanced mind in which the intellectual does not destroy the spiritual. Origen is among the greatest of Christian teachers, and he is justly compared with the greatest philosophers. He was a scholar, but by no means a pedant, and his interest was as much in the love of God as in the knowledge of Him. His homilies are expository sermons delivered for the most part at Caesarea in Palestine and taken down by shorthand writers. Intellectual rather than sentimental in their appeal, they reveal their author as one of the great preachers of antiquity. Origen is an excellent example of the fact that the functions of preaching and teaching reinforce one another in the Christian ministry. What Origen taught of doctrine and of the Scriptures is that which he preached and upon which he commented.

It seems that all the best characteristics of Origen, his thoroughness, his patience, his courage, his humility, come out with singular distinctness in his conception of the teacher's vocation. Whatever the value of his own personal work, the dignity of his high calling admits for him no question. He is a guide of those who are called to carry their search for Truth above that which is written. As a true teacher, he never loses sight of his many limitations and his overwhelming respon-sibilities. This dissertation attempts to show his understanding of the great harm that has come upon the church through the incompetence of her appointed instructors. Origen makes it unmistakably clear that the teacher's task is not wholly one of instruction. He reminds us that along with doctrine must go the *vitae exemplum,* and teaching must arouse the conscience as well as inform the mind. He regards the pedagogical functions as sacred.

For Origen, the true priesthood is to be found in the spiritual perfection of the individual soul. He summons the saintliest men from the ranks of the laity and charges them with the spiritual care of the faithful. He places upon them an obligation of obedience toward the hierarchy, but that obedience is purely external. Origen is far from distinguishing the visible body of the faithful, the community, from the group of the elect. Deliberately he mingles them. The Church, as Origen conceives it, is more that of the hierarchy of saintliness grouped around the spiritual master than that of the ecclesiastical community around its bishop. He wrestles with the question of the relation between the visible hierarchy of the presbyters and the hierarchy of the teachers or doctors. Certain attitudes correspond to each of these hierarchies. The presbyters are turned more toward worship; the instructors more toward the ministry of the word and the Scripture. Although Origen rather clearly represents the course of the teachers or doctors, his life and work attest to an epoch in which the two hierarchies tend to unite. Whereas he does not deny the powers of the visible hierarchy coming from the priestly ordination, he is not resigned to dissociate the sacerdotal powers from the sacerdotal sanctity. For him what is important is not the institutions but spiritual reality.

This is a study of the original sources, as far as they have come down to us. Practically all the extant writing of Origen, either in the original Greek or, where that is lacking, the Latin translations of Rufinus and Jerome, have been examined, although not all with equal thoroughness. The homilies and commentaries have been the most important resources for this study; however, supplementary evidence has been gathered from the whole corpus and from numerous secondary sources. A certain degree of caution has been used with respect to the Latin translations of Rufinus. No important conclusions in this dissertation depend upon controverted passages in *De Principiis*.

"Basil of Caesarea and the Bible" by William A. Tieck (144 W. 228th St., New York 63, N. Y.). Columbia University, 1953. Director: Prof. Frederick C. Grant (Union Theological Seminary)

(I) Basil the Great of Caesarea (329/30-379) presents a remarkable instance of the struggle between a profoundly religious "heredity" and an equally thoroughgoing secular educational "environment." Coming out of an ancestry of virile Christian piety and a home in which he was nurtured on the teachings of Origen mediated through Gregory Thaumaturgus, he spent many of his formative years under the best rhetors and sophists of the day in Constantinople and Athens.

(II) This tension between Christianity and classicism was resolved in his late twenties, when he renounced wealth, position, and worldly wisdom (at least outwardly), and withdrew to an ascetic life. The outstanding feature of the monastic asceticism which he was soon practicing and propagating was its bibliocentricity. The Bible was the *regula* par excellence, the rule by which he rigidly fashioned his own life and the monastic system for which he is celebrated.

(III) Henceforward Basil's conviction of the absolute sufficiency and finality of Scripture dominated him. Both his theory and his practice are instinct with the unique superiority of Holy Writ to anything that secular culture can offer. To Basil the issue presents itself as "foolish wisdom" vs. "the oracles of the Spirit." The Word of God mediated to the believer by the Spirit is infallible revelation; the faith which enshrines this revelation is the highest wisdom; and before such wisdom reason itself must bow.

(IV) For the Scriptures are *theopneustos;* it is this divine inspiration which gives them their incontestable authority. Basil's concept of authorship and the divine afflatus is conspicuous for its sanity; nor is the illapse of the Spirit less essential to the understanding of the Scriptures than to their authorship. Thus it is that Basil ventures the bold step of making the Bible interpreted by the Spirit-filled conscience of the believer the ultimate seat of authority. Prophecy, while vehemently contrasted with divination, is largely conceived of as prediction; the Psalms especially abound in messianic allusions. As a consequence of its equal inspiration throughout, a fundamental unity and harmony pervade Scripture, though Basil exhibits a keen awareness of the superiority of the Gospel to the Law and has his decided preferences among the books.

(V) Basil is a biblicist rather than a traditionalist. Although in theory tradition has the same force as Scripture for him, actually his use of the written revelation dwarfs his resort to the unwritten. But while the accent is heavily on Scripture, he is concerned that the ancient heritage be preserved inviolate no less in its traditional than in its scriptural formulation. He is the avowed enemy of novelty: thus his quarrel with Eunomius is largely a matter of the latter's refusal to honor scriptural-traditional terminology and of his proclivity to innovate instead.

(VI) From both the scholarly and the edificatory standpoints Basil's exegetical consciousness is of a high order. He combines a lexical and grammatical regard for Scripture with an appreciation of its formal and stylistic side, and is given to probing the context to discover the thread of meaning or ar-

gument. It is along these lines that he arrives at a mode of interpretation which is primarily literal-practical. In his concern for the historical setting and in his forthright disavowal of allegory, he is one of the brightest of the morning stars of the exegetical reformation which the work of the Antiochian school constitutes. This is true despite the fact that Basil could no more completely sever himself f r o m the spell of allegory than he was able to disown his classical education. But if he goes to any extreme it is in the direction of literalism, although he overly "spiritualizes" the Psalms in particular. His resort to the Greek version of the OT virtually as if it were the original not infrequently leads him astray. While he conforms to the age in this bondage to the Greek, he often ventures resourceful interpretations and insights of his own: this however is usually done in a more or less restrained manner.

(VII) Basil's concern with matters of canon is incidental. He quotes almost all the deuterocanonical writings of the OT without apology, though by no means as often or as significantly as the protocanonical. In the NT, Hebrews is attributed to Paul, the Apocalypse to the evangelist John, while in the case of the catholic epistles Basil shared the attitude of the East in its suspicion of all but Jas., I Pet., and I Jn. As for the biblical text reflected in the writings of Basil, the Benedictine ed. of 1721-30, which is the vulgate, is unfitted to be an instrument of research where the minutiae of letters and syllables is involved. And modern critical work on the Basilian text has been relatively negligible. However, the next few months to four years will see scientific editions of almost the whole of the undisputed Basilian corpus. Even then the human factors in patristic quotations make the formula with which we have to deal in biblical-text investigation an extremely complex and delicate one.

"Monastic Life and Discipline in the Diocese of Lincoln 1420 - 1449: Studied from Episcopal Registers and Visitation Records," by Virgin-ia Nelle Bellamy (Episc. Theol. Sem. in Ky.). Duke University, 1952. Director: Ray C. Petry.

One of the most illuminating sources on medieval life is found in the accounts of episcopal visitations made by local bishops to the individual religious houses in their dioceses. Although this type of diocesan jurisdiction came into prominence in the thirteenth century, very few extensive records have been preserved from that era; it is from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that the fullest and most revealing accounts are available. A valuable series of this kind comes from the diocese of Lincoln and covers the period from 1420-1449, extending through the episcopates of Richard Flemyng (1420-1430-31), William Gray (1431-1435-36), and William Alnwick (1436-1449). These Lincoln visitation records, edited by A. H. Thompson for the Lincoln Record Society, form the basic material for this thesis. They, reinforced with related works, present revealing and interesting insights into English monastic life and discipline in the first half of the fifteenth century.

As a historical approach to a small section of medieval monasticism for a specific time, this study brings into focus many of the problems of the cloistered life on the eve of the Reformation and deals with the spiritual quality of the religious vocation. Cognizant that this type of source material —episcopal visitation records—is concerned primarily with infractions of the rules and is therefore a negative approach, an effort is made, nevertheless, to see the lives of the monks and nuns in the milieu of the period.

It is immediately obvious that fifteenth century monasticism, filled with decay and degeneration, was in need of reform. The Church was aware of the situation. Canon law, the procedure of diocesan visitation, the efforts of consecrated bishops, and the concern of conscientious monastics all sought to correct the existing evils and regain the spirit of the Benedictine Ideal. But the tide of corruption that was sweeping medieval religious

houses had reached powerful proportions in these last years before the Reformation. Only a strong revitalization of individual and corporate monastic life could have stemmed the stream of decadence. Both the communities and individuals were apparently found wanting in that spiritual verve and institutional discipline necessary for restoration. And the accumulated corruption of the medieval world was greater than the reforming power of the remaining nucleus of devoted monks and nuns. Thus no over-all relief and no strengthening of convent life gave to the cloistered religious in the first part of the fifteenth century the simplicity and genius of monasticism as it had been envisioned by its founders.

"A Historical Analysis and Appraisal of Bishop Lancelot Andrewes' Ecclesiology with Particular Reference to P r e d i c a t i o n and Priestly Office," by t h e Rev. Charles Preston Wiles (St. Mary's Episcopal Church Burlington, New Jersey). Duke University, 1951. Director: Ray C. Petry.

Through an analysis and appraisal of Bishop Lancelot Andrewes' ecclesiology, insight is gained into the nature of the English Church as it emerged from the Reformation period of the Elizabethan Settlement into Jacobean maturity.

Chosen by James I as the "official" Apologist for the Anglican position in this era, Andrewes was confronted with the task of defending the English Establishment vis-a-vis Rome and Puritanism. Andrewes believed that the religious Reformation in England was an expression of the Divine Will working through the King and the Church he represented. It was the means of restoring and preserving the faith and discipline of the Catholic Church. In service to his King and His Church Andrewes endeavored to restore and restate Catholic faith and practice, in the light of new insights gained through the distillation of religious thought in the Reformation. His efforts were expended to crystallize an

ecclesiology that could indisputably rest upon the cornerstone of the Christian faith—i.e., the undivided Primitive Church that gave full expression to Catholic faith and practice. For Andrewes, the English Church was an appellant, resting its claims on Scriptural and Patristic evidences.

Through Andrewes' ecclesiology, one is able to recognize that for Anglicanism the great positive insights contributed by the English Reformation were anchored in the English Church's attempt to restore the pristine integrity of true Catholicism by the application of the Protestant corrective. This the English Church was peculiarly fitted to do, for the *plene esse* of its theology and ethos followed no precedent—i.e., they were not the result of deliberate advanced planning, but the result of the interplay of historical forces out of which Anglicanism emerged obedient to its own law of development.

One must also recognize that in defending the Establishment against opposition on theological grounds which identified the cause of the Church and the State, the predicament created by the Elizabethan Settlement was heightened. In Elizabeth's reign political enforcement of liturgical forms had brought neither conformity nor theological agreement as it had been hoped that it would. Instead of the statutory Liturgy safeguarding the Crown and national independence, by ridding England of religious dissension, the act of Uniformity fostered non-conformity and sedition. Civil rebellion against Henrician and Jacobean claims of sovereignty and demands for uniformity would be the cost of the Elizabethan Settlement. The alliance between the Crown and the Church's hierarchy had made religious toleration and a religious settlement quite impossible.

Yet if one is unsympathetic to Andrewes' defense of the Divine Right of Kings it must be remembered that the medieval principle of Uniformity, not Toleration, was still the motivating principle of political theory. So long as Divine Right, not pragmatism, was the basis of secular government, tol-

eration and liberty of thought would suffer vast restrictions and the jurisdiction and claims of Church and State would remain confused. Andrewes did not rise a b o v e the limitations of thought that marked the debate between the English Crown and the Pope. So far as he was concerned there was no problem in the relationship between the English Church and State. Their cause was one—viz: to protect the reformed expression of the Catholic faith embraced in the English Church from the deformities of Romanism a n d the innovations of Puritan extremists. Andrewes aligned himself with the King as a protesting Catholic — protesting against Roman claims and accretions — not merely because he was a loyal Englishman but as one who believed that the King and the Church he represented, as supreme Governor, was a truer expression of Catholicism than the Roman Pontiff and the international ecclesiastical Empire he symbolized.

We may also discern through our use of Bishop Andrewes' representative ecclesiology that the contributions made by the English Reformation could never be labelled as a mere restatement of the faith and practice of the Church as it was crystallized at the end of the Chalcedonian era. To be sure the E n g l i s h reformation sought for the esse of the faith and practice of the primitive Church. Yet in the very seeking for the essentials of Catholicism in the classical period of the early Church, the distilling process which sifted patristic from medieval thought gave new expression and emphasis to those essentials which the English reformation sought to ratify. It was the English Church's singular articulation of those essentials through a representative voice such as Andrewes that gave credence to its claim that it was a true expression of reformed Catholicism.

Andrewes' polemical writings as well as his *Sermons* and *Private Devotions* set forth the Catholic nature of the English Church, which, nevertheless, embraces the Protestant corrective. Nowhere can Andrewes' ecclesiology be epitomized more perti-

nently than in his Eucharistic doctrine which holds both Catholic and Protestant positive insights. Nowhere is the spirit or the breadth and depth of the genius of Andrewes better known than in his *Private Devotions*. They reveal the motivating power in his life — viz : to create a nation of practicing Christians whose lives, individually and corporately, would bear witness to the spiritual power resident within the Anglican expression of the Catholic Church.

"An Appraisal of John Wesley's Sacramentalism in the Evolution of Early American Methodism," by Paul S. Sanders (Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.) Union Theological Seminary, 1 9 5 4 . Director: Professor Cyril C. Richardson.

About half this work is concerned with Wesley's churchmanship. He is presented as an Anglican of the classical, seventeenth-century pattern, imbued with fervent evangelical zeal. His conversion is seen as providing the motivation of his mission, but not as the sole category of interpretation in assessing the meaning of Christian faith and life. Individual experience was subsumed under the necessity of corporate Christian life within the church. Wesley's evangelicalism moved within the context of sacramentalism; his sacramentalism w a s allied in fruitful tension with evangelicalism. In his thought the Protestant ethic of grace and the Catholic ethic of holiness were seen not as antagonistic or even arbitrarily yoked together, but as inevitable concomitants one of the other. The clearest emphasis in Wesley's somewhat confused view of Baptism would seem to be that by this sacrament one is incorporated into the New Israel. His synthesis is most clearly seen in his emphasis upon effectual participation in the Eucharist in the Real Presence of the Living Christ. This sacrament is a means of communion with fellow Christians and is a pledge and foretaste of the eternal Communion of Saints. It re-presents for existential participation the Eternal Sacrifice of Christ, and demands in turn the sacrifice of Christians, as

individuáls and as the church. As one is saved by faith but is only to exercise faith through the gift of God, so one realizes (this does not mean only mentally) the Presence in the Supper by faith, but can only exercise faith through the Word and Spirit.

American Methodism was from the start marked by a sectarian spirit; there was little effective contact with either Wesley or Anglicanism. The pressures both of external example and inner conviction led to an evangelistic method which was at least non-ecclesiastical. Whereas Wesley's evangelistic work had presupposed the structure and tradition of English Christianity, particularly Anglicanism, in America this context was lacking; revivalism was no longer simply a technique but became the main constitutive element in the organism of Christian life.

Provided by Wesley in 1784 with the various appurtenances of a *church*, for several generations American Methodism simply followed the lines laid down by itself when it was a loose *movement*. While the frontier and later revivalism undoubtedly affected the external conditions of worship, the basic pattern was already set. Still, the older Wesleyan heritage was never lost: the Ritual transmitted the Anglican liturgy and sacramental theology, and the characteristic institutions were concerned with Christian nurture as well

as conversion. The position of the sacraments was ambiguous; the Wesleyan synthesis was not maintained, nor was the American breakdown of that synthesis complete.

Methodism emerged as a "denomination," stressing elements of both the sectarian and the churchly minds. As revivalistic pietism settled down in union with traditional orthodoxy, the sacraments in Methodism assumed a fairly stable position which would be maintained until theological liberalism would arise to subvert both sacramentalism and evangelicalism. Baptism and the Lord's Supper may be said during the period of early American Methodism to have meant rather less than they had to Wesley but also rather more than later American Methodism has usually assumed to be the case.

The study has been made largely on the basis of primary sources. In the first case, the Wesleyan corpus was of primary importance: Letters, Journal, sermons, Notes on the New Testament, and especially the Eucharistic hymns, supplemented by studies of Anglicanism, Wesley, and Methodism. American church history, and American Methodist history, provided the general background of the second part, where again primary attention was directed to the *Sunday Service* and the various editions of the Discipline, Ritual and hymnal.

BOOK REVIEWS

Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period. Volume IV. The Problem of Method. Symbols from Jewish Cult. By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. New York: Pantheon Book, 1954. Pp. xiii + 235 + 117 plates.

With this volume in his great series, Professor Goodenough turns from assembling the archeological evidence to the task of appraisal. The first chapter analyzes the problem raised by Philo, Josephus, and the rabbis in their criticism of works of art, along with the modifications of the older attitude presumably because of "popular" pressure. It is no part of Goodenough's purpose to deal with the attitudes of Christians, but it may be worth noting that works of art become a problem for some Christians in the second century just as they did for Jews (e. g., Tatian as contrasted, to some extent, with Melito, Athenagoras, and Clement). "Once the Jewish state was destroyed, and rabbinic control became more and more theoretical, the 'decorations', as well as the forbidden menorah, appeared everywhere" (p. 24). Therefore, Goodenough argues, the meaning of images to the Jews cannot be explained from the fragmentary rabbinic sources. This argument seems sound, though as in a Christian parallel caution must be employed. We cannot recover gnostic thought entirely from the Church Fathers; but at the same time, when we look elsewhere for it we must avoid ascribing too great importance to it. Not all, or even many, Christians were gnostics. How many Jews were fond of images (out of the several millions in the Diaspora)?

Goodenough next tries to set forth a "method in evaluating symbols," and claims bluntly that "the philological approach has to be discarded" (p. 26). This seems to me an overstatement; Goodenough himself uses philology.

Yet we must agree that the importance of symbol (beyond philology) is rightly stressed. For example, no one can understand the early church without bearing in mind the common worship, the common symbols, which lay beyond and underneath all the attempts of theologians and others to put their meaning into words; and this fact may have something to do with the early Christian fondness for allegorical exegesis—meanings were not to be fixed by philological or even, in the early period, theological definition. The letter killed; the spirit gave life. It is on this ground that we can accept Goodenough's general statement (p. 43) that "the great religion offers many roads, the sect few, or only one." But then he turns to interpret the symbols of religion in one way, in broadly Freudian terms. I am not competent to criticize what he says, though it seems a little too neat; and in any event it does not have a very direct bearing on the interpretation of most of the symbols he discusses in this volume.

After this he proceeds to take up individual Jewish symbols, apparently first used after the fall of Jerusalem. (1) The Menorah, or seven-branched lamp, was essentially "a mystic symbol of Light and Life — God present and manifest in t h e world — through which the Jew hoped for immortality" (p. 95). This interpretation is based on (philological?) evidence from inscriptions, Philo, Josephus, rabbinic literature, and the cabbalistic *Zohar*. (2) The Torah shrine is explained, very tentatively, in Freudian terms: "to go through a door is to be born, and death, as faith keeps telling man, is birth into a new life" (p. 111). (3) The lulab (bunch of twigs including a palm branch) and ethrog (a citrus fruit carried with the lulab) are explained by interpreting the feast of Tabernacles as a mystical - sexual festival of life, centering in water and

light—a festival (as Tacitus and Plutarch suggest) like rites of Dionysus. From this point Goodenough goes on to suggest that the lulab (often represented as a palm branch) was a symbol of "immortality or of mystic consummation" (p. 165). (4) The shofar, or ram's horn, is interpreted in relation to Isaac's sacrifice and vicarious atonement, and Goodenough argues that the story of Isaac was understood in these terms before the rise of Christianity.

Here h e follows H. J. Schoeps (*Journ. Bibl. Lit.* 65, 1946, 385ff.), who has claimed that such allusions to Isaac's sacrifice as Romans 8:32 reflect an older Jewish view. In view of the absence of early evidence, however, some caution seems desirable. Was all borrowing on the part of Christians?

(5) Another symbol is the incense shovel or fire pan, which Goodenough suggests was commonly used in Hellenistic Jewish homes or synagogues. He also suggests that "it had come to have an eschatological association, so that Jews wanted to have it in their graves as well as in the synagogues" (p. 206). This statement means that since it is found in and on graves, it must have been "eschatological."

Thus the objects depicted in synagogues and on tombs, all cultic objects, are taken to have (a) eschatological meaning (in relation to life after death) and (b) mystical meaning. Several questions arise at this point. (1) Is it likely that such objects all carry all, or even many, of the implications which Goodenough finds in them? For instance, I see no reason to go beyond the last trumpet (p. 173) in considering the meaning of the shofar; I should think it was attested for the early first c e n t u r y by 1 Corinthians 15:53, to go no farther. (2) Is it likely that "mystical Judaism" was really widespread enough for us to find such meanings in all, or even many, of the objects discussed? It is certain that a mystical, even gnostic, Judaism existed, but to what extent can generalizations be drawn from its existence? (3) And

finally, it will doubtless be made clear in later volumes what the semi-Freudian symbol-analysis contributes to our understanding, but it seems not to have much to do with the symbols discussed here, except for the highly debatable Torah-shrine. And at this point Goodenough well criticizes the purely Freudian exegesis of Reik (p. 166 n. 1).

Of course Goodenough himself is well aware of the problematic nature of his investigations, and of his method. As he says, he may well be wrong (and even reviewers can err) but he has at the very least shown that Hellenistic Jews systematically borrowed art forms from the pagan world. What the borrowing meant will doubtless be discussed in later volumes.

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Aquinas on Nature and Grace. Translated and edited by A. M. FAIRWEATHER. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954. Pp. 386. $5.00.

In this volume, Prof. Fairweather has adopted the simplest possible principle of selection: stick to the *Summa Theologiae* and focus on the problem of "nature and grace." This may or may not be the best way to represent the full round of St. Thomas's system, or even his profoundest thought on nature and grace. At any rate, the translations here are excellent—a definite improvement over the old English Dominican translation, which operated on the assumption that English cognates really translate Latin terms. Fairweather h a s put Aquinas into clear and accurate English; one gets the clear drift of the argument without a glossary. This uncommon gift of translating scholastic Latin makes one wish he would set his hand to something like the *Quaestiones Disputatae,* which are even better Thomas than the theological *Summa.*

The introduction is not quite as helpful as it could have been. It is concerned largely with the contrast between Aquinas and Augustine on the points of revelation and reason—and

the metaphysical implications of this. One *might* agree with Fairweather's thesis—and still wish he had done a little more to set Thomas in his own age, especially in relation to Abailard, Bonaventura and Duns Scotus. There is a bibliography which is helpful but spotty (in which the *new* Marietti edition of the *Summa Theologiae* is not listed and *Quodlibetales* is misspelled.)

On the whole, this is a useful volume—handier than the *Summa* itself, more adequate than any of the other current selections. It will fill a real need for those who want a good "center slice" of that extraordinary medieval theologian who is still very much more modern than most of our contemporary ancestors.

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The English Church in the Fourteenth Century. By W. A. PANTIN. Cambridge University Press, 1955. $5.00.

This book is the latest in a series of excellent studies to emanate from a circle of active English scholars who are in the process of re-writing the religious history of medieval England. These men and women work with the sources and they go about their tasks "sine ira et studio." Had earlier English historians observed with equal scrupulousness these same canons, instead of being forced to expend so much effort in refuting their errors, Mr. Pantin and his colleagues could now instead be building on what they produced.

Mr. Pantin considers first the social and political aspects of the English Church. He finds that the king generally got the bishop he wanted, but that this bishop was usually a university graduate with experience in either diocesan or civil affairs or in both. He says the unbeneficed clergy outnumbered those holding benefices by almost two to one, but that the pluralism which produced this unhealthy condition was not an unqualified evil. Pope and king, at any rate, were able

to siphon off the surplus revenue remaining after the provision of the chaplain to support their own administrative systems in an era when taxation was impossible. The author agrees with Barraclough that papal provision represented nothing more sinister than a phase in the growing centralization of the Church, and he echoes present opinion when stating: "It is a mistake to imagine that the Statute of Praemunire (or for that matter the Statute of Provisors) was a general or direct attack on papal authority." He does regret, however, that the pope did not prove less yielding to royal pressure and did not employ provision as an instrument of reform, although one wonders whether the king would have permitted this.

Mr. Pantin considers next the intellectual activities of the English Church. He surveys centers of learning other than Oxford and Cambridge; he provides sketches of the lesser-known scholars at these schools; he notes the most persistent subjects of controversy in this "an age of continual controversy"; and he discusses leading polemicists like Richard Fitz-Ralph. He declares the government ordered FitzRalph to cease his attacks on the friars and Wyclif's opponents to be silent partly "to prevent disturbances in the kingdom." But he fails to mention that the government placed a similar and simultaneous injunction upon Wyclif; and he should have said it was Gaunt, not the government, who was either actor or inspiration in the earlier moves to shield Wyclif.

The third part of the volume is devoted to religious literature, which includes a "very impressive" number of manuals of instruction for parish priests. These bear evidence of the strenuous efforts made by "many serious-minded men ... trying hard to educate and improve the parish clergy" in a century which, despite its faults and scandals, was a "profoundly religious age." Free and soul-searching criticism characterized much of this literature, and Mr. Pantin finds "One of the most disastrous and blighting effects of Wycliffism was that, for the

first time in the history of this country, it associated criticism with heterodoxy." The volume includes an interesting chapter on religious and moral treatises in the vernacular, which were intended as much for the unlearned priest as for the laity. Mr. Pantin reminds the reader that, as only recently realized, the fourteenth century witnessed likewise a great deal of preaching. The concluding chapter deals with mystical literature, most of which appeared in the vernacular and in such abundance as to make the fourteenth century "the golden age." This literature both reflected as well as contributed to what Mr. Pantin describes as "one of the most important phenomena of the religious history of the later Middle Ages, namely the rise of the devout layman."

Throughout the course of his revealing study, Mr. Pantin provides continuous evidence to confirm the statement made in the Introduction, that "Nothing could be more clear than that the fourteenth-century English Church was very consciously part of the universal Church, in ecclesiastical government and in its intellectual and spiritual life."

The volume includes an index although no bibliography, possibly because the study is based upon Mr. Pantin's Birkbeck Lectures of 1948.

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John Whitgift and the English Reformation. By POWEL MILLS DAWLEY. New York: Scribner's, 1954. xii-251 pages. $3.00

This compact volume is a substantial study of the Elizabethan church with John Whitgift as the central figure. The title is well chosen, for Whitgift's life began just when Henry VIII was taking his first measures in the alteration of the constitution of the Church of England, and ended very soon after the death of Elizabeth I. At his death he had been more than twenty years Archbishop of Canterbury, the watchful defender of the Elizabethan establishment. Dr. Dawley has made

good use of his sources and of the growing body of special researches in the field. He brings us a vivid account of the ecclesiastical events through which Whitgift moved, and marks out clearly the progress of his career: but we do not find ourselves in the end so intimately aware of the personality of the great prelate as we should desire. Apparently the sources do not afford a close acquaintance. There are a good many years of his life in which much more is known of his environment than of the man himself.

Whitgift's early tutor was his uncle, Robert Whitgift, a former Augustinian abbot who willingly adopted the Reformation. At Pembroke College, Cambridge, the earnest reformer, John Bradford, laid his influence upon the youth. But when Bradford was burned, Whitgift joined Andrew Perne, Master of Peterhouse, who basked in Queen Mary's favor, and was "not molested" in the persecutions. Dr. Dawley quotes the Marprelate aspersions on Whitgift for his relations with Perne, but offers no judgment of his own on the motives on which he acted. The ecclesiastical settlement of Elizabeth's early years is clearly described. In the midst of it Whitgift took holy orders, and was warm in his praise of the Book of Common Prayer. From the time of his address before the Queen on conformity, 1567, his promotion was rapid. Having filled numerous offices he became Bishop of Worcester in 1577, and Archbishop in 1583.

At no stage in his career did Whitgift exhibit the qualities that make men popular. But the Queen knew that she could trust him, and his contemporaries of all parties must have seen in him a stedfast churchman, earnest, competent, and predictable. Dawley brings him to the primacy with only 70 pages left in which to present the facts of those two critical decades. To Whitgift's service in this office he pays this tribute:

> Devoting his life to spare the English Church the narrow confines of Puritanism, perhaps more than any other man he made possible the growth of the distinct ethos of Anglicanism.

There is of course another side to this. Some of the Puritans thought they were called to rescue the Church of England from its insularity and bring it into fuller association with the Reformed Churches of Continental countries. But from his Anglican position Dr. Dawley really gives both Puritans and Romans very fair treatment. This is most evident in the quotations given from Puritan writers. When he couples the adjective "fanatical" with the noun "Puritan", the particular reference o f t e n largely sustains the judgment conveyed. He is not without admiration for Archbishop Grindal, whose favor toward the Prophesyings cost him the loss of his authority, but in this matter he takes the Queen's side. He explains that:

> Puritanism had become a conspiracy; the prophesyings were the scenes of an insidious undermining of the Church of England.

But is it not rather the case that the attempt of a Puritan element to "undermine" the structure of Anglicanism was largely a consequence of the suppression of the Prophesyings? Certainly a number of loyal bishops favored them, and yielded most unwillingly to the Queen's imperious command which Grindal chose to disobey lest he should offend against "the majesty of God."

Whitgift was unduly maligned by his opponents; he has deserved this moderate, interesting and well-informed vindication. His policies are here made clear and comprehensible. Dawley shows that he was not excessively rigid and hardly ever vindictive, and that he could sometimes be gentle even with ardent Puritan opponents. On the polity of the Church he held to episcopacy not as necessary to the existence of a church but because it was by law established, while Cartwright argued for presbyterianism as necessary according to Scripture. Whitgift to confute him wrote:

> That any one kind of government is so necessary that without it the church cannot be saved ... I utterly deny.

At this point most Presbyterians today would not follow Cartwright, while some Anglicans would not follow Whitgift.

JOHN T. McNEILL

Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation: *S o m e Reformation Controversies and their Background*. By W. SCHWARZ. Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp. xiv + 225 $4.75.

The problems of biblical translation, like those of biblical interpretation (or, for that matter, of philosophical theology), are not new, but as Schwarz shows and as C. H. Dodd observes in his preface go back to the time when the Septuagint "made a bid for acceptance as the equivalent of the Hebrew Scriptures." In his introductory chapter on "the Bible and the translator" Schwarz points out the difference between two basic points of view: (1) the "inspirational," in which "the translator is nothing but an instrument of God," and (2) the philological, in which the imperfections of language and of linguists are fully taken into account. The second and third chapters deal with discussions on the origin of the Septuagint (first in Hellenistic Judaism, then in the ancient church, especially in the controversy between the philologist Jerome and the inspirationalist Augustine) and the traditionalist view of scripture as expressed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Schwarz then comes to the main part of his study, which is concerned with the two alternatives to tradition presented at the time of the Reformation. The first is the philological view, advocated by Reuchlin (Hebrew) and Erasmus (Greek); this is discussed with admirable fulness and incisiveness in the long fourth and fifth chapters, and the development of the two humanists' thought (as well as of traditionalists' opposition to it) is carefully traced. The last chapter is concerned with Luther's proclamation of the inspirational view and his controversies with the humanists. "Man can find the true meaning of Holy Writ by God's grace only, and

not by human endeavour." As he him-
self says, h e prefers Augustine to
Jerome, though he does not deny the
right of the philologist to interpret the
letter of scripture. "The thought could
gain currency that the Bible could be
rendered in the same way as any lit-
erary work."

Schwarz' excellent book deserves
close study by anyone concerned with
Bible translation, biblical theology,
or the history of Christian thought.
At a few points in the first quarter
of the book supplements could be sug-
gested; thus in dealing with Philo on
prophecy and interpretation Wolfson's
discussion in the second volume of
his *Philo* could be employed. It could
be added that Irenaeus, Clement, and
Origen speak explicitly of the divine
origin of the Septuagint (and there-
fore Origen cannot have meant to "re-
fute the authority of the Septuagint,"
p. 26; cf. p. 42, n. 3). And, corrobor-
ating Schwarz' view of Colet's attitude,
we might mention the articles of E. F.
Rice, Jr., "John Colet and the Annihi-
lation of the Natural," *Harvard Theol.
Rev.* 45 (1952), 141-63, and P. A.
Duhamel, "The Oxford Lectures of
John Colet," *Journ. of the History of
Ideas* 14 (1953), 493-510.

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*Bischofsamt und apostolische Suk-
zession im deutschen Protestantis-
mus.* By ERNST BENZ. Evangelisch-
es Verlagswerk, Stuttgart, 1953, 264
pp.

Ernst Benz of Marburg is already
well known to readers of this journal
for his able and valuable studies on a
wide range of historical subjects. It
should be noted that the present study
is not concerned with Luther's or his
immediate successors' teaching on the
episcopal office or apostolic succes-
sion, nor does it revolve about the
arguments on these subjects raised
from biblical or systematic theology.
Rather it examines the various prac-
tical efforts to restore the episcopal
office in its ancient conception within
the Churches of the Reformation in
Germany. In successive chapters Benz

discusses the following: Jablonski's un-
successful maneuvering to persuade
King Frederick I of Prussia—who
needed a validly consecrated bishop
for his coronation, but like all the
territorial princes feared infringe-
ments on his spiritual prerogatives—
to join the Reformed and Lutheran
bodies in Prussia on an episcopal
basis; Jablonski's achievement in con-
veying episcopal ordination and apos-
tolic succession to the Bohemian Breth-
ren; the controversy regarding epis-
copacy in the Evangelical Church in
Russia and the Bishopric of Saratow;
Frederick William III's exercise of
his prerogatives as *Summus Episcopus*
in the appointment of titular bishops;
Frederick William IV's abortive effort
to gain bishops who would be "con-
secrated" but not "ordained" to such
an office; the signal achievement,
through the cooperation of the English
crown and the Anglican Church, of
erecting an evangelical bishopric of
apostolic succession in Jerusalem. The
account is supplemented by chapters
devoted to concluding remarks, cer-
tain of the most important textual
materials, notes, index, and seven illus-
trations.

The events Benz describes, revolv-
ing as they do about conflicting con-
ceptions of the Church and its proper
ordering and linked to the Erastian
politics of the Prussian court, permit
varying readings. The author wisely
limits himself to certain general con-
clusions: he indicates the inaccuracy
of the prevalent view that the state-
episcopal pattern remained unchalleng-
ed within German Lutheranism; the
restoration efforts were tied to the
objective of uniting the Lutheran and
Reformed Confessions; the proponents
of the episcopal conception looked for
active support to Churches already
possessing this order, particularly to
the Anglican Church of a Latitudi-
narian rather than Anglo-Catholic
persuasion; the role played by the
bishops of the Bohemian Brethren
in emphasizing an ecumenical and
unionistic, yet evangelical interest, is
remarkable; these episcopal efforts
were always paralleled by interests in
liturgical restoration; the presence and

claims of the prevailing territorial-episcopal system were the primary hindrances to the development of an independent conception; it is questionable whether prelates of the Church of England could have ordained Prussian or Hannoverian bishops who took no oath of allegiance to the King of England and were not in obedience to the Archbishop of Canterbury; a sister Church, e.g., the Church of England, can give only what it possesses, and one can hardly propose to take as little or as much of its conception as he sees fit; the psychological problems involved in a previously-independent, "less perfectly constituted church" suing for episcopal ordination from what becomes a "mother-church" are both far-reaching and devastating.

The events Benz discusses became very relevant precedents with the fall of the German monarchy in 1918 and the dissolution of the territorial-episcopal system. Hitler's imposition of a *Reichsbischof* and territorial bishops inspired debate and reconsideration, and more recently the *EKiD* has faced the old problems in its attempt to introduce a n e w conception of the Church. Although the United Lutheran Church has recently given the episcopal office most careful reconsideration in our country, Benz' elucidation of an old concern may be relevant to many another situation.

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Protestant Christianity Interpreted through its Development. By JOHN DILLENBERGER and CLAUDE WELCH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. xii + 340 pages. $4.50.

The authors with disarming candor call this work a "project," and explain that it

was undertaken at the request of the Committee on Projects and Research of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education,

because

"it was felt that there is a very serious need for a single book on Protestantism

which could be used in college and university courses in religion, and which would in general make available to intelligent laymen a deepened understanding of Protestant Christianity (p. xi)."

The authors claim that in this "venture" they have

"primarily .... depended upon the major original writings which are a part of Protestant history [and] .... have been guided also by numerous recent works on various aspects of Protestantism (p. xi)."

Frankly, however, the first part of this claim is not convincing to this particular historian, and, for example, were this work submitted as a doctoral dissertation I doubt that any examining committee made up of members competent to judge would allow such a claim for it.

With few exceptions, careful reading of the chapters confirms the suspicion that this "project," so far as interpretative motifs are concerned, is largely a harvest of surveys, textbooks, and a few book length monographs. For example, four central chapters (v-viii) insofar as they deal with developments in America, are obviously based on Brauer's PROTESTANTISM IN AMERICA (listed bit by bit in the "Suggestions For Further Reading" Section for each of the four chapters), and one can easily discern in the text the works of Sweet, Miller, Trinterud, Hudson, and Nichols (also listed) both in their use, and, from a historian's point of view, in their misuse. It is hard to explain "misuse" in this sense, but any historian will understand what I mean when I say that it is analogous to what Mark Twain meant when he said of his wife's attempt to swear, that she had most of the words right but the tune was wrong. So one can repeat almost word for word generalizations that Sweet, or Trinterud, or Hudson make, but in such fashion and context as to distort the original meaning—something not difficult for an experienced reader of students' papers to spot.

This may sound as if flavored with professional bias and even jealousy—which no doubt it is in part. After all, even the good of a book reviewer, since he is presumably human, must

be tinged with evil. But on the other hand, taking the authors at their word that the work grew

"out of the conviction that the nature and meaning of Protestantism can be seen only in the light of its historical development,"

the criticism of it is also based in part upon the conviction that there is a discipline of history, and (however incompetent some professional historians may be) there is such a thing as competence in it. Hence any work that claims to deal with the "historical development" of a "movement" falls within the critical realm of the professionals.

Here, to my mind, the authors seek refuge behind their understanding of H. R. Niebuhr's distinction between "outer" and "inner" history. Thus while "Protestantism is a movement within history" (p. 307 — are there some movements *without* history?) it is only the "outer" history that is "open to the inspection of everyone." But the "inner" history is *our* history" of "any community" with which we identify ourselves (p. 308).

This view, which rests upon acceptance of a positivistic view of history, carries two plain, if not necessary, implications: (1) that any outsider's criticism of the insider's history of his movement is invalid, and (2) that the insider really cannot have a "critical" history of his own community. Space forbids further dissection of this view, but it would seem to be an ever present and tempting refuge for obscurantism and a mighty fortress for sectarianism. Perhaps criticism of the furniture within a structure reared upon this foundation is a thankless task.

However that may be, the basic criticism to be made is that the work is packed with generalizations that range all the way from slight distortion (the "yes, but" kind of statement) to downright misinformation. It is granted that any such work must be made up largely of summary generalizations, and that any historical generalization must do less than justice to the subtle complex of so-called "facts." Within this context I am in-

clined even to agree with one of my colleagues who said that after twenty-five years of teaching and writing history he was convinced that most of what gets into the text-books just isn't true. Nevertheless, there are better and worse generalizations, and accepted criteria for sorting them out — among them the broad knowledge of experience that compends of textbook material seem inevitably to gravitate toward the latter. A few typical examples may be noted.

To the Puritan "the activity of the Christian was considered a sign of his election (p. 103)"—yes, but! " . . . Puritans provided the spiritual foundation for a democratic society (p. 106)"—was it quite that simple? Congregationalists and Separatists agreed that "the church is the local church" and "there is no church in the abstract . . . (pp. 108-109)." But according to the Cambridge Platform the local church, within "the Catholick Church," is "a part of the Militant-visible-church." What it denies is "an universall visible church"—something quite different from what the authors suggest. The Congregational pattern of the church "might be in accord with the spirit of the Bible, [but] it could not be found directly in scripture (pp. 109-10)"—this would indeed be hard to argue with such "insiders" as Hooker, Mather, and Cotton who stated that "the partes of Church-government are all of them exactly described in the word of God." The New England P u r i t a n Congregational "church was to be made up only of professed believers (p. 116)"—*plus,* says the Platform, "the children of such, who are also holy." This made quite a difference. The "strong 're-vivalistic' tone and enthusiam engendered [in the south] caused them [the Baptists] to be the victims of persecution (p. 140)." They were revivalistic, but weren't they "persecuted" because of their opposition to the Establishment?

"Unlike the Declaration of Independence, its [the Constitution] argument for checks and balances and for equality was partly based on the dangers of misuse of power (p. 146)"

But what do the authors make of the statement that "when any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it," and of the long list of specific grievances against the King? Early in the nineteenth century,

"even the churches which had hoped for direct support from the state, or which hoped to dominate the life of the society through governmental recognition, either had voluntarily altered their position or had been forced to do so. (p. 150)"

Is there one clear cut example of a church that did this "voluntarily" in the sense implied by the either / or statement? Finally one might note examples of a tendency to anthropomorphize the historical generalizations used, such as found on page 149: "There [on the frontier] the revivals alone won the victory" over infidelity. Such slips occur when positivistically inclined or amateur historians forget that the subject matter of history is people, not movements in the abstract.

It may be said that my examples are taken from a relatively small section of the book, and it may be, as one of my teachers said of H. G. Wells' OUTLINE OF HISTORY, that "it is right in everything except what one knows something about." This I am willing to concede, although continuing to maintain that the part I know something about is quite important for an interpretation of Protestant Christianity to Americans "through its development."

But even supposing we were to put the best possible face on the matter and grant that the broad generalizations in this book are no more numerous than any attempt to write a brief survey makes inevitable, and indeed that the work is remarkably free from outstanding "boners." Still it is cogent to ask just what college and university students actually learn, or are expected to learn, from studying such a compend of historical generalizations—none particularly wrong, none

particularly right. As a teacher in a graduate school I know that some of them do manage to learn a surprising amount that is right. But on the other hand, some of them obviously learn so much that is wrong, and learn it in such fashion, that one is inclined toward Lord Melbourne's foreboding that "you may fill a person's head with nonsense which may be impossible ever to get out again." (NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1955, p. 121).

Lastly, what about those "intelligent" laymen for whom it is becoming almost a habit for ministers and theological professors of a professionally clerical bent to write. Who are they, and in what sense are they "intelligent?" That is the question.

One is of course entitled to his own opinion of how to "make available" to them "a deepened understanding of Protestant Christianity." But frankly I am not convinced that the best way to do this is to offer them this kind of book, even when (or especially when) it is introduced by a somewhat patronizing reference to their intelligence. Unhappily for the authors, the Committee, and the publishers—and however innocent and unintentional—the less than subtle implication is that those laymen to whom the book does not appeal are doubtfully or not at all "intelligent." But part of my contention is that it might not appeal to some of them precisely because and insofar as they were intelligent and historically minded.

In summary, this work seems to me to be a good example of what two exceptionally competent men can do at the request of a Committee. But it also seems to me a good example of the kind of "project" two exceptionally competent young scholars should *not* undertake just because some Committee asks them to. The pitfalls are too numerous and the scholar's life too short.

SIDNEY E. MEAD

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MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

The Council met April 15, 1955 at the Butler School of Religion with the following members present: J. H. Nichols, F. A. Norwood, C. E. Schneider, and W. S. Hudson.

C. E. Schneider reported that E. R. Hardy, Jr., L. A. Weigle, and S. E. Ahlstrom had been appointed as members of the Brewer Prize Committee and that he would call the attention of the committee to the definition of its responsibilities in the By-laws.

A report from L. J. Trinterud with regard to the Zwingli Papers was discussed and he was requested to continue negotiations with a view to the publication of these materials.

The following persons were elected members of the Society, subject to the constitutional provision: Robert S. Arthur, Joseph Mc-Lelland, James H. Smylie, Norman B. Gibbs, John H. Tietjen, E. Herbert Nygren, W. Stanford Reid, Ralph K. Weber, Ronald A. Mc-Creery, Asa Collins, Frank Gulley, Jr., Mario J. Alfonso, Edward A. Dowey, Jr., J. Richard Muntz, Theodore L. Trost, Franklin W. Murdock, Robert M. Puckett, Richard L. Means, P. J. Schroeder, and Frank F. Norfleet.

Attest: Winthrop S. Hudson, Secretary

MEETING OF THE SOCIETY

In the absence of the president, the meeting, April 15, 1955, was called to order by F. A. Norwood.

The minutes of the previous spring meeting were approved as printed. The secretary reported the actions of the Council and read a communication from Quirinus Breen regarding the program of the Pacific Coast meeting and the Abigail E. Clark Memorial Fund at the University of Oregon.

A resolution of appreciation to Dean O. L. Shelton and the Butler School of Religion for the gracious hospitality extended to the Society was adopted unanimously.

The program included the following papers: "The Problem of Jonathan Edwards" by W. S. Morris, "Montanism and Its Trinitarian Significance" by Jaroslav Pelikan, "Economic Factors Determining the Attitude of Denominations Toward Slavery" by W. W. Sweet, "Dhuoda, France's First Woman of Letters" by Allen Cabaniss, and "The Relevance of Grundtvig" by Johannes Knudsen.

Attest: Winthrop S. Hudson, Secretary